concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I fully concur in the Court’s determination that petitioner Eric Scott Patterson may properly be tried for a third time in state court, where he failed to secure a ruling by any court, state or federal, that the evidence at his first trial was insufficient to support his conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering, and where his second trial ended in a hung jury. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984); see also United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 907 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Bobo, 419 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Miller, 952 F.2d 866, 872-74 (5th Cir.1992). I write separately only to express my firm view that this panel did not violate any Sixth Circuit precedent or rule when it declined to reach Patterson’s sufficiency challenge during the first round of habeas proceedings following his initial tri*670al and conviction. See Patterson v. Haskins, 316 F.3d 596, 611 (6th Cir.2003) (“Patterson P). Rather, the panel acted entirely in accordance with this precedent by citing a good reason for its unwillingness to address Patterson’s sufficiency challenge — namely, that to do so would require speculation as to how a properly instructed jury might have weighed the evidence, not only as to the offense of conviction, but also as to a lesser-included offense that the jury in Patterson’s first trial had no occasion to reach. See Patterson I, 316 F.3d at 611. Because I am convinced that the Patterson I panel did not err in this regard, I cannot join in the majority’s “mea culpa” on this issue.
As the majority acknowledges, there are only a handful of cases — and not a single habeas decision prior to Patterson I — in which a panel of this Court has expressed its view as to whether it would or should address a suffieiency-of-the-evidence challenge vis-a-vis some other claim of error. In the first such decision, United States v. Orrico, 599 F.2d 113, 116 (6th Cir.1979), the panel stated that “[w]e decide the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, rather than admissibility, because the former issue is determinative of the question whether Or-rico may be retried.” In support of this chosen course of action, the panel cited the then-recent ruling in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that a reversal for evi-dentiary insufficiency precludes a retrial on double jeopardy grounds. While this surely is a sound explanation for that panel’s election to address the defendant’s sufficiency challenge in lieu of his other claims of error, I do not read this single statement in Orrico as purporting to announce an inviolate “rule” that all subsequent panels were bound in all circumstances to follow.1
In the nearly twenty-five years between Orrico and Patterson I, this Court revisited this issue on only two occasions. First, in United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 189 n. 1 (6th Cir.1983) — another pre-Rich-ardson decision — the panel observed in a footnote that “[wjhere the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before us, we consider that issue first because it is determinative of whether the appellant may be retried.” In support of this proposition, the panel cited the ruling in Orrico, as well as a footnote in Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 n. 1 (6th Cir.1981) — a footnote which, in turn, cited Orrico as the sole relevant Sixth Circuit decision on this *671point.2 Similarly, in United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522, 529 n. 5 (6th Cir.1990) (emphasis added), the panel opined (once again in a footnote) that “[t]he reversal on trial error here does not necessarily obviate the need to review the sufficiency of the evidence.”3 Again, Quinn cites Orrico and Delk, as well as the more recent Aarons decision, as the pertinent authorities on this subject.
Thus, the sole source of the majority’s posited “requirement” to address sufficiency-of-the-evidenee challenges is the single sentence in Orrico in which the panel explained why it had elected to address a sufficiency challenge instead of a question about the admissibility of certain evidence. Certainly, this falls far short of the extended discussion that our sister circuits have deemed appropriate before settling upon a general practice in appeals from federal convictions for handling sufficiency challenges accompanied by other claims of error. See, e.g., Miller, 952 F.2d at 871-74; Douglas, 874 F.2d at 1149-50. Moreover, while Orrico cites only to Burks on this point, the Supreme Court subsequently explained in Richardson that Burks does not “require” appellate courts to rule on sufficiency challenges. See Richardson, 468 U.S. at 323, 104 S.Ct. at 3085. Finally, and as noted in Delk, 665 F.2d at 93 n. 1, Orrico was an appeal from a federal conviction — as, indeed, were Miller, Douglas, and all of the other out-of-circuit cases identified by the majority (or in my own research) as endorsing a practice of reaching sufficiency challenges. The present ha-beas proceeding raises additional concerns of federalism and comity that the majority fails to acknowledge, and these considerations militate strongly against a reflexive, one-size-fits-all adoption here of any possible “rule” that could be gleaned from Orri-co.
Nevertheless, it is not even necessary in this case to engage in a debate about the prescriptive force of Orrico, because this Court already has recognized that any “practice” that might have emerged from that decision has its exceptions. As the majority acknowledges, (see Majority Op. at 653), one such exception was recognized in Davis, supra, 873 F.2d at 901, 907, where the panel that heard defendant Davis’s initial appeal reversed his conviction on the ground of a deficient indict*672ment without reaching his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at his first trial. After Davis was charged in a superseding indictment, he argued that any retrial was barred by the initial panel’s failure to address his sufficiency challenge.
In rejecting this contention, the panel in Davis found that the prior panel in that case had a sound basis for electing a course of action different from the one chosen in Orrico. In particular, the Court observed that Orrico did not present “a situation where the defendant had been tried on an indictment incorporating a legal theory that had turned out to be invalid.” Davis, 873 F.2d at 907. Under these circumstances, the Court reasoned that “it would have been pointless for [the initial panel] to sift through several days’ worth of trial evidence to determine whether it would have been sufficient to support a conviction under” a since-invalidated legal theory. 873 F.2d at 907. Similarly, the Court found that it would have run counter to “considerations of judicial economy” for the prior panel to decide whether the evidence introduced at Davis’s initial trial would have been sufficient to sustain a conviction under a valid legal theory, where Davis had yet to be indicted under such a theory and there was no assurance that the government would seek to do so. 873 F.2d at 907.
This, then, was the legal landscape as it existed in this Circuit when we heard and decided Patterson I. On one hand, the Orrico panel had elected in 1979 to address a sufficiency rather than an eviden-tiary challenge, and two subsequent panels had relied on Orrico in pursuing similar courses of action. On the other hand, the panel in Davis had deemed it appropriate to chart a different course in that case, despite its acknowledgment of the procedure followed in Orrico. When presented with Patterson’s sufficiency challenge, therefore, we had both of these alternatives available to us — we could have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence, notwithstanding our determination that the jury instructions at Patterson’s initial trial were erroneous, or we could have found, as in Davis, that there were reasons to refrain from such a review.
We explicitly chose the latter course, citing reasons why, in our judgment, it “would be imprudent” to address Patterson’s sufficiency challenge. Patterson I, 316 F.3d at 611. First, in light of an omission in the jury instructions regarding the offense of which Patterson was convicted, we found it problematic to “comment[ ] on whether sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the essential elements of a crime for which the jury was never completely charged.” 316 F.3d at 611. Next, and more importantly, we observed that, in order to grant the unconditional writ sought by Patterson, we necessarily would have been required to gauge the sufficiency of the evidence both as to the offense of conviction and as to a lesser included offense about which the jury also had been instructed. We were particularly reluctant to undertake this latter inquiry because the jury at Patterson’s trial had not done so, having “ceased deliberating” as instructed upon finding Patterson guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on child endangering. 316 F.3d at 611.
Whether or not the majority might choose a different course of action today, there is no basis for its conclusion that we “erred” or deviated from some longstanding Circuit practice when we deliberately elected not to address Patterson’s sufficiency challenge. In an effort to identify such an error, the majority first reasons that Davis is “readily distinguishable,” (Majority Op. at 654), in that the reasons *673given for declining to reach a sufficiency challenge in that case were not the same as the reasons we identified in Patterson I. Yet, beyond the fact (discussed below) that the panel in Davis did not characterize itself as “carving out a narrow exception of limited application” to a purported Circuit “rule” governing sufficiency challenges, (Majority Op. at 654), there is certainly no indication that the panel meant for this “exception” to be exclusive, or to occupy the field of possible circumstances under which a court could decline to reach a sufficiency challenge. Rather, the panel merely decided the case before it, deeming it inappropriate under those particular circumstances to consider the sufficiency of the evidence at the defendant’s initial trial.
This, of course, is precisely what we did in Patterson I. Even if one were to assume — which I do not — -that our reasons were somehow not as “good” as those identified in Davis, no error can be gleaned from the mere fact that our reasons were different from those cited in an earlier case, and certainly no “mea culpa” is warranted. If no prior panel had opined that the sorts of reasons we gave in Patterson I were “good enough” to warrant an “exception” to this Circuit’s “rule,” neither had any prior panel opined that such reasons were not “good enough,” and that only the circumstances presented in Davis could justify such an exception. Indeed, as noted earlier, there is no case predating Patterson I in which this Court invoked any sort of “rule” or “practice” requiring that sufficiency challenges be addressed in ha-beas proceedings, much less opined as to the existence or extent of any possible “exceptions.” Writing on this blank slate, we were not constrained in Patterson I to read Davis as establishing the sole set of circumstances under which we could decline to reach a sufficiency challenge.
Nonetheless, the majority insists that it would be “disingenuous” to construe Patterson I as a “conscious and purposeful departure from a longstanding practice.” (Majority Op. at 656.) Yet, if Davis is to be held up as the gold standard for such “conscious and purposeful” deliberation, I cannot see how our decision in Patterson I would fail to measure up. Just as in Patterson I, there is nothing in Davis that reflects the panel’s recognition that it was bound to adhere to some longstanding Circuit practice unless it could identify a basis for an exception.4 Rather, the panel in Davis, like its counterpart in Patterson I, merely explained the reasons for its judgment that a sufficiency review would be inappropriate in that case. If the panels in Davis and Patterson I alike failed to perceive the need for more extensive discussion or justification of their respective decisions to forgo a sufficiency review, I can only surmise that this was attributable to the panels’ common understanding that they were not bound by any “longstanding Circuit practice” to proceed otherwise.
To be sure, Davis cited Orrico and Delk, and then explained why those cases were distinguishable. Yet, I do not believe that a panel can be accused of failing to reach a “conscious and purposeful” decision merely by virtue of the fact that it does not cite and distinguish any and all cases that arguably bear upon the issue before it. Whether “purposefully]” or otherwise, the fact remains that we considered in Patterson I whether • to address a sufficiency challenge and decided that “it would be *674imprudent” to do so. 316 F.3d at 611. As explained, I believe that this course of action was readily available to us under the existing Sixth Circuit precedent, which was silent as to habeas proceedings and quite limited even as to appeals from federal convictions.
In any event, any suggestion that we were oblivious to a “practice” adopted in Orrico or some other Sixth Circuit decision is belied by our denial of Patterson’s petition for rehearing, in which he expressly argued that we were required under Quinn, Delk, and Orrico to address his sufficiency challenge. The majority unfortunately fails to mention this filing in its discussion of the unstated reasoning and “desire[s]” that purportedly shaped our decision in Patterson I. (See Majority Op. at 656.) Unless the majority is prepared to say that we rejected this petition out-of-hand without reading or considering it— and my recollection is definitively to the contrary — it is readily apparent to me that we “consciously] and purposefully]” elected not to address Patterson’s sufficiency challenge, despite his argument that we were compelled to do so. Having concluded that we did not err in this regard, I need not join in the majority’s speculation as to “[w]hat we attempted to do,” (id.), nor its “mea culpa’’ for having unanimously decided the case as we did, both initially and upon Patterson’s request for rehearing.
Finally, I feel compelled to address the apologia with which the majority closes its opinion. Even assuming, for the moment, that I agreed with the majority’s conclusion that we erred in Patterson I, I fail to perceive the need in this case to reassure the citizenry that our system of justice functions properly on the whole, much less to attribute the purportedly “uncomfortable result! ]” here to our obligation to follow Supreme Court precedent. (See id. at 669.) As to the former, it is important to distinguish between our decision not to address Patterson’s sufficiency challenge and the possible outcome of any such sufficiency review that we might have undertaken. Unless Patterson’s challenge would have been successful, our purported error in declining to address it could not possibly be viewed as “inimical to our system of justice,” (id.) — to the contrary, such an error would be utterly harmless. Yet, throughout his state court appeals and the ensuing federal habeas proceedings, Patterson has never once secured the opinion of any judge — state or federal — that the evidence at his first trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction.5
But, even if Patterson’s sufficiency challenge might have succeeded, it is misleading to suggest that a court’s inability or unwillingness to address such a challenge is “inimical” to a properly functioning system of justice. Simply stated, there are all sorts of circumstances under which even a meritorious challenge might not be heard, particularly in a habeas proceeding. To cite a fairly stark example, the Supreme Court has invoked considerations of exhaustion and procedural default to deny federal habeas review to a death row inmate who filed his state court appeal a mere three days after the relevant deadline. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). And, of course, this Court routinely denies certificates of appealability on all sorts of issues — including sufficiency challenges — that habeas petitioners wish to pursue, based on a panel’s gatekeeping determination that the petitioner has failed to “ma[k]e a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). At worst, then, the present *675case merely confirms that judicial error is among the possible reasons why a seemingly meritorious argument might not succeed. This will hardly come as a surprise to petitioners in habeas proceedings — and I suspect that even the general public harbors no illusions about the infallibility of judges.6
This brings me to my second concern with the majority’s concluding remarks— namely, that they could be read as laying the blame for today’s supposedly “uncomfortable result[]” at the feet of the Supreme Court. Any error — if error there was — was ours alone, of course, and we had ample notice and opportunity to timely correct any such error upon Patterson’s filing of a petition for rehearing. Even in the absence of the Supreme Court precedent cited by the majority, I would be reluctant to subscribe to a rule that would allow judges to revisit their decisions years later, based upon a delayed realization that they might have been mistaken. It goes without saying, of course, that correct rulings are vitally important to the proper functioning of a judicial system, and that judges are acutely aware of this. As a result, judges strive mightily to avoid the consequences of an erroneous judgment, and this was no less true of our panel in Patterson I. Yet, finality also plays a crucial role in our judicial system, as this Court’s decisions have long recognized. See, e.g., Pierce v. United Mine Workers Welfare & Retirement Fund, 770 F.2d 449, 451-52 (6th Cir.1985); Barrier v. Beaver, 712 F.2d 231, 234-35 (6th Cir.1983); Hines v. Royal Indemnity Co., 253 F.2d 111, 113-14 (6th Cir.1958). And the latter, in my judgment, assumes still greater importance in habeas cases where, as here, a defendant has been given a full and fair opportunity to present all of his arguments through a complete course of state and federal proceedings.
Finally, it bears emphasis — and the majority also recognizes this, (see Majority Op. at 655-59) — that any purported error in Patterson I did not subject Patterson to an unconstitutional retrial. Nor has our decision otherwise diminished any of the constitutional protections that Patterson enjoys as he faces his third state court trial. Rather, he fully retains his due process guarantee of a verdict based upon sufficient evidence, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), as well as his opportunity to challenge any eventual conviction through a full round of state court appeals and, if necessary, federal habeas proceedings. I am content that Patterson’s fate rests first and foremost upon the judgment of a jury of his peers, and see nothing “uncomfortable” or “inimical to our system of justice” in this outcome. Accordingly, while I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that we erred in Patterson I, I concur in its judgment that Patterson’s state court trial should be allowed to go forward.
. To the extent that the panel in Orrico construed Burks as prescriptive — i.e., mandating that a court must address sufficiency challenges — rather than descriptive — i.e., identifying the consequence of a successful sufficiency challenge — the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Richardson surely belies such a reading of BurKs. Specifically, the Richardson Court emphasized that "our decision in Burks did not extend beyond the procedural setting in which it arose,” and that "[w]here, as here, there has been only a mistrial resulting from a hung jury, Burks simply does not require that an appellate court rule on the sufficiency of the evidence because retrial might be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Richardson, 468 U.S. at 323, 104 S.Ct. at 3085; see also Miller, 952 F.2d at 871-72 (concluding that a prior Fifth Circuit decision was “no longer good law” in light of Richardson, and construing this latter ruling as "refusfing] to extend Burks beyond instances in which the appellate court in fact reversed for insufficient evidence”); United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1149-50 (7th Cir.1989) (observing that the Supreme Court "has never held that a reviewing court must review the sufficiency of the evidence whenever a defendant raises the issue on appeal,” and reasoning that Richardson precludes a "broad reading” of Buries as having adopted such a requirement). The panel in Onico, of course, did not have the benefit of Richardson' s discussion of Buries.
. Because the majority has cited Delk in support of its posited "Burks rule,” (Majority Op. at 652), a brief discussion of that decision is warranted. The footnote from which the majority culls a ''require[ment]” to address sufficiency challenges is, in fact, a survey of then-recent decisions from this and other circuits on "issues related to,” but distinct from, the "precise question” before the panel in that case. Delk, 665 F.2d at 93 n. 1. Curiously, the majority has not reproduced the entirety of the passage it quotes from this footnote, which reads in full: "Several courts including this one have indicated that where it is claimed on appeal from a federal conviction that the evidence was insufficient, the reviewing court is required to decide the sufficiency question even though there might be other grounds for reversal which would not preclude retrial.” 665 F.2d at 93 n. 1 (emphasis added). Once again, Orrico is the sole Sixth Circuit decision cited in support of this proposition. Plainly, then, Delk adds nothing to the question before us here — its footnoted discussion of "related” cases was explicitly acknowledged to be pure dicta, and this survey, in any event, merely leads us right back to the decision in Orrico.
. In light of this quoted language from Quinn, I fail to see how the majority here can read that case as reflecting the panel’s "recognition] ... that it still needed to address Quinn’s insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.” (Majority Op. at 652 (emphasis added).) Rather, it seems to me that the panel in Quinn was merely observing that a sufficiency review was not necessarily moot in light of "[t]he reversal on trial error,” given that a successful sufficiency challenge would preclude a retrial. Quinn, 901 F.2d at 529 n. 5.
. Notably, when Davis was decided, it could at least be maintained that two prior panels, in Orrico and Aarons, had adopted a "practice” of addressing sufficiency challenges in appeals from federal convictions. When we decided Patterson I, in contrast, there were no analogous rulings in habeas cases that could have alerted us to some Circuit “practice” that we might be obliged to follow.
. To the contrary, I am firmly convinced that the evidence was sufficient.
. One check against this, of course, is to pursue an appeal. Here, however, Patterson failed to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari following our decision in Patterson I. Nor did he seek en banc reconsideration of the panel's ruling.