concurring.
The Court is correct to affirm the district court’s denial of Lopez’s writ of habe-as corpus. This case does not present us with the opportunity to overrule White v. Sehotten, 201 F.3d 743 (6th Cir.2000), however, and I therefore concur only in the judgment.
I.
In Lopez v. Wilson, 355 F.3d 931, 933 (6th Cir.2005), the original panel concludes that “White is not controlling in this case, because the White decision predates the AEDPA.” Rather, the analysis required is a determination of whether the state court’s denial of Lopez’s request for the appointment of counsel to file a Rule 26(B) motion was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Lopez, 355 F.3d at 937, 939; Maj. Op. at 342 (“The [AEDPA] governs this appeal.”).
A state court decision is “contrary to” federal law, meanwhile, only if the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite to a Supreme Court holding. A decision constitutes an “unreasonable application” of federal law only if the state court correctly identified the relevant Supreme Court precedent but applied it in an objectively unreasonable manner to facts before it. See Lopez, 355 F.3d at 937 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)); *358Maj. Op. at 342. The state court need not even evidence awareness of the relevant precedent. See id. (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002)); Maj. Op. at 342. If the state court’s decision is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, the AEDPA denies to the federal habeas court the authority to issue the writ. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
As today’s majority points out, “the United States Supreme Court has never held that a criminal defendant has the right to assistance of counsel to file an application to reopen a direct appeal.” Maj. Op. at 354; see also id. at 355. Even if Lopez locates the gravamen of his complaint in the well established right to counsel on direct appeal, see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), the state court’s decision to treat Rule 26(B) as collateral did not constitute an objectively unreasonable application of Douglas or any other federal law, “as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). At worst, the state court’s decision was contrary to Sixth Circuit precedent. Thus, nothing has changed since my concurrence in Lopez, 355 F.3d at 942.1
II.
This is a straightforward AEDPA case. Yet because the majority would use it as a vehicle to overrule White, it endeavors to set up a conflict between White and relevant precedent. As Judge Martin points out, the conflict the majority lights upon is “manufactured.” Dis. at 343.
The majority alleges that a vacated, post-AEDPA case (Lopez) that turns on Supreme Court precedent directly conflicts with a pre-AEDPA case (White) binding only in this Circuit. The majority frames the conflict as follows: Lopez held that “it is not clearly established under federal law that applications to reopen direct appeals are part of the direct appeal process.” Maj. Op. at 342; White represents federal law establishing that applications to reopen are part of the direct appeal. Id. (“See Lopez ... contra White.”) The majority “therefore overrule^] White v. Schotten.” Id.
Of course, as the majority elsewhere acknowledges, the Lopez holding concerns what is clearly established under federal law “as determined by the United States Supreme Court ” Maj. Op. at 342 (emphasis added). White cannot conflict with Lopez because, as Circuit precedent, it has no bearing whatsoever on cases governed by the AEDPA.
Having staged a conflict, moreover, the majority only manages to show that White is in tension with other, Sixth Circuit case law. As Judge Rogers points out in his concurrence, this Court’s decisions in Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691 (6th Cir.2000), Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280 (6th Cir.2000), and Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515 (6th Cir.2001), do not directly conflict with White. Rogers Cone.; see also Martin Dis. at 360. These cases characterized *359Rule 26(B) as collateral for purposes of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. The majority reasons that if Rule 26(B) is collateral for these purposes, it must be collateral for constitutional purposes. The majority challenges the dissent to offer evidence to the contrary. Maj. Op. at 354. Yet two of the very cases the majority eites-Bro-naugh and Necmu/-provide such evidence. Athough it treats the Rule as collateral for purposes of the AEDPA statute of limitations, this Court still otherwise characterizes Rule 26(B) as a direct appeal. See Bronaugh, 235 F.3d at 285; Searcy, 246 F.3d at 519-20.
Ultimately, White faces direct conflict in but two instances: the dicta of an unpublished opinion, see Lambert v. Warden, Ross Corr., 2003 WL 22071466 (6th Cir. Sept.2, 2003), and a recent holding of the Ohio State Supreme Court. Neither are binding upon this Court. See 6 Cir. R. 28(g); Maj. Op. at 351 (“[W]e are not bound by the Morgan decision, which is only authoritative as a matter of state law....”).
III.
The majority ultimately recognizes that a straightforward AEDPA analysis does not allow it to reach White. The majority solves the problem by answering a constitutional threshold question of its own invention.
Having set up a conflict between White and an AEDPA case, having criticized White on the basis that it conflicted with the structure and purpose of the AEDPA,2 and having argued that several AEDPA statute of limitations cases detract from White, the majority suddenly announces that the AEDPA analysis is inapposite. Maj. Op. at 353 (“[Bjecause Lopez failed to identify a constitutional right, he has not suffered an injury cognizable on habeas, and further inquiry under § 2254, as amended by AEDPA, is unnecessary.”); but see id. at 342, 343.
In support of this twist, which flouts the structure and purpose of the AEDPA by requiring a complex discussion of Circuit law, the majority cites to a footnote in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). The footnote says that “non-constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings.” Id. (emphasis added). Stone, decided thirty years before Congress enacted the AEDPA, nowhere holds that a constitutional claim becomes non-constitutional because it lacks merit. Accordingly, Lopez’s claim that the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution furnishes him with a right to counsel becomes no less constitutional because, as the majority bypassed AEDPA to show, the claim is wrong. See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 2000 WL 191846, *1 (6th Cir. Feb.11, 2000) (unpublished order) (refusing under Stone to address appellant’s non-constitutional breach of plea claim and then holding that appellant’s “ineffective assistance claim is without merit.”).
IV.
In conclusion, I disagree that White can be overruled on the facts before us: if the AEDPA is a narrow street, it is narrow both ways. Because White should continue to govern pre-AEDPA cases, I respectfully concur in the judgment.
. The procedural posture of this case also precludes me from joining the dissent. Part II of Judge Martin’s analysis relies on Halbert v. Michigan, - U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), a case that came to the Supreme Court on direct appeal. See id. at 2586. Our jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) is insufficiently broad to conduct an analysis under Halbert, which in any event came down after the state court made its decision. Moreover, the fact that "the constitutional question in this case ... is admittedly a close call," Martin Dis. at 362, militates against the conclusion that the state court's application of the relevant Supreme Court precedent was objectively unreasonable.
. The majority uses Lambert to support is contention that White, a case that was • not governed by the AEDPA, was nevertheless “incorrectly decided ... because its holding is at odds with the structure and function of the AEDPA.” Maj. Op. at 15.