concurring in the judgment:
Although I agree with the result reached by Judge Luttig, as well as his view that it was inappropriate for the district court, in sentencing Clark, to rely on the sentence she could have received in state court had she been prosecuted there, my analysis of this case is more aligned with that of Judge Motz. I write separately to emphasize my view that, apart from the sentencing court’s improper and erroneous reliance on the sentence Clark could have received in state court, the considerations that informed its sentencing decision were entirely appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
First, the court calculated and considered the applicable Guidelines range, as required under § 3553(a)(4). Second, the court appropriately weighed Clark’s history and characteristics, emphasizing that Clark had no prior criminal history, that she had otherwise shown no propensity toward criminal activity, and that she probably would not have been involved in criminal activity but for her boyfriend. See § 3553(a)(1) (requiring court to consider history and characteristics of defendant). Third, and relatedly, the court observed that Clark had not engaged in criminal activity since her arrest in this case and had secured and maintained employment since that time, suggesting that there was little need to deter future criminal activity. See § 3553(a)(2)(C) (directing courts to consider the need for punishment “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”). Finally, the court considered “the need ... to provide the defendant with needed educational ... training” by requiring Clark to obtain a GED as a condition of her probation. § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Because of the sentencing court’s erroneous reliance on the sentence Clark could have received had she been prosecuted in state court, we need not decide whether these other considerations would have ren*690dered the sentence she received a reasonable one. It is noteworthy, however, that other circuits have had occasion to sustain as reasonable sentences outside the Guidelines range that are based on similar considerations bearing on the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 427-29 (7th Cir.2005) (upholding as reasonable sentence of 236 months, where Guidelines prescribed sentencing range of 70 to 87 months, because of seriousness of crime and risk of recidivism); United States v. Shannon, 414 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding as reasonable 58-month sentence, where Guidelines called for sentence of 6 to 12 months, because court properly considered defendant’s extensive criminal record and incorrigibility); United States v. Pizano, 403 F.3d 991, 995-96 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding as reasonable sentence of 18 months, where Guidelines called for minimum sentence of 120 months, because defendant assisted in other prosecutions, had no extensive criminal history, and expressed regret).
All that being said, I agree with what Judge Motz has written and I also concur in the judgment.