dissenting.
Because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support William Moye’s convictions on both Counts One and Two of the indictment, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to reverse the convictions.
I
At 5:30 a.m. on August 14, 2003, Anne Arundel County police officer Kurt List-man responded to a burglar alarm at Bart’s Sporting Goods store at 6814 Richie Highway in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. When Officer Listman arrived, he saw a car parked next to the side door leading into the store. Officer Listman saw a person, who was later identified as Courtney Cooper, behind the wheel of the car, and another person, who was later identified as Jackie Briggs, trying to get into the car.
As Briggs tried to get into the car, Cooper sped off, leaving Briggs behind. Cooper eventually was apprehended after a high-speed chase. Briggs, who fled on foot, was also apprehended. The car was *218found to contain thirteen firearms and two more were recovered on Briggs’ person.1 The fingerprints of Cooper, Briggs, and Moye were not found on any of the firearms.
As Officer Listman was “taking off’ to chase Cooper, another Anne Arundel County police officer, Matthew Walters, spotted Moye crawling out of the store’s side doorway, which was no longer being used as an entrance. In fact, the doorway was blocked by permanent shelving divided into cubbyholes that were approximately eighteen inches by eighteen inches in size. (Government’s Exhibits 2c, 2f). Directly on the other side of the cubbyholes was a set of side-by-side doors used to hide, with the use of pegboard and merchandise, the cubbyholes from the store’s retail space. (Government’s Exhibit 2h). The distance between the side-by-side doors and the store’s gun display cabinets, which ran perpendicular to the doors, is approximately three feet. (Government’s Exhibits 2g, 2h).
Officer Walters saw Moye crawling out of the store through the cubbyhole below the side door’s knob. This cubbyhole was the only one that was not cluttered with boxes and/or store equipment/merchandise. (Government’s Exhibits 2c, 2f). After Moye escaped through the cubbyhole, he fled on foot, but was later apprehended.2
II
The majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support Moye’s convictions under both Counts One and Two. I strongly disagree. In my view, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to sustain Moye’s convictions.
Moye’s convictions must be upheld if “there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government,” to support them. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). “[Sjubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). Moreover, we can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the “prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir.1984) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.2002). Finally, where the evidence supports differing reasonable interpretations, the jury will decide which interpretation to accept. United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.1997).
Count One charged Moye with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess a firearm, which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under Count Two, which charged Moye with possessing stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), the government had to prove that: (1) Moye possessed a firearm described in the indictment; (2) at the time he possessed it, the firearm was sto*219len; (3) Moye acted knowingly; and (4) the firearm had at some time traveled in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(j).
Under our possession jurisprudence, possession can be actual or constructive. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir.1992). Constructive possession is established if it is shown “that the defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and control over the item.” Id.
According to the majority, the record evidence falls short of the sufficiency mark because there is no evidence that Moye constructively possessed any of the weapons recovered. To support this conclusion, the majority posits that the “only evidence the Government presented to support constructive possession was that Moye was present in the same location from which the guns were stolen.” Ante at 213. The majority adds that no fingerprints or other physical evidence linked Moye to the guns. The majority further posits that the “Government did not present testimony that Moye had been seen with any of the guns.” Ante at 213. Finding that there is no evidence of constructive possession, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to convict on Counts One and Two.
With all due respect to the majority, no leap of faith is necessary to conclude that Moye possessed these weapons as they made their way from the store to Briggs’ person and the getaway car. In fact, when the circumstantial evidence is viewed collectively and in a light most favorable to the government, Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, the jury unquestionably was entitled to conclude that Moye entered the store through the uncluttered cubbyhole, broke into the cabinets displaying the firearms, removed the firearms from such cabinets, and then passed' them back through the same cubbyhole to the awaiting Briggs, who then put thirteen firearms in the car and kept two for himself.3
The circumstantial evidence begins with the manner in which the robbery was carried out. The getaway car’s location next to the side door, the forced entry, and the fact that the store had an alarm all suggest that Cooper, Briggs, and Moye knew this was a race against time.
The next two pieces of circumstantial evidence are the size of the cubbyholes blocking the doorway and the fact that only one of the cubbyholes was uncluttered. (Government’s Exhibits 2c, 2f). From these facts, the jury was entitled to draw the reasonable inference that only one person, Moye, as opposed to all three individuals, entered the store to retrieve and then remove the firearms. Indeed, given the exceedingly small size of the entry space, it would have made little sense, in terms of efficiency, for Cooper, Briggs, and Moye to enter the store. Clearly, having one person in the store allowed for quick and easy access to everything in the store and allowed the items to be quickly passed through the uncluttered cubbyhole. The jury obviously was entitled to use its common sense and conclude that this tactic made eminently more sense than having two, or perhaps three, people *220enter the store through the small cubbyhole.4
The final pieces of circumstantial evidence are the time of the forced entry and Moye’s flight. Given the hour of the forced entry (5:30 a.m.), the jury was entitled to conclude that Moye was not present at the scene for an innocent purpose. In addition, the jury unquestionably was entitled to draw the reasonable inference that Moye fled because he knew he was prohibited under federal law from possessing firearms. Cf. United States v. Obi 239 F.3d 662, 665 (4th Cir.2001) (“It cannot be doubted that in appropriate circumstances, a consciousness of guilt may be deduced from evidence of flight and that a jury’s finding of guilt may be supported by consciousness of guilt.”).
According to the majority, the evidence presented to the jury in this case suggests, at most, that Moye merely was “present in the same location from which [the] guns were stolen.” Ante at 213. Of course, the jury was at liberty to reach this same conclusion, but was not required to do so. As discussed above, a second reasonable interpretation of the evidence is that Moye was the inside man in a hit-and-run robbery. In the race against time, the firearms had to quickly make their way from inside the store through the single uncluttered eighteen inch by eighteen inch cubbyhole to Briggs’ person and the getaway car. A reasonable interpretation of the record evidence is that Moye crawled into the store, removed the firearms, and then passed them through the cubbyhole to the awaiting Briggs.5 With two reasonable interpretations available to the jury, it was for the jury, not this court, to decide which version was more credible. Wilson, 118 F.3d at 234.
To be sure, as appellate judges, we enjoy no greater vantage point on appeal than did the jury at trial and we have no right to usurp the jury’s role to And facts. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. 457. If we did otherwise, we would be doing exactly what the majority has done here — substituting our judgment for that of the jury. In this case, the jury was entitled to reach the reasonable and quite unremarkable conclusion that Moye possessed the firearms as they made their way from the store to Briggs’ person and the getaway car.
The only remaining question in the case concerns the district court’s aiding and abetting instruction. The majority concedes that the instruction was permissible under Count Two. With regard to Count One, the district court’s aiding and abetting instruction was, at most, harmless error. Through the court’s instructions, the jury could not have convicted Moye of Count One, which charged him with a felon-in-possession violation, under an aiding and abetting theory because there was no evidence that either Cooper and/or Briggs were felons. Thus, the jury could not have concluded that Moye aided and abetted either Cooper or Briggs in the commission of a felon-in-possession violation. The only way the jury could have convicted Moye under Count One was to conclude *221that Moye actually or constructively possessed the firearms at issue. As noted above, the evidence amply supports the conclusion that Moye possessed the firearms as they made their way from the store to Briggs’ person and the getaway car.
For these reasons, I would affirm Moye’s convictions.
. The car was later determined to be stolen.
. The side door had piy marks on it, indicating a forced entry. A screw-driver was recovered next to the door, and the government presented evidence that the screwdriver could have been used to make the forced entry.
. During its closing argument to the jury, the government made this precise argument to the jury:
[Cjircumstantial evidence would ■ indicate that it must have been him that took the guns out of the store. It had to have been him. There was nobody else in the store. And clearly, as common sense indicates, those guns didn't miraculously jump into the back of the car or jump into Briggs' pockets.... Someone had to take those things out, push them through that hole and hand them off to put them in that car and for Jackie Briggs to have them in his pocket and the only person in that store was William Moye.
. Along a similar vein, the jury was entitled to view Moye as a prime candidate to be the inside man in the robbery of the firearms. Officer Walters described Moye as a man with a "small frame, small build.”
. The majority makes much of the fact that Moye's fingerprints were not found on any of the firearms. However, as explained by the government's expert witness, more often than not, fingerprints are not recovered from firearms. Indeed, the government’s expert noted that firearms are manufactured to prevent the accumulation of fingerprints. Given this testimony, it is not surprising that the fingerprints of Cooper, Briggs, and Moye were not found on any of the firearms.