concurring.
I concur in the decision to remand this case to the Board for further consideration, as that at least is a first step to correcting what I perceive to be an egregious error by the Government. I would have gone further and decided the case in Ms. Snyder’s favor without a remand.
In the first place, I think the Wisconsin court order, filed with OPM in 1993, can be read as it obviously was intended — to grant Ms. Snyder, in addition to a percentage of her ex-husband’s retirement allocation, two types of death benefits: a relatively insignificant benefit (the lump sum) should her ex-spouse predecease her before he retires, and a lifetime benefit should her ex-spouse predecease her after he retires (when her share of his retirement allocation would terminate as a result of his death). The two-part heading and the two distinctive sentences contained in paragraph VI of the court order can readily be understood to so provide. And indeed that is the way the Government expressly read the order for the eight years between its filing with OPM and the ex-husband’s retirement from federal service in 2001. The Government’s argument in this court, that the only death benefit the Wisconsin court order was intended to grant her was the de minimis lump sum benefit if he died between the divorce and retirement, is wholly unpersuasive and indeed, in light of the record before us, borders on the frivolous.
That record shows that OPM advised Ms. Snyder in writing in 1994 that the court order was acceptable under its regulations for former spouse benefits, and that “[b]enefits are not payable until the employee separates from the Federal service and applies for benefits.” Though this letter did not specifically address the lifetime benefit following the employee’s death, it clearly did not consider a pre-retirement death benefit to be the only survivor benefit available. Furthermore, in a subsequent letter that same year, intended to be a “clarification of the benefits awarded to you by the court,” Ms. Snyder was advised that “the court awarded you two types of benefits — apportionment and survivor annuity. ... In survivor annuity, the benefit become [sic] payable after day after [sic] Mr. Ruffs death.” This letter left little doubt about OPM’s understanding that the court order included a survivor benefit applicable after the ex-husband’s death.
That understanding was confirmed in August 2001, now seven years after the earlier letters, and following the ex-husband’s (Mr. Ruffs) retirement from federal service that July. At that time OPM wrote a letter to Ms. Snyder stating that OPM “will honor a court order we have received awarding you a survivor annuity as the former spouse of Robert L. Ruff.” Since her ex-husband was now retired, that letter could only refer to the post-retirement lifetime survivor annuity and not the pre-retirement lump-sum benefit. This letter was followed a week later with another letter. This second letter acknowledged Ms. Ruffs application for her *1344apportioned share of Mr. Ruffs current retirement allocation, and specifically reconfirmed her entitlement to the survivor annuity as well.
Suddenly, within weeks of these two letters, OPM advised Ms. Snyder that, based on a new reading of the language of the court order, “we have determined that your [sic] are not entitled to a former spouse survivor annuity.” Adding insult to injury, because Mr. Ruff had now retired it was the case that, pursuant to OPM regulations, Ms. Snyder was barred from obtaining any correction to or amendment of the original Wisconsin court order.
For policy reasons, estoppel against the United States Government generally requires something more than the circumstances which would support estoppel against a private party. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984). Although the Supreme Court has not been precise as to what it is, ‘something more’ has been described by this court as “some form of affirmative misconduct.” Zacha-rin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2000); see also United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Roche, 401 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2005).1 In Zacharin, finding no affirmative misconduct by the Government, we noted that “[t]here is no evidence that any representative of the government gave Mr. Zacharin incorrect legal advice ..., [and] there is no evidence that [government representatives] made any misrepresentations to Mr. Zacharin with regard to [the contract in dispute].” 213 F.3d at 1371.
In the case before us, the record is replete with legal representations by government representatives with regard to the scope and meaning of the Wisconsin court order. For more than seven years, until after no correction was possible, OPM represented that Ms. Snyder was entitled to a post-retirement survivor benefit; only then did OPM without warning rescind its previous assurances that the Wisconsin court order was in full compliance. These representations when first issued and later confirmed were either correct, and their subsequent rescission was in error, or they were clear misrepresentations on their face.
The statute of limitations for many civil wrongs is three years, and even civil actions involving the Government itself are barred after six years. Basic fairness dictates that the Government, after giving repeated assurances that all is well, cannot wait years, until after no remedy is possible, before suddenly perceiving a documentary glitch that could have been seen, and corrected, anytime during those years.
At a minimum the Government owes Ms. Snyder the value of the opportunity costs foregone during those eight years when she could have been making other arrangements for her well-being should Mr. Ruff predecease her. The simplest measure of those opportunity costs is the survivor annuity the Government had already promised. On the egregious facts of this case, I would estop OPM from decreeing that the court order is somehow deficient, and I would mandate that Ms. Snyder is entitled to the survivor benefit ordered by the Wisconsin court and originally promised by OPM.
. Further, an estoppel against the Government cannot result in the payment of money not otherwise provided for by law, an issue not relevant here since survivor annuities are specifically authorized. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423-24, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990).