dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the MKS-M14A is not a “machinegun,” as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), because it cannot “be readily restored to shoot, automatically.” Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.2000).1 Summary judgment is warranted when there is no genuine issue of material fact *426and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Of course, it is well-established that a motion for summary judgment must be supported by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other documentary evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). . In reviewing those materials, “[t]he Court should believe the evidence presented by the nonmovant, and draw all justifiable inferences in his favor.” Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Plant v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 933-34 (6th Cir.2000)).2
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), an .unauthenticated document like the Vasquez report may not be considered.3 Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir.1993). Without the Vasquez report, we are left to rely on the deposition testimony of claimant’s expert, who testified, in pertinent part, as follows:
Q In making that change [to convert the MKS-M14A to shoot automatically] do you have an estimate of how long it would take you to make that change if you could make that change?
A I’ve thought about, you know, the equipment and stuff I would have, if I had the machines available to make the parts to what I would call OM, original manufacturer’s specs. You’re probably looking at a ballpark of about four to six hours.
This unrebutted evidence establishes that the MKS-M14A could be converted by an expert gunsmith with readily available equipment to shoot automatically in four to six hours. The issue therefore becomes whether the MKS-M14A, which could.be converted by an expert gunsmith with readily available equipment to shoot automatically in four to. six hours, is a weapon that, as a matter of law, can “be readily restored to shoot, automatically.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).4 In light of that testimony, alongside the reasons that follow, I conclude that the rifle cannot be “readily restored” to shoot automatically.5
*427II.
The inquiry begins with the fundamental purpose of judicial construction of statutes, which is to ascertain and give effect to the original meaning of the words used by Congress:
[W]e begin with the understanding that Congress “says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there,” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). As we have previously noted in construing another provision of § 506, when “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts’ ” — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — “ ‘is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)).
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000).
Where, as here, no statutory definitions exist, courts may refer to dictionary definitions for guidance in discerning the plain meaning of a statute’s language. United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 263 (6th Cir.2004); Cler v. Ill. Educ. Ass’n, 423 F.3d 726 (7th Cir.2005); Cleveland v. City of L.A., 420 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir.2005). The ordinary, common meaning of the word “readily” is “[i]n a prompt, timely manner; promptly.” American Heritage Dictionary Of The English Language 222 (4th ed.2000). Other dictionaries are to the same effect:
“in a ready manner: as a: without hesitating: WILLINGLY < readily accepted advice> b: without much difficulty: EASILY <for reasons that anyone could readily understand >[,]” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http:// www.m-w.com (enter term “readily”); “quickly, immediately, willingly or without any problem,” Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, http://dictio-nary.cambridge.org/ (enter term “readily”);
“[i]n a prompt, timely manner; promptly,” Dictionary.Com, http://dictio-nary.reference.com/ (enter term “readily”).
Correspondingly, “restorable” means “[ajdmitting of being restored; capable of being reclaimed; as, restorable land.” Dictionary.Com, http://dictionary.reference.com/ (enter term “restorable”).
Although the majority recites a variety of similar definitions for the term “readily,” it thereafter relies on the “modifiers” contained in those definitions to conclude that the term “encompass[es] several elements of restoration!)]” This approach clouds the issue and opens the door to future extensions of the word “readily” in *428contravention of the objective understanding of the word. In my view, it defies common sense to conclude that a process that takes in excess of four to six hours is “a process that is fairly or reasonably efficient, quick, and easy ....” Id.
Moreover, the ■ majority’s analysis of whether the MKS-M14A could be restored to shoot automatically fails to adequately explain how the defendant weapon, which is a new and entirely separate weapon from the M14, could be “restored” in any fashion. “Restoration” acts to “returnf] something to its earlier good condition or position.” Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, http://dictionary.cam-bridge.org/ (enter term “restoration”). Although no “earlier” version of the MKS-M14A exists, the majority relies on “broader” definitions for the term “restored” in an effort to explain that an item need not “return to a preexisting state[ ]” to render it “restored.” Like its efforts to define “readily,” the majority’s approach to the term “restore” further clouds the issue and again assigns to the term a definition without boundaries. For example, pursuant to the majority’s limitless definition of “restore,” even a single shot weapon is now conceivably subject to' forfeiture. Indeed, the skilled technician who is somehow capable of converting a single shot weapon to fire automatically has “restored” the weapon to shoot automatically because, according to the majority, restoration “does not require return to a preexisting state.” Id.
Considering the dictionary definitions for the words “readily” and “restored,” I reject the conclusion reached in United States v. Smith, 477 F.2d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1973), that a firearm is readily restora-ble to shoot automatically when it takes eight hours to rebuild and reconstruct the rifle by an expert gunsmith in a machine shop. Similarly, I reject the majority’s reliance on Smith to reach its conclusion that a somewhat lesser time frame satisfies the “readily restorable” language in § 5845(b).
III.
The conclusion reached in United States v. Smith that a rifle can be readily restored is contrary to the weight of recent authority. For example, the district court in United States v. Aguilar-Espinosa, 57 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Fla.1999), defined “readily restorable” as a “less than arduous assembly of manageable and available parts by a combination of (1) the' ability of a reasonably skilled and informed but not necessarily expert or artistic worker and (2) tools commonly understood by and commonly available to such workers ... but excluding, for example, the resources available to a master machinist ...” id. at 1362. Accord United States v. Seven Misc. Firearms, 503 F.Supp. 565, 573-74 (D.D.C.1980) (finding weapon was not “readily restorable” because to accomplish such a procedure would require more than four hours in a shop with appropriate tools, expert gunsmith services, and the sum of roughly $65,000).
Other courts have likewise adopted similar tests for defining what constitutes “readily restorable.” See, e.g., United States v. Woodlan, 527 F.2d 608, 609 (6th Cir.1976) (finding weapon “readily restora-ble” because it was “capable of being modified in two minutes to fire automatically”); United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 664-65 (5th Cir.1977) (finding weapon was “readily restorable” because merely connecting two pieces with a “minimum of effort” rendered it operable); United States v. Catanzaro, 368 F.Supp. 450, 453 n. 3 (D.Conn.1973) (finding weapon “readily restorable” because it required only $15 worth of easily obtainable replacement parts and one hour of assembly); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.1982) (finding sufficient evidence that *429defendant possessed a “readily restorable” maehinegun because it would convert to fully automatic if the “disconnect” were filed down or shaved off); F.J. Vollmer Co., Inc. v. Higgins, 23 F.3d 448, 452 (D.C.Cir.1994) (analyzing whether “critical features” of the weapon would be required to render the weapon “readily restorable”).
Applying the dictionary definitions of “readily restorable” in conjunction with the foregoing caselaw survey highlights the anomalous nature of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Smith, 477 F.2d at 400. Accord Aguilar-Espinosa, 57 F.Supp.2d at 1362 (noting Smith “presses the notion of ‘ready restoration’ near or beyond its distal boundary”).6 The majority’s reliance on that decision is therefore misplaced.
TV.
Finally, I note that the available legislative history supports my position. Although I am mindful of the limited utility and reliability of legislative history, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., — U.S.-,-, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2626, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005), it nonetheless reveals that “ ‘readily restored to shoot’ is intended to mean that only a simple mechanical operation is required to restore a weapon to a capacity of fully automatic fire.” Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1967, H.R. 1097, 90th Cong. § 911(b)(1968) (emphasis added). Consistent with the dictionary definition of “readily,” this brief legislative history reflects the need for courts to focus on the expediency of the process involved to restore the weapon.
V.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Alverson and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962), I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
. I note preliminarily that Congress recently enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000 (CAFRA). In doing so, Congress intended to "rectify an unfairness to the individual vis-a-vis the government ... by leveling the playing field between the government and persons whose property has been seized.” United States v. Real Property in Section 9, Otsego County, 241 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir.2001). Among other changes, the law corrected a widely criticized "aberration” in the prior forfeiture law that placed the burden of production and persuasion on the claimant to prove that the property was not subject to forfeiture after the government established mere probable cause. Id. In its place, CAFRA implemented the customary burden of production and persuasion in civil actions, which requires the government to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Although CAFRA’s language indicating its applicability to any civil forfeiture action brought under any "civil forfeiture statute,” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1), suggests its corresponding applicability to this case, CAF-RA specifically exempts "the Internal Revenue Code of 1986” from its definition of a "civil forfeiture statute,” id. § 983(i)(2)(B). Accordingly, because the National Firearms Act is part of Title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code), § 983(i)(2)(B) prevents CAFRA from applying to this case.
. Significantly, the majority ignores this aspect of our summary judgment standard of review.
. Notably, the Ninth Circuit is also working to resolve the instant issue. The case of United States v. One TRW U.S. Rifle, Model 14, 7.62 x 51 mm caliber, involves the same rifle manufactured by the same company, a similar fact pattern, and the same counsel for appellant. The district court of Arizona issued an order granting summary judgment to the United States declaring that the defendant weapon was forfeitable as a "machinegun.” United States v. One TRW U.S. Rifle, Model 14, 7.62 x 51 mm caliber, No. CIV 02-264-TUC-RCC (D.Ariz. Apr. 16, 2004). In that case, Officer Vasquez also helped the United States conclude that the defendant weapon is a "ma-chinegun” within the meaning of § 5845(b). Brief of Appellee (No. 04-16049), 2004 WL 3155791, *5-6 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2004). The Ninth Circuit recently heard oral argument in this case on February 15, 2006.
. Title 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) provides:
The term "machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely -and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which á machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
Pursuant to the National Firearms Act, it is illegal for an individual to possess a "ma-chinegun” that is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. Id., § 5861(d).
.Moreover, when purchasing the MKS-M14A, the manufacturer, MKS Specialties, represented to claimant that the weapon could not be restored to shoot automatically:
To render the function of this receiver [of the rifle] safe during firing, a piece cut from *427an auto sear is welded directly to the rear of the receiver to allow for the use of the connecting rod. By welding this piece to the receiver it makes any modification or conversion to a select fire or full auto weapon impossible without damaging or rendering the receiver useless. The button which is attached to this section is strictly cosmetic and in no way is it, or can it be converted for full auto use.
(Emphasis added.) Because the government did not object to claimant’s submission of the MKS letter, this evidence is unrebutted and, as a result, the government has failed to demonstrate that the MKS-M14A was designed to shoot automatically. Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir.1994) (“If a party fails to object before the district court to the affidavits or evidentiary materials submitted by the other party in support of its position on summary judgment, any objections to the district court's consideration of such materials are deemed to have been waived .... ”).
. The majority seeks to distinguish the Aguilar-Espinosa court's criticism of the Smith decision by noting the Aguilar-Espinosa court's "understanding of ‘readily restored' is based on its impressionistic concept of this term formulated almost entirely from whole cloth” and, as a result, the majority designates the Aguilar-Espinosa court's definition as dicta. Although the majority criticizes the Aguilar-Espinosa decision, it nevertheless relies on Aguilar-Espinosa to support its definition of “readily restored.”
On the merits, the authorities cited by the Aguilar-Espinosa court support that court's definition of "readily restorable.” Indeed, the court in S.W. Daniel, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 253 (11th Cir.1987), affirmed the district court's use of a jury instruction, which cited § 5845(b) almost verbatim, and then emphasized that only a "simple modification” was required to qualify the weapon as a ma-chinegun, id. at 254. Similarly, in United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.1977), the court concluded that a weapon was "readily restorable” because merely connecting two pieces with a “minimum of effort” rendered it operable, id. at 664-65. Finally, we recognized in United States v. Woodlan, 527 F.2d 608 (6th Cir.1976), that a weapon was "readily restorable” because it was "capable of being modified in two minutes to fire automatically!,]” id. at 609. The three cases relied upon by the Aguilar-Espinosa decision therefore squarely support the court's definition of "readily restorable.”
The majority asserts, in conclusory fashion, that "the Defendant weapon potentially satisfies even this definition [provided by the Aguilar-Espinosa court] of 'readily restored.' ” Because the majority declines to accompany that statement with any governing legal authority, it is difficult to discern how a six-hour timetable for reconstructing the defendant rifle would satisfy the Aguilar-Espinosa court's definition of "readily restorable” which focuses on simplicity and expediency.