concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that summary judgment was proper because the language of the contract renders Keck’s mental state irrelevant, I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s treatment of Goldsmith’s inferred-intent rule, and to address an argument that the majority ignores, namely that the language of the intentional act exclusion does not apply because Keck did not intend to harm Defendants.1
I.
Background
At issue in this case is the applicability of a so-called “intentional act” exclusion to damage caused by the insured, John Keck. The 'exclusion protects the Plaintiff, Continental Insurance Company, from liability for “bodily injury or property damage ... [i]ntended' by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions” of the insured. It further states that “[t]his exclusion applies even if ... [s]uch covered person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct.”
Defendants argue that the intentional act exclusion does not apply both because: (1) Keck did hot act intentionally; and (2) Keck did not intend to cause any damage *542or bodily injury. Defendants support their allegations that Keck neither acted intentionally nor intended to cause damage with the affidavit of Dr. Hardesty. According to Dr. Hardesty, Keck was unable to understand the physical nature of the consequences of his actions. In other words, Keck was incapable of recognizing that shooting Defendants would harm them.
Plaintiff argues that whether Keck intended to act or intended to cause harm is irrelevant in determining its liability for damages caused by Keck. According to Plaintiff, the policy itself renders Keck’s intent to act and/or cause harm irrelevant because it states, “This exclusion applies even if ... [s]uch covered person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct.” Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that under Kentucky law intent to act and/or cause harm is conclusively inferred as a matter of law where the insured’s actions are inherently injurious in nature. Applying the inferred-intent rule, the district court found as a matter of law that Keck intended to act as he did and granted summary judgment. Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the district court’s opinion, the district court did not rule on the language of the contract.
II.
The Inferred-intent Rule
The permutation of the inferred-intent rule discussed in this case derives from the Kentucky Court of Appeals’ decision in Goldsmith v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Ohio, 890 S.W.2d 644 (Ky.Ct.App.1995). It refers to a court’s obligation to infer an insured’s intent to cause damage or harm, conclusively, regardless of the insured’s actual mental state and applies primarily in sexual molestation cases. Id. at 646-47. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reasoned that this conclusive inference was appropriate for policy reasons. Id. at 647. Quoting an earlier decision with approval, the Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote, “‘The emotional and psychological harm caused by sexual molestation is so well recognized, and so repugnant to public policy and to our sense of decency, that to give merit to a claim that no harm was intended to result from the act would be utterly absurd.’ ” Id. at 645 (quoting Thompson v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 839 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky.Ct.App.1992)).
Despite homicide’s injurious nature, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has been unwilling to extend Goldsmith’s conclusive and irrebuttable inference beyond sexual molestation cases to homicides. The Kentucky Court of Appeals emphasized the limited applicability of Goldsmith’s irre-buttable inference stating, “Lest there be no misunderstanding, we reapply the inferred-intent rule in this specific category of insurance law involving acts of child molestation cases ‘without displacing a subjective or objective intent standard in other categories of liability insurance cases.’ ” Id. at 646. Moreover, in its most recent published decision on this issue, Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Ky.Ct.App.2000), the Kentucky Court of Appeals expressly declined to extend Goldsmith to a homicide. It stated, “[njotwithstanding the possible application of the approach adopted in Goldsmith, we are guided by another case concerned with the law in Kentucky as it relates to insurance coverage and the acts of the mentally ill.” Id. Thereafter, the court adopted this Court’s approach in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. May, 860 F.2d 219 (6th Cir.1989). Following Nationwide, the court in Stone held that an insured had the right to offer psychiatric evidence that he was unable to form the requisite intent to cause harm, and that if the insured could offer such evidence that summary judg*543ment was improper despite the inherently injurious nature of homicide. Id. 813-14. Thus, Stone makes clear that the inferre-dintent rule as applied in Goldsmith does not apply outside the sexual molestation context.
Walker v. Economy Preferred Insurance, 909 S.W.2d 343 (Ky.Ct.App.1995) does not support a contrary position because Walker never addressed whether it was proper to irrebuttably presume intent to damage where a party offered reliable evidence that no such intent existed.2 In Walker, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that some intentional acts by an insured are so inherently injurious that intent to damage will be presumed on summary judgment, despite an insured’s testimony to the contrary. Walker, S.W.2d at 343; see also Stone, 34 S.W.3d at 813. In other words, an insured’s bare assertion that he or she did not intend to cause harm will not create a genuine issue of material fact where the insured’s actions are of the kind that a reasonable person would expect to cause harm. Walker, 909 S.W.2d at 343. Walker does not dispute the proposition that medical evidence of an insured’s inability to form the requisite intent to damage may create a genuine issue of material fact. In fact, no party in Walker even offered such evidence.
In this case, the damage which occurred did not result from the insured’s act of sexual molestation, but rather his shooting of Defendants. Thus, the insured’s conduct in this case is more akin to the insured’s conduct in Stone, and Goldsmith’s irrebuttable presumption does not apply. Because Defendants do offer evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as Keck’s ability to form an intent to cause damage in the form of Dr. Hardesty’s affidavit, Kentucky law as articulated in Stone does not permit this Court to infer Keck’s intent to cause damage from the nature of his acts. Thus, the district court erred in applying the inferred-intent rule to conclusively infer Keck’s intent to cause damage.
III.
Language of the Insurance Contract
Although the inferred-intent rule was not a proper basis for summary judgment, summary judgment was nonetheless proper because the language of the insurance contract rendered both Keck’s intent to act and intent to cause damage irrelevant. As the majority correctly recognizes, the language of the contract stating that the intentional act exclusion applies “even if ... [sjuch covered person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her conduct” renders Keck’s intent to act irrelevant. See Black’s Law Dictionary 292 (7th ed.1999) (quoting J.W. Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Laiv, 13 n. 2, 24 (16th ed.1952)) (defining conduct as acts and omissions). This clause, however, does not render Keck’s intent to cause damage irrelevant. See id. A person can have the capacity to govern his or her own conduct, i.e. the ability to physically control his or her own actions, and nonetheless not intend to cause damage by his or her actions.
In addition to this language, however, the intentional act exclusion in this case also states that Plaintiff is not responsible for “bodily injury or property damage [ ][i]ntended by, or which may reasonably *544be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts or omissions” of the insured. Although no Kentucky court to date has interpreted similar language, courts addressing similar language in other states have held that the phrase “which may reasonably be expected to result” denotes an objective as opposed to subjective standard of coverage rendering the insured’s intent to cause damage irrelevant. Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCarn, 471 Mich. 283, 683 N.W.2d 666 (2004); Wallace v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. CV-02-008, 2003 WL 21018821 (Me. April 18, 2003) (unpublished); Erie Ins. Exchange v. St. Stephen’s Episcopal Church, 153 N.C.App. 709, 570 S.E.2d 763 (2002) King v. Galloway, 828 So.2d 49 (La.Ct.App.2002). “That is, we are to determine whether a reasonable person possessed of the totality of the facts possessed by [the insured] would have expected the resulting injury.” McCarn, 683 N.W.2d at 660. This interpretation is persuasive because it comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of “may reasonably be expected to result.” See James Graham Brown Found., 814 S.W.2d at 279 (holding that under Kentucky law the terms of insurance contracts are to be interpreted as according to the usage of the ordinary man). Therefore, because a reasonable person in Keck’s position would have expected damage to result from the shooting, the damage at issue in this case was “reasonably ... expected to result” and is excluded from coverage by the intentional acts exception of the policy.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the order of the district court.
. The majority’s position is not entirely clear because the majority uses the term intent indiscriminately without clarifying whether it means intent to act or intent to harm, both of which are at in issue in this case.
. The only case that might support the majority’s position is James v. Kentucky Farm Bureau, No 2002-CA-001738-MR, 2003 Ky.App. LEXIS 312 (Ky.Ct.App. Dec. 12, 2003). James is an unpublished opinion, however, and cannot be cited as precedent in any court in Kentucky. See id. Therefore, this Court should not choose to apply it over Stone, a published decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 34 S.W.3d at 809.