dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Any error arising from the district court’s interpretation of the term “minor” as used in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2)(D) is harmless.
First, it is undisputed that Defendant sent pornographic images of children to a law enforcement officer, believing and intending that he was distributing the mate*1173rials to a minor. That act constituted an attempt to distribute the materials to a minor as a matter of law, even though the officer was not a minor. See United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717-18 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that an actual minor is not required to sustain an attempt conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2422, only that the defendant believed that he was inducing a minor). Therefore, the § 2G2.2(b)(2)(D) enhancement was appropriate. See id. cmt. n. 1 (defining “distribution” as “any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor”).
Additionally, in reaching its sentencing decision, the district court clearly was motivated by Defendant’s atrocious related conduct and self-centered attitude. The record shows that the sentence would have been the same under the advisory system, regardless of which Guidelines section had applied.
For these reasons, I would affirm the sentence.