dissenting.
Before the district court, the Government argued that its agents had satisfied the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) and thus were not required to obtain a warrant for Abdi’s arrest. The Government relied exclusively on that argument; it did not argue that there was independent probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to arrest Abdi. Because this second argument is therefore waived for the purposes of this appeal, I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
The discussion of waiver that follows requires some additional background on the proceedings in the court below and on appeal.
A. District Court Proceedings
In the district court, Abdi moved to suppress evidence based on his allegedly illegal arrest. He contended that the war-rantless arrest violated the statutory administrative-warrant requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). That statute allows warrantless arrest when two conditions are met: (1) probable cause to believe the alien has violated immigration law, and (2) probable cause to believe the alien is an escape risk. Abdi argued that neither condition existed. Abdi then claimed that this statutory violation was tantamount to a Fourth Amendment violation and that the court should therefore suppress the evidence.
The Government responded that the warrantless arrest complied with the statute, asserting that (1) there was probable cause to believe Abdi had violated immigration law, namely, those laws set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv); and (2) Abdi was an escape risk. Accordingly, the Government argued, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. In the alternative, the Government argued that even assuming a statutory violation, suppression would be unwarranted because, under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the illegal arrest did not taint the evidence at issue. Thus, the Government apparently assumed, like Abdi, that a statutory violation would amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.
Having considered both parties’ arguments regarding the validity of the arrest under the statute, the district court concluded the that the Government violated the statute. Although the court concluded that the Government met the statute’s first requirement (probable cause to believe Abdi had violated immigration law), it held that the Government failed to meet the second requirement (probable cause to believe Abdi was an escape risk). Recognizing that the Government presented no other basis on which to find the arrest lawful, the district court then addressed whether suppression was warranted.
On the suppression issue, the Government argued that the district court’s determination that the arrest violated the statute did not necessarily justify suppressing the evidence in the circumstances presented in this case. In support, the Government argued that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not always suppressed. The Government, however, did not argue that a statutory violation alone is — as a matter of law- — an insufficient basis on which the court could invoke the exclusionary rule and suppress *563the evidence. The district court disagreed with the Government’s argument, concluding that the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence the Government invoked actually militated in favor of excluding the evidence. The court therefore excluded the evidence, and the Government appealed to this Court.
B. The Government’s Appeal
In its opening brief to this Court, the Government introduced a new argument: Abdi’s warrantless arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment because, according to the Government, no warrant is needed to arrest someone in a public place when there is probable cause to arrest that person. (See Appellant Br. at 21-24.) Noting that the district court concluded “that ICE agents had probable cause to execute an administrative arrest” and that Abdi was arrested “as he was leaving his apartment,” the Government asserted that the arrest did not violate Abdi’s Fourth Amendment rights and that suppression was therefore unwarranted. (Id. at 23-24.)1
Abdi responded by explaining that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a warrantless public arrest simply when there is probable cause for an immigration violation; rather, a warrantless public arrest would be permissible only if the Government had probable cause to believe Abdi committed a felony. (Appellee Br. at 4.) The Government, however, had never asserted probable cause regarding any felony. Abdi noted this point, explaining he was not arrested under “the common law of criminal arrest.”
Responding to Abdi’s point that a war-rantless criminal arrest requires not just generic “probable cause” regarding any sort of violation, but probable cause regarding a felony, the Government, for the first time, asserted such probable cause existed: “[E]ven if, as Abdi now claims, a warrantless arrest requires probable cause that the subject committed a felony, the officers who arrested him possessed an abundant basis for probable cause that such a violation was in progress.” (Appellant Reply Br. at 7.) “In particular,” the Government argued, “the violations of the immigration law for which there is probable cause to detain Abdi included planning, inciting and soliciting terrorist activity, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv), [and] virtually the same conduct is embraced by 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which prohibits, inter alia, attempting or conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, including the provision of weapons and personnel.” (Id.) This statement is the first instance in this case that the Government has argued it had probable cause to believe Abdi committed a felony, and it is the first time the Government specified what felony in particular (a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). The majority relies solely on these arguments to decide this case.
II. WAIVER
It is fundamental, and firmly established by Supreme Court precedent, that appellate courts generally are not to consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 n. 3, 119 S.Ct. 1961, 144 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999) (“Because [petitioner’s] argument was neither raised nor considered below, we decline to consider it.”); Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc., 525 U.S. 249, 253-54, 119 S.Ct. 685, 142 L.Ed.2d 648 (1999) (declining to affirm lower court’s decision based *564on arguments that were neither developed before nor considered by the lower court); Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 775 n. 9, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (“The [standing] issue was not raised below, so we do not address it.”); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 38, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989) (“We decline to address [the argument that the petitioner had no right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment] because respondent failed to raise it below.”); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 469 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983) (declining to consider an argument not presented to the lower courts).
Logically, this principle is applied to bar both the government and a defendant from raising Fourth Amendment arguments for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 360 n. 5, 114 S.Ct. 1599, 128 L.Ed.2d 319 (1994) (“Finding no exceptional circumstances that would warrant reviewing a claim that was waived below, we adhere to our general practice and decline to address respondent’s Fourth Amendment argument.”); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). Following Supreme Court precedent, our sister circuits have declined to consider Fourth Amendment arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2001) (holding that, by failing to raise it to the district court, the Government waived its argument that the subjective intent of the officers was irrelevant for establishing probable cause); United States v. 22249 Dolorosa Street, 167 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the government waived its argument that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise that argument to the district court); United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir.1996) (holding that the government waived its standing argument when it was put on notice that the defendant would claim a privacy interest).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Giorde-nello is on all fours with the case at bar. There, the petitioner challenged the validity of the warrant issued for his arrest, arguing that the complaint underlying the warrant was defective. 357 U.S. at 484, 78 S.Ct. 1245. In the lower courts, the government defended the legality of the petitioner’s arrest “by relying entirely on the validity of the warrant.” Id. at 487, 78 S.Ct. 1245. On appeal, however, the government raised a new argument to validate the arrest regardless of whether the warrant was valid, namely, that applicable law “permits the arrest without a warrant upon probable cause that the person arrested has committed a felony.” Id. The Court held that the government waived this argument: “We do not think that these belated contentions are open to the Government in this Court and accordingly we have no occasion to consider their soundness.” Id. at 488, 78 S.Ct. 1245. “To permit the Government to inject its new theory into the case at this stage,” the Court continued, “would unfairly deprive petitioner of an adequate opportunity to respond.” Id. The Court reached this conclusion because in the district court the petitioner, “being entitled to assume that the warrant constituted the only purported justification for the arrest, had no reason to cross-examine [a Government witness] or to adduce evidence of his own to rebut the contentions that the Government makes here for the first time.” Id. Moreover, there was no basis to send the case back to the district court for a hearing on the facts underlying the government’s new argument, because “[t]he facts on which the Government now relies to uphold the arrest were fully known to it at the time of trial, and there are no special circumstances suggesting such an exceptional *565course.” Id.See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (government argued in district court that exigent circumstances and consent justified warrantless search of residence, but additional argument on appeal that petitioner had no expectation of privacy in residence was waived).
Under Giordenello and its progeny, the Government has waived its new justification for Abdi’s warrantless arrest. Just as in Giordenello, in the district court the Government defended the arrest entirely on one basis (the statute) and then on appeal, for the first time, argued the arrest was justified because there was probable cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony. See Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 487, 78 S.Ct. 1245. Indeed, the facts warranting waiver here are even stronger than in Giordenello because not only did the Government here fail in the district court to make its argument that this arrest could be seen as a typical criminal arrest for which there was probable cause, it took pains to argue the contrary. For example, the Government stated that “[ujnlike the ivarrant requirement in the usual criminal arrest, in this case, the warrant would have offered no further constitutional protection to the defendant.” (Appellant’s Br. to District Ct. at 23 (emphasis added).) The Government further argued that Supreme Court precedent does not “require hyper-technical analysis of a warrantless arrest or proof of exigent circumstances where an arrest, like this one, is authorized by a federal immigration statute.” (Id. at 22 (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). See also id. (“[T]he warrant requirement within the administrative immigration system is different from the usual criminal context.”); id. at 21 (noting that the administrative warrant system “differs fundamentally from the criminal judicial system”).) A finding of waiver is all the more appropriate in this situation, where the Government has changed its position. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 209, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (“The Government ... may lose its right to raise factual issues of this sort before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion during the litigation.”).
The majority nonetheless asserts that Giordenello and Steagald do not support a finding of waiver here. (See Maj. Op. at 560-61 n. 19.) It argues these cases are distinguishable on two grounds. I find neither persuasive.2
The majority first argues that these cases “were in a completely different procedural posture than the present case” because in those cases the petitioner had been tried and convicted, while this case involves an interlocutory appeal. This point is easily refuted: waiver is appropriately invoked on interlocutory appeals of suppression orders. See, e.g., Nee, 261 F.3d at 86 (government’s alternative *566Fourth Amendment argument waived on interlocutory appeal). The majority further explains that because of this procedural posture, “unlike the situation in Steagald and Giordenello, it cannot be said that Abdi does not have an opportunity to respond to the underlying allegations and adduce his own evidence to rebut these contentions during trial and on appeal if he is convicted.” This is true but irrelevant. Of course Abdi will have the opportunity to respond at trial to the “underlying allegations” of his guilt; but before that point is reached, the Government must meet its burden of showing Abdi’s warrantless arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The relevant question under Steag-ald and Giordenello is whether Abdi has had an opportunity to respond to that argument. He plainly has not.
The majority then argues Steagald and Giordenello are inapposite because, unlike those cases, the Government’s new argument here is not materially different from that it presented to the district court and, accordingly, there are no additional questions of fact that would need to be developed by either party in the record below. I respectfully disagree with this contention. As an initial matter, the Government’s new argument is plainly different from that it argued to the district court. As I point out above, its repeated representations to the district court that Abdi’s arrest was not a criminal arrest contradict its new argument that the arrest can be justified as just that. (See infra p. 554. See also JA 492 (Government attorney at suppression hearing states as follows: “And one other thing I want to point out here: This was not a criminal arrest.”).) As for the majority’s claim that “the record in the present case is fully developed” to assess the Government’s new argument, I find that contention flawed for two reasons.
First, while the majority adopts — without response from Abdi — the Government’s new claim that the probable cause to believe Abdi violated the immigration statute (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)) inexorably leads to the conclusion that there was also probable cause to believe he violated the criminal statute (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), I am not convinced that is the case. If this equivalence is so evident, I am puzzled by why the Government explained at oral argument that the reason it chose to have ICE execute a civil arrest under § 1182 instead of having the FBI arrest Abdi for a criminal violation (such as under § 2339B) was that, although it considered both options, “there was concern as to whether there was a sufficient probable-cause basis for a criminal offense but there was abundant probable-cause basis for an immigration violation.” (See July 17, 2006 Oral Arg. at 10th min. (emphasis added).)3
To be sure, one might argue that it does not matter what the Government’s positions were along the way, so long as at the end of the day there was probable cause to believe Abdi violated 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. And, as the majority notes, “virtually” the same conduct is embraced by both statutes. (See Maj. Op. at 559.) In this way, the majority’s adoption of the Government’s belated argument has superficial appeal. But the very purpose of the waiver doctrine is to prevent us from reaching these sort of presumptive conclusions where one party has not had the chance to proffer evidence (or, in this case, even an argument to this Court) of why that conclusion might not follow. See Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 488, 78 S.Ct. 1245 (“We do not think that these belated contentions are open to the Government in this Court and accordingly we have no occasion to consider their soundness”) *567(emphasis added). Perhaps the Government’s concern stemmed from a realization that the immigration provision, § 1182, by providing three distinct violations — including, for example, that the person engaged in “terrorist activity by threatening use of a firearm,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I) — provided an easier path to establish probable cause than § 2339B, which makes it a crime for a person to commit a very specific act, i.e., “knowingly provide!] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt! ] or conspire! ] to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. In short, the evidence underlying the probable-cause determination for the immigration arrest may have sufficed for probable cause under the criminal provision, but the Government, by not raising this argument until its reply brief in this Court, has not afforded Abdi his right to challenge that evidence in district court or even to argue that point to this Court.4 Waiver is therefore appropriate.
Second, lost entirely in the Government’s recent claim — and the majority’s adoption of it — that Abdi’s warrantless arrest is supported by probable cause that Abdi committed a felony is the age-old requirement that such an arrest must take place in public. Because the Government did not argue its public-criminal-arrest theory in the district court — -and actually dissuaded the court from any such consideration — there was no development of evidence on this point. The majority, however, simply assumes that the arrest was in “public” and moves on to the probable-cause question. But all we know is that when Abdi was arrested, “[h]e was coming out” of his home. (JA 347.) Crucial to this “public” inquiry is where Abdi was when arrested — something for which we have almost no evidence, but that could have easily been developed in the court below.
Under Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), a person may not be arrested at home without a warrant, regardless of the existence of probable cause, absent exigent circumstances. United States v. Bradley, 922 F.2d 1290, 1293 (6th Cir.1991). In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987), the Supreme Court described the contours of the Fourth Amendment’s protections in “curti-lage” — the area immediately surrounding a home that “harbors the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Widgren v. Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Dunn Court established four factors for determining whether an area is a home’s curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home; (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. Id.
Because the Government chose not to raise its new argument in the district court, there was no development of the record related to whether Abdi was in the curtilage of his home when arrested. Cf. United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1229 n. 2 (7th Cir.1990) (court had no detail concerning condominiums’ common-area garage “and the application to it of the four factors cited in Dunn, so it [was] not possible to decide for certain whether the garage ... was curtilage”). To be clear, I recognize that the Government may have had little difficulty establishing that Abdi *568was outside the curtilage of his home.5 But that is not the point. What matters is that, just as in Giordenello and Steagald, the Government’s district-court arguments made evidence on the point irrelevant. See Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 488, 78 S.Ct. 1245 (“[P]etitioner, being entitled to assume that the warrant constituted the only purported justification for the arrest, had no reason to cross-examine [a Government witness] or to adduce evidence of his own to rebut the contentions that the Government makes here for the first time.”).
The Government here chose in the district court — for whatever reasons — not to go down the path of probable cause for a warrantless criminal arrest in public; it cannot now be heard to avail itself of this theory. I would hold that this argument is waived.
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
Having concluded that the Government waived its argument that Abdi’s warrant-less arrest was constitutional as one in public and supported by probable cause that Abdi had committed a felony, I turn to the Government’s preserved argument that the arrest satisfied the civil immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). On that point, I agree with the district court, for the reasons stated in its opinion, that there was not probable cause to believe Abdi was an escape risk and that the arrest therefore violated the statute.6 Thus, because the Government violated the statute and waived its argument that it had probable cause to arrest Abdi for a felony, the Government has failed to meet its burden to show the warrantless arrest satisfied the Fourth Amendment.7 I would therefore AFFIRM the order of the district court.
. The Government also argued for the first time that suppression is an improper remedy where there is only a statutory violation.
. Before raising these grounds, the majority notes that "the issue of waiver was not presented by either party in their briefs or arguments before this court.” (Maj. Op. at 560 n. 19.) It should come as no surprise that the briefs do not mention waiver: the first time the Government asserted it had probable cause to arrest Abdi for a felony, and the first time it offered what that felony might be, was in its final brief to this Court. To be sure, the Government suggested in its opening brief that it had "probable cause,” but that was under the mistaken belief that it needed probable cause for only an immigration violation, not a felony. Additionally, the majority is mistaken that waiver was never mentioned at oral argument. Counsel for Abdi stated, in response to questioning by this Court regarding waiver, that the Government had indeed waived this argument. (See July 17, 2006 Oral Arg. at 23rd min.)
. This concern could, of course, explain why the Government took pains to make clear to the district court that this was not a criminal arrest.
. The majority points out that the district court stated that the Turgal Declaration “reeks of probable cause.” (Maj. Op. at 559.) The district court, of course, was dealing with whether there was probable cause for only an immigration violation.
.Though, without a factual record, we certainly cannot assume this to be so. Cf. Wid-gren, 429 F.3d at 582 ("[T]he cleared area immediately surrounding the house constituted curtilage.”); Causey v. Doyle, 442 F.3d 524, 528-29 (6th Cir.2006) ("A fenced backyard such as the plaintiffs' is within the curti-lage of the residence and therefore receives Fourth Amendment protection.”); Bradley, 922 F.2d at 1293 (noting that warrantless arrests violated Tennessee law — which this Court later stated "paralleled the federal standard,” United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1437 (6th Cir.1994) — when officers "enter[ed] private, occupied lands for the purpose of making an arrest”).
It is also debatable whether the Government could have established "exigent circumstances” justifying a warrantless entry into Abdi’s home or curtilage. We have traditionally found the existence of exigent circumstances (1) when the officers were in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; (2) when the suspect represented an immediate threat to the arresting officers and public; or (3) when immediate police action was necessary to prevent the destruction of vital evidence or thwart the escape of known criminals. Cau-sey, 442 F.3d at 529 (citing Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1375 (6th Cir.1992)).
. I reach this issue because, were I to decide — notwithstanding my conclusions regarding waiver — that the warrantless arrest satisfied the statute, I would presume the constitutionality of the statute and join the majority in holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
. Given the majority's holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, I do not address whether the district court properly suppressed under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the various statements and physical evidence at issue. I also note that, were the argument properly before me, I would agree with the majority’s holding that suppression is not available as a remedy for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) that do not amount to Fourth Amendment violations. (See Maj. Op. at 557.)