dissenting.
When officials read an affidavit describing how a man emerged from his single-family residence with over six grams of crack cocaine and how agents on the scene believed that there were more drugs inside the dwelling, the officials could reasonably believe that the search-warrant affidavit adequately described probable cause to justify a search of the dwelling. See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594-97 (6th Cir.2004). If there was, in hindsight, no probable cause for the search, the officials executing a warrant based on that affidavit are still entitled to the good-faith exception in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). For this reason, the district court should not have suppressed the evidence that authorities obtained in executing the warrant based on the affidavit.
In this case, police arrested McPhearson at his residence and found a white chalky substance, which turned out to be crack cocaine, in his pocket. Having found illegal drugs on McPhearson, officers believed that they could find additional drugs in McPhearson’s home. Indeed, it is a reasonable inference that at least some people who carry crack cocaine around with them in their homes would leave some of the contraband, which they could divide into smaller amounts, elséwhere in their homes. See United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 749-50 (6th Cir.2005) (acknowledging that officials may make at least a single inference to fill a gap in an affidavit). Acting on this suspicion, authorities obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit that described how officers discovered crack cocaine on McPhearson’s body and believed that additional drugs were in the home.
Decisions from this Circuit suggest that the affidavit in this case was sufficient to establish probable cause. In United States v. Frazier, for example, this court found a “strong” connection between the place to be searched and the evidence to *528be sought when affidavits described how authorities found drugs in defendant’s former residence and that defendant, a suspected drug dealer, likely kept contraband where he resided. 423 F.3d 526, 537 (6th Cir.2005). In this case, authorities found drugs on McPhearson as he emerged from his single-family residence, a place that he might have kept additional drugs. In United States v. Carpenter, meanwhile, this Court, sitting en banc, noted that if the “affidavit had stated that beaten paths led from the marijuana patches to the door of [defendants’] residence, and that two men had been spotted walking from the marijuana patches to the residence, the affidavit would likely have been sufficient to establish probable cause.” 360 F.3d at 594 (citations omitted). In this case, officers discovered McPhearson with drugs on his body, in contrast with drugs a distance away, and observed McPhearson emerge from his home, in contrast with finding him walking towards his residence.
Whether the affidavit adequately described probable cause in this case is a close call; however, whether officials could claim good-faith rebanee on the affidavit is a straightforward issue. Because the affidavit described facts sufficient to bring this case within the realm of Frazier and Carpenter, the officers are entitled to the Leon good-faith exception. To be sure, the officers certainly could have done more to elaborate on why they believed that there was probable cause to search McPhearson’s house. For example, they could have described in detail how, in their professional opinions based on experiences in narcotics investigations, individuals who carry on them over six grams of crack cocaine while in their homes frequently have additional quantities of drugs in that residence. However, only a police officer with extraordinary legal training would have detected any potential deficiencies in the affidavit because it failed to articulate this inference. See United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 337 (6th Cir.1998).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.