concurring.
With all due respect, the majority makes this case much more complicated than it needs to be. We should reverse the denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Campbell because the undisputed facts show that he acted reasonably in interpreting the ambiguous court order and in defusing the domestic dispute to which he had been summoned. It is as simple as that.
I.
Deputy Campbell was called to the scene of a dispute between warring parents with a child caught in the cross-fire. In reliance on his interpretation of the custody decree, the father came to the mother’s house, with bags packed and loaded in the car, ready to pick up the youngster and commence a two-week vacation. In reliance on her interpretation of the decree, the mother refused to let the boy go. It was to this volatile situation that Deputy Campbell was called.
As this drama was playing out in the front yard of the mother’s house, Campbell had to decide in a hurry what to do to peaceably resolve the situation lest it escalate out of control, a scenario which is not unheard of in such matters. Both parties relied on the terms of the custody decree. Although the court order was not a model of clarity as to who was entitled to Matthew on the dates in question, Campbell gave the decree a reasonable interpretation and caused the matter to be resolved in a civil fashion until the parties could return to court for clarification of the decree. Even if Campbell were mistaken in his interpretation, his conduct was exactly the sort of immediate, on-the-scene judgment by a law enforcement - officer that qualified immunity was intended to protect. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law”).
Substantive due process protects individuals from arbitrary deprivations, see Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845, 118 S.Ct. 1708, not the consequences of a reasonable, good-faith judgment call like the one made in this case. As we said in Moreland, 159 F.3d at 371 n. 4, if an officer’s actions “were objectively reasonable, it follows that his conduct did not offend the more stringent standard applicable to substantive due process claims.” Thus, whatever the minimum standard of acceptable conduct for law enforcement officers responding to a dispute between parents over visitation rights, Campbell’s actions clearly did not fall below that standard. For this reason, Campbell is entitled to qualified immunity under the first prong of Saucier — specifically, the plaintiffs failed to establish that a constitutional right was violated on the facts alleged. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.... ”).
II.
I write separately also to note a disagreement over another point. According *1004to the majority, “a single instance of visitation, of a single week in duration,” is not a fundamental right. (Emphasis in original.) I do not believe that is always true. Even though a non-custodial parent may have visitation “only” every other weekend, to some parents that weekend is the moon and the stars. See, e.g., Brown, 722 F.2d at 364 (whether interest is substantial enough to warrant constitutional protection “depends on the security with which it is held under state law and its importance to the holder”). As a former state-court trial judge who has presided over thousands of domestic relations cases, I note that visitation rights are profoundly important both to non-custodial parents and their children. They are not afterthoughts; they are integral components of custody plans. It is well known that children who have regular, frequent, and hassle-free visitation with their non-custodial parents survive the breakup of their parents’ relationship much better than those who do not.
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Zakrzewski actually refutes the majority’s position that depriving a parent of a one-week visitation period can never amount to a substantive due process claim. In that case, the court concluded that the officer’s conduct in transferring the child to the custodial parent “was within the bounds of reasonableness” and thus dismissed the non-custodial parent’s substantive due process claim. See 87 F.3d at 1014. It necessarily left open the possibility that, under other circumstances, an officer’s conduct in removing a child from a non-custodial parent absent an emergency or court order may be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to constitute a due process violation. Id. (“[T]he one-time interruption of Zakrzew-ski’s right to visitation in this case does not amount to a deprivation of liberty.” (emphasis added)).
Had the decree in this case clearly granted visitation to Brittain for the date and time in question, I fail to see why a plainly wrongful or malicious deprivation of those rights by a police officer, in the absence of an emergency or court order, would not constitute an “abuse of power.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708. But that is not the case before us. Because Campbell acted reasonably under the circumstances, there was no deprivation of a constitutional right. Our inquiry should end there. See Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir.2000) (“Since Spain’s acts were objectively reasonable, however, no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred, and there was no ‘deprivation of rights.’ ”).
III.
With respect to her procedural due process claim, Brittain also contends that in the face of the ambiguous decree, she had a “right” to expect Campbell to leave Matthew with her and do nothing at the scene except refer the parties back to court. She makes a cursory reference to Bam and Wallis to support that claim, but as the majority correctly points out, those are cases involving the removal of children from their homes and their placement in foster care by child protective services workers, cases that have no relevance here. Brittain makes no further effort at describing what process Officer Campbell owed her, and that is fatal to her procedural due process claim.