dissenting.
After reviewing the majority’s opinion, I must respectfully dissent. Given the factual record in this case, summary judgment is improper and the case should be remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.
I.
Teresa Tysinger is an eight-year veteran of the City of Zanesville Police Department. Tysinger learned she was pregnant in August 2000. The next month, after Tysinger had an altercation with a suspect, her doctor recommended that she be on light duty during the pregnancy. When Tysinger subsequently informed Police Chief Eric Lambes of her doctor’s recommendation, he told Tysinger that there were no light duty positions available and forced her to take a leave of absence until she could return to full active duty. In March 2001, Tysinger gave birth. She returned to work in June.
Perhaps the more important facts in this case involve two male employees who Tys-inger claims were similarly situated to her and yet received more preferential treatment by the City and the Department. Officer Tom Landerman injured his qua-dricep muscle in a non-work related incident. Landerman’s physician ordered him not to work while he recovered. He wore a metal brace on his leg for six weeks, which limited his movement significantly, but he continued to work at the Department. After the brace was removed, Lan-derman had a limp for an additional four weeks. He avoided telling Chief Lambes of his injury during the two weeks subsequent to receiving the injury. After a conversation with Lambes regarding the injury, Landerman was not ordered to stay home or forced into a leave of absence, but continued working throughout the entirety of the injury.
Detective Jeff Madden broke a toe on his right foot. After taking a few days off, his supervisor, Captain Miller, asked Madden to return to work despite his still having limited movement. Madden was not required to take a leave of absence despite his injury, but in fact was requested by his superior to work with the injury.
*581ii.
This case comes before this Court at the summary judgment stage. We review a granting of summary judgment de novo. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir.2005). “In reviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited. Rather, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In this case, the nonmoving party is Tysinger, and therefore all evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to her.
“[WJomen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). As the majority states, a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination is established by showing (1) plaintiff was pregnant; (2) plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action. Maj. Opn. at 572-73.
I agree with the majority that Tysinger has demonstrated the first three elements of a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, I agree with the majority’s determination that the adverse employment action by the City of Zanesville was twofold “by denying Tysinger accommodating work within her restrictions and, requiring her to take an extended leave of absence.” Maj. Opn. at 573 (emphasis added). I also partially agree with the majority’s conclusion that Tysinger has failed to demonstrate that she was treated differently than her similarly situated male counterparts to the extent that she was not granted light work duty. Neither Officer Landerman nor Detective Madden requested or was granted lighter work. What they were allowed to do, however, was continue working despite clear medical infirmities which limited the ability to do their jobs. This difference in treatment causes me to part ways with the majority’s reasoning.
The heart of Tysinger’s claim is that she was treated differently from Landerman and Madden. Both men experienced a physically debilitating injury which rendered them physically incapable of completing the tasks required of them in their job descriptions. Yet when their superiors were made explicitly aware of the injuries and the effect those injuries would have on their performances, they were allowed to continue working and “suck it up,” “tough it out,” or “grin and bear it” — whichever masculine catch-phrase you wish to apply. In contrast, Tysinger was not given the “suck it up” option. When Tysinger approached Chief Lambes and made him aware of her condition that would limit her ability to complete her physical duties, Lambes forced her to take a leave of absence. She was not given the opportunity to “tough it out.” The reason, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Tysinger, is quite clear: Tysinger was pregnant. The Zanesville Police Department has thus instituted two standards for its employees: employees unable to complete their physical duties due to a condition other than pregnancy may continue working through their limitation, while pregnant employees are forced to take a leave of absence. I believe that this different treatment of similarly situated individuals demonstrates a clear nexus between the forced leave of absence and Tysinger’s pregnancy and, therefore, would find that she has fulfilled the fourth element of her prima facie case.
The majority attempts to limit this with a quote from Lambes’s affidavit, in which *582he stated “[h]ad she been willing to perform full duty work, she would not have been removed from the active duty roster.” Maj. Opn. at 574. However, it was clear that the forced leave of absence was not Tysinger’s choice. As the majority opinion states, Lambes told Tysinger “she would have to be off work until she was able to return to full active duty,” Maj. Opn. at 571 (emphasis added), and Lambes “requir[ed] her to take an extended leave of absence,” Maj. Opn. at 573. This was not a case in which Tysinger demanded either light duty or a leave of absence. Instead, Tysinger told Lambes about the pregnancy and requested light duty. That request was denied, and she was then forced to take a leave of absence. On the other hand, when Landerman and Madden found themselves in a similar situation to that of Tysinger, they were not forced to take a leave.
The majority believes that Madden and Landerman did not receive more favorable treatment than Tysinger because “[i]t is undisputed that they were not granted an accommodation in the form of light or restricted duties.” Maj. Opn. at 574. This analysis completely ignores the more severe adverse employment action taken in Tysinger’s case — namely, the leave of absence that the Police Department forced her to take. While the two men were allowed to continue working despite their infirmities, Tysinger was forced out of her job. That Tysinger told Chief Lambes that she was pregnant and requested light duty does not change the fact that she was still similarly situated to both Landerman and Madden. Both Landerman and Madden’s superiors knew that they were injured and incapable of completely fulfilling their job duties, yet both were allowed to continue working.
The majority holds that Tysinger, by requesting light work, “did not present herself to her employer as ready and able to perform all the duties of her position” and was, therefore, different from Madden and Landerman. Maj. Opn. at 575. However, this is no different than the condition in which the City found those two men. The superiors of both men knew, either implicitly or explicitly, that because of their injuries, they were not “ready and able to perform all the duties” of their respective positions. Officer Landerman walked around his workplace with a metal brace for six weeks and a limp for four weeks after that. In addition, Chief Lam-bes was made explicitly aware of the injury within two weeks after Landerman was injured, when the two men discussed the injury and how it would affect Lander-man’s job performance. As for Officer Madden, Captain Miller knew he was injured because Madden was taking time off due to his broken toe, at which point Miller called Madden and asked him to come back to work despite the physically-limiting injury. Just because Madden and Landerman failed explicitly to request light duty does not change the fact that their superiors were aware of their limitations and silently agreed with the two employees to ignore those limitations and have them “bear with it.”
Tysinger has introduced evidence that when Lambes was made aware of Tysinger’s pregnancy, he forced her into a leave of absence, requiring Tysinger to use her sick days until she could return to full, active duty. According to Tysinger’s deposition, Chief Lambes “told me I was done until I got a slip saying I could return to full, active duty.” At a minimum, the record is unclear as to whether Lambes intended to force Tysinger into using her sick days, thus presenting an issue of material fact on this point. Given the facts of this case and all inferences in favor of Tysinger, summary judgment in favor of the City of Zanesville was not proper. See Bennett, 410 F.3d at 817 *583(holding that in reviewing a summary judgment motion, “the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”). In the eyes of Chief Lambes, Tysinger “was done” until she was no longer pregnant.
The majority believes that Tysinger was asking for more favorable treatment than Landerman and Madden when she requested to continue working after telling Chief Lambes of her pregnancy. Quite to the contrary, she was not requesting more favorable treatment, but only the same treatment. Tysinger should have had the same opportunity that the similarly-situated men had — namely, upon her superiors learning of a condition which limited her ability to perform her duties, she should have been allowed to keep working. Title VII states that pregnant women “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). In this case, similarly-situated men were allowed to decide for themselves whether or not to keep working despite their physical limitations. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Tysinger, she was not given that choice, but instead was forced to take a leave of absence.
By approaching her superior and starting a dialogue about alternative work assignments to fit her physical needs, Tys-inger attempted to do what was prudent for her own well-being. Chief Lambes took this request as grounds to force her into a leave of absence. In contrast, Madden and Landerman also made their superiors aware of their physical limitations and yet were allowed the choice to continue working. As to its male police officers, the City of Zanesville appears to be pro-choice. As to the pregnant Tysinger, the City took her choice away. This is disparate treatment by the City based exclusively on Tysinger’s pregnancy and it appears to have violated Title VII.I would not grant summary judgment for the City and would remand the case for further proceedings.1
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
. Because the City has offered no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for forcing Tysinger to take a leave of absence, the burden-shifting enumerated in Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir.2000), would not lead to the dismissal of Tysinger’s claim. See Maj. Opn. at 576-77.