dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The district court completely ignored Breitkreutz’s testimony, accepted without reservation or examination the testimony presented by Cambrex, and failed to conduct the careful analysis required by the United States Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (requiring case-by-ease determination of whether a disability exists under the ADA). Thus, its grant of summary judgment on behalf of the company cannot stand.
It is clear that the company regarded Breitkreutz as having an impairment that substantially limited his ability to engage in the major life activity of working. Bre-itkreutz was cleared to work as a Reactor Operator by several doctors, including Dr. Bergston of the Mayo Clinic, and Dr. Lynn Nelson, an orthopaedic surgeon, subject only to a 50- or 75-pound lifting restriction. Yet, the company imposed several significant additional restrictions on Breit-kreutz that a jury could well determine prevented Breitkreutz from doing not only his own job but a broad class of jobs as well. The company’s attorney, Anthony Hall, selected Dr. Nelson to evaluate Bre-itkreutz and to submit a report to the company. Dr. Nelson did not fax his report, dated July 31, 2002, until August 1, 2002, one day after the company would accept additional medical information regarding Breitkreutz’s condition. Dr. Nelson’s failure to fax the report in a timely manner cannot be held against Breit-kreutz. Dr. Nelson’s report must be considered in determining whether the company perceived Breitkreutz as disabled, and it is unclear from the record whether the district court in fact considered it. Dr. Nelson’s report indicated no strength deficiency, and further stated that:
2) Mr. Breitkreutz’[s] work at [Cam-brex] represented, at worst, a temporary [not permanent] aggravation of his underlying degenerative condition.
5) Other than [the 75-pound] lifting restriction, I have no recommendation for further evaluation or treatment. Mr. Breitkreutz may well experience occasional flares of low back pain, which should be adequately managed with occasional use of over-the-counter medications, per label.
(App. at 98-99 (third bracketed section in original).)
Notwithstanding this report, which clearly indicated that Breitkreutz could perform the essential duties of his job, the company terminated him the very day Dr. Nelson’s report is dated. Certainly a jury could determine that the company ignored the medical reports when it terminated Breitkreutz, and therefore also determine that the company, regardless of the medical reports, perceived Breitkreutz as disabled when it terminated him.
The majority states that since the company relied on information from physicians as a basis for terminating Breitkreutz, it did not perceive Breitkreutz to be disabled based on “myths, stereotypes or archaic attitudes.” I agree with this general proposition, but not with its application here. If the company had relied on the medical information from the Mayo Clinic, Dr. Nelson, and others, it could not have perceived him as unable to perform the essential duties of his job. Rather, it would have permitted him to continue working as ei*786ther a Reactor Operator or in another capacity within the Charles City facility.
As we pointed out in Webner v. Titan Distribution, Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir.2001): “[A] lifting restriction standing alone is insufficient to demonstrate that [an employee is] substantially limited in the life activity of working, [but] the inability to lift heavy objects can translate across a broad spectrum of physically demanding jobs.” Breitkreutz was terminated because of the company’s misconception that his limitations prohibited him from performing any job in the organization, not because of the 50- or 75-pound lifting restriction that the medical reports indicated was required. It is for the jury to determine whether the work restrictions imposed by examining physicians substantially limited an employee’s ability to work. The matter should be remanded to the district court with directions to permit the case to go to the jury pursuant to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court.