dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The court today affirms summary judgment on a record that fails to demonstrate that Krajewski knew of the specific danger that striking a hammer against the Enderes pry bar on its first use would cause chipped metal to fly into his eye.
To invoke the assumption of risk defense under Nebraska law, the defendant must show that the plaintiff knew of and understood the specific danger of the activity undertaken. Burke v. McKay, 268 Neb. 14, 679 N.W.2d 418, 424 (Neb.2004) (quoting Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185.12). Awareness of the general risks posed by a type of product or activity is not sufficient; the plaintiff must know of the specific danger posed by the particular activity or product at the time of use. See Pleiss v. Barnes, 260 Neb. 770, 619 N.W.2d 825, 829-30 (Neb.2000) (holding assumption of risk inapplicable where evidence showed that plaintiff, who fell from ladder, knew the general danger that ladders could become shaky and fall but not that he knew that “this particular ladder” created a specific danger that it could “flip, twist, and slide”); Williamson v. Provident Group, Inc., 250 Neb. 553, 550 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Neb.1996) (holding assumption of risk inapplicable where evidence showed that plaintiff, who fell while walking across parking lot where crushed limestone was scattered, knew the general danger of falling while walking but not that she knew the specific danger of walking across that parking lot in those particular circumstances); see also Burke, 679 N.W.2d at 424-25 (holding plaintiff, who was hurt by a horse in a rodeo, was aware of the specific danger where he previously had seen the particular horse he rode, “horse No. 18,” rear up and flip on top of its rider rather than bucking like a typical rodeo horse).
At his deposition, Krajewski testified that he was aware that striking two metal tools together can cause one of them to chip and that this is a reason to wear safety goggles when working with tools. When asked if there is a risk “when you’re hammering or tapping metal on metal that you’ll have chips come from pieces of metal,” Krajewski answered, “There is a risk in everything.” Next, when asked whether he would agree that “whenever you use a hammer on any piece of equipment or on any tool ... there is a risk of something chipping off,” Krajewski replied, “Yes there is a risk.” He agreed that this was why safety goggles are recommended and confirmed that he had read warnings on the pry bar packaging and on the hammer advising users to wear safety goggles. Enderes Tool Company, the district court, and now this court characterize Krajew-ski’s concession that metal chips can fly whenever tools are struck together as awareness of the specific danger.
Krajewski’s responses show that, at the time of his deposition, he was aware of the general danger that metal chips can fly when a hammer is struck against other metal tools. There is evidence, however, that the Enderes pry bar was not intended to be a struck tool and posed a greater danger than other pieces of metal. Nebraska statute and case law thus required Enderes Tool to show that Krajewski was aware of the specific danger that metal chips would fly when he struck his hammer against that Enderes pry bar on its first use. See Pleiss, 619 N.W.2d at 830. Krajewski’s deposition testimony does not accomplish this task. Perhaps Endres Tool’s counsel was posing his questions broadly to generalize the characterization of the risk for greater benefit at trial. Nonetheless, Krajewski’s affirmative re*712sponse to the question of whether he knew that chips can fly “whenever you use a hammer on any piece of equipment or on any tool” does not establish that he was aware of the specific danger of metal chipping the first time he used the particular Enderes pry bar involved in his eye injury.
This issue should have been submitted to the jury and summary judgment is inappropriate.