dissenting.
Faraji Garth concedes that he committed an appalling crime, a dangerous armed robbery that, of course, put people’s lives at risk. It is tempting, therefore, to gloss through the weighty procedural details of habeas corpus review on the path to denying relief for this confessed armed robber. The protections afforded by our Constitution, however, work only if they are followed faithfully and meticulously as to each crime for which a *714defendant is accused without regard to guilt or innocence on other counts of the indictment. On the other side of the coin, federal habeas corpus law provides a very-narrow scope of review and relief, and has been further restricted bjr the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In particular, principals of comity, federalism, and judicial efficiency preclude the federal courts from reaching the merits in a habeas case when the claim was presented to the state courts and the state court ruling against the ha-beas petitioner was based on independent and adequate state-law procedural grounds. Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir.2004). Garth asked the federal district court to do just that — to grant habeas relief on his freestanding claim that the jury instructions contained an incorrect mens rea requirement. The state argued, correctly, that this freestanding claim was barred from review by procedural default. The majority, however, states that it will address these argument on the merits without considering the State’s procedural default argument. Ante at 709, n. 3. Although it may seem economical to jump straight to the merits of Garth’s freestanding claim of jury instruction error — particularly where the merits of this claim are so intertwined with Garth’s still viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim — we cannot abandon principals of comity and federalism for the sake of economy. Garth’s freestanding claim of jury instruction error is ineligible for federal habeas corpus relief because he failed to comply with Indiana’s procedural rule that requires such claims to be raised on direct appeal. Garth raised his claim about the mens rea error for the first time in his post-conviction relief proceedings. In Indiana, post-conviction courts do not provide a petitioner with a “super appeal.” Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind.2001). Indiana allows petitioners to address only a narrow range of issues in post-conviction proceedings, and a petitioner otherwise waives any issues not raised on direct appeal. (See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1). Garth’s post-conviction appeals (hereinafter “PCA”) court properly concluded that these claims were waived. (PCA Decision at 5) (R. at 27, Ex. J to Ex. A, p. 5, n. 1). Garth has not asserted any of the equitable doctrines that allow a federal court to consider a claim on the merits notwithstanding a procedural default in the state courts. See Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 514-15. Consequently, the majority errs by addressing Garth’s claims on the merits where the Indiana PCA court dismissed his claim on an independent and adequate state procedural law ground.
Although this court cannot address the merits of the underlying claim of jury instruction error, we can examine Garth’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as Garth did pursue this claim through one complete round of state post-conviction review. This claim necessarily requires us to look at possible error in the jury instructions; the same error, in fact, that Garth asks us to review directly. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that our review of the jury instructions in the context of an ineffectiveness claim is equivalent to a direct review of the question of jury instruction error. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are bounded by the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and its progeny, which instruct that to make a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate first that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and second that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052; United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir.*7152005). “Our review of the attorney’s performance is highly deferential and reflects a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Davis v. Lambert, 388 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir.2004). For the second prong — establishing prejudice — the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
On top of the requirements of Strickland, federal habeas law adds an additional hurdle. It is not enough that Garth show that his counsel was ineffective. As the majority describes, under the AEDPA, Garth must demonstrate that the state court’s decision holding otherwise was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or [] resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “A state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law when the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court or, on facts materially indistinguishable from the facts of an applicable Supreme Court precedent, reaches a different result.” Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).
Under the AEDPA, therefore, Garth must demonstrate that the Indiana Appellate Court, on post-conviction review, unreasonably applied Strickland in evaluating Garth’s ineffective assistance claim. Unlike the majority, I would find that the PCA court’s application of Strickland was not only wrong, but objectively unreasonable.
The majority agrees, as it must, with the PCA court and with Garth that at the time of Garth’s trial, Indiana law on accomplice liability for attempted murder required the state to prove that the accomplice had the specific intent that the killing occur. See Williams v. Indiana, 737 N.E.2d 734, 739, 740 n. 16 (Ind.2000) (explaining that, in order to gain a conviction for attempted murder as an accomplice, the state has always been required to prove that the accomplice had the same specific intent as the principal); see also Bethel v. State, 730 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind.2000); Woodson v. State, 767 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) confirmed on reh’g, 778 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.2002); (PCA Decision at 8) (R. at 27, Ex. J to Ex. A, p. 8). The PCA court, the district court below, both parties, and the majority of the panel on this appeal agree, furthermore, that jury instruction number eleven was erroneous because it failed to instruct the jury that in order to convict it had to find that Garth intended that Hardy would be killed. (PCA Decision at 8) (R. at 27 Ex. J to Ex. A, p. 8); (D. Ct. decision at 4); (Brief of Respondenfl-Appellant at 12-13); (Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 16); ante at 709, 711-12. In fact that instruction specifically used the words “knowingly or intentionally.” (R. at 20, p. 706) (emphasis added). In short, the law required intent; the jury instruction allowed for conviction on mere knowledge; and yet Garth’s attorney remained silent voicing no objection to this key error. This alone would constitute an objectively unreasonable performance, but as I will describe in further detail in a *716moment, counsel’s failures went much further.
The PCA court, with which the majority agrees, concluded that the error in instruction number eleven was mitigated by the instructions as a whole, which later informed jurors, in instruction number five, that “attempt is a crime of specific intent.” (PCA Decision at 10) (R. at 27 Ex. J to Ex. A, p. 10); ante at 712. Read in full that instruction states:
Attempt is a crime of specific intent, that is, it must be done with the intent to commit the alleged felony. Specific intent is a material element of the crime charged, and must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. In laymen’s terms, intent means a person’s purpose or state of mind at the time he engages in the alleged criminal act.
(R. at 20, p. 700). This instruction certainly does describe the requisite mens rea required for attempted murder, but fails to clear up the confusion over the mens rea requirement for an accomplice to attempted murder. To understand why this distinction is important, we must first understand how the law of accomplice liability and attempt intersect in Indiana. Under Indiana law, in order for the state to secure a conviction for attempted murder as an accomplice, the state is required to prove, “(1) that the [principal], acting with the specific intent to kill, took a substantial step toward the commission of murder, and (2) that the defendant [accomplice], acting with the specific intent that the killing occur, knowingly or intentionally aided, induced or caused the [principal] to commit the crime of attempted murder.” Williams, 737 N.E.2d at 739. For our purposes, I find it helpful to break the mens rea requirements down into smaller steps and reiterate that the jury instructions must inform the jury of the following three things: (1) the principal, Garth’s brother, must have had the intent to kill the victim, Hardy; (2) Garth must have had the intent that Hardy would be killed, and (3) Garth must have knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused his brother to commit the crime of attempted murder. Because jury instruction five describes the mens rea requirement for attempted murder and not for accomplice liability, that instruction allows a jury to infer that Garth could be convicted if his brother intended to kill Hardy even if Garth neither intended to kill Hardy nor intended that his brother would kill Hardy. The instruction does not advise a jury that the accomplice must have the same mens rea as the principal. And in fact, this confusion is amplified by instruction number twelve, which informs jurors that if an accomplice “combines and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose, he is liable criminally for everything done by his confederates which flows incidentally from the execution of the common design as the natural and probable consequences of the common design.” (R. at 20, p. 707). According to this instruction, if Garth’s brother committed attempted murder, Garth is hable as well without regard to Garth’s state of mind. This is plainly incorrect and compounds the error of instruction number eleven.
As the majority correctly points out, a court must consider the jury instructions as a whole when evaluating whether they adequately informed the jury of the state’s burden. The PCA court’s conclusion that the definition in instruction five cured the omission in instruction eleven ignores the misleading effect of instruction twelve that I just described. More importantly, it ignores the outright error of instruction number two which also grossly misstates the mens rea requirement for attempted murder. Recall that instruction number two states:
*717The crime of attempted murder as charged in Count I is defined by statute as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits murder, a felony. A person attempts to commit a murder when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the murder, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the murder.
(R. at 20, p. 696) (emphasis added). It is undisputed, however, that in order to prove attempted murder in Indiana, the government must prove that the defendant intended to kill, not merely that he did so knowingly. Spradlin v. Indiana, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind.1991). The instruction goes on to further confuse the distinction between intentionally and knowingly:
To convict the defendant, Faraji Omar Garth, in Count I, the State must have proved each of the following elements:
The defendant
1. on or about August 21,1997,
2. acting with the specific intent to commit murder, to-wit: knowingly killing James Hardy,
3. did intentionally point a loaded Raven .25 caliber handgun at the head of the said James Hardy and repeatedly pull the trigger,
4.which conduct constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the intended crime of murder.
If the state failed to prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant not guilty.
If the State did not prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the Defendant guilty of the crime of attempted murder, a Class A Felony, in Count I.
(R. at 20, p. 696-97) (emphasis added). Not only is this instruction erroneous, but it contradicts the clear Instruction in instruction five that “attempt is a crime of specific intent, that is, it must be done with the intent to commit the alleged felony.”1
Summing up the morass created by the jury instructions:
(1) The defendant, the PCA court, and the majority all agree that instruction number eleven failed to describe the requisite intent for accomplice liability for attempted murder.
(2) The first half of jury instruction number two incorrectly stated that an accomplice could be guilty for *718merely knowingly engaging in the requisite conduct.
(3) The second half of instruction number two incorrectly instructed jurors that acting knowingly is the same as acting with specific intent.
(4) The only instruction that accurately described the intent requirement is instruction number five, but it did so only for attempt; it said nothing about accomplice liability, and directly contradicted the instruction in number two that “specific intent” means “knowingly.”
(5) Instruction number twelve implied that if Garth’s brother committed attempted murder, Garth would be liable as well without regard to Garth’s state of mind.
Despite these catastrophic errors (including directly contradictory instructions), Garth’s counsel stood silent. This was not a trial strategy or within the realm of reasonable assistance. The failure to object to these erroneous jury instructions constituted an objectively unreasonable performance. The PCA court’s contrary conclusion was not only incorrect, it was unreasonable.
Counsel’s error is of no consequence, however, if the ineffectiveness did not prejudice Garth. Goodman, 461 F.3d at 1027. Garth need not demonstrate that it is more likely than not that proper objections to the jury instructions would have resulted in his acquittal; he need only establish that there is a reasonable probability, a better than negligible likelihood. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1045 (7th Cir.2004). In considering the reasonable probability of differing results we must be cognizant of the confusing nature of attempt and of accomplice liability. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has specifically recognized “the inherent ambiguity in attempted murder prosecutions and the need to instruct juries precisely as to the correct level of culpability.” Williams, 737 N.E.2d at 740. That court further noted that “both the level of ambiguity and the corresponding need for precise jury instructions significantly increase in a prosecution for aiding an attempted murder.” Id. Liability for being an accomplice to attempted murder hangs on the precise mens rea of the accused, and a minor imprecision in the jury instructions can readily alter the outcome of a trial. Garth admitted that he knew that the robbery was a risky crime and all but conceded that he acted knowingly. (R. at 636-638, 647). Instructions that told the jury that either knowledge or intent would suffice for a conviction for attempted murder as an accomplice sealed Garth’s fate. Garth’s lawyer’s failure to object to such instructions obviously prejudiced Garth.
The majority does not discuss the issue of prejudice caused by counsel’s ineffective assistance under the second prong of Strickland, choosing instead (and incorrectly, I maintain) to evaluate the merits of Garth’s freestanding claim of jury instruction error. By turning to the merits of the freestanding claim, the majority is forced to consider a “harmlessness” analysis without benefit of briefing from the State, which had properly argued that the freestanding claim had been waived. The majority concludes from its harmlessness analysis “[a]ny error in instructing the jury as to the intent to convict Garth of attempted murder was harmless. The reason is that Garth’s intent was never seriously disputed at trial. The dispute was centered on whether Ahman actually tried to kill Hardy.” Ante at 712. But Garth’s intent was most certainly disputed at trial, and therefore under either a harmless standard or under Strickland’s prejudice prong, the majority errs in its *719conclusion. The majority concedes that “[t]he government’s whole theory of the case was that, despite being easily recognizable and identifiable, Garth and two others robbed the store without masks because they intended to kill the only witness to the crime.” Id. (emphasis added). Garth disagreed. Specifically, Garth argued that neither he nor anyone intended to kill the store clerk and that no one attempted to do so. This case presented a paradigm dispute over the issue of intent.
The competing theories on intent were highlighted throughout the trial. The government advanced its theory of intent from its opening statement to the close. In the opening statement the government set forth its theory of the case:
It is our theory of the case, and what we will prove to you, is that he wanted Mr. Hardy to die, because what you will hear is that this defendant was a regular of the store, so was his brother, Ahman, so was Leo Johnson. From the State’s evidence, you are going to hear that not one of them had a mask on their face or hid their identity in any way ... Our theory will simply be, ladies and gentleman, they did not wear a mask, this defendant did not wear a mask, because they were going to kill James Hardy, so they didn’t need to wear a mask.
(R. at 20, p. 228-29). During closing arguments the government again spoke of the jury’s need to consider the mens rea and erroneously advised that:
We need to show that Faraji Garth, on or about August 21 of 1997, acted with specific intent to commit the murder, that is the knowing kill ... or the killing of James Hardy, by intentionally pointing a loaded Raven .25 caliber handgun at the head of said James Hardy, and repeatedly pulling the trigger, and that step constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the murder.
Id. at 661. The government then reiterated, that “[tjhere can be no question that where he pointed that gun he was trying to kill him, and that’s not disputed.” Id. at 662. During rebuttal, the state argued again that the fact that the men, who were known to the clerk, robbed the store without masks, “cries out, and tells you, compels you to the conclusion that you knew from the beginning that they were going to kill James Hardy.” Id. at 692-93.
Garth, on the other hand, countered that he had no intent that anyone would be killed in this simple robbery:
On direct examination, Garth presented the following testimony:
Q. Was it your intention, at any time, to harm the attendant at the store?
A. No. I never touched that man.
Q. Would you have taken part in that robbery if anyone else had voiced intention to you about murdering this attendant?
A. No.
Id. at 651. After the presentation of the state’s case, Garth’s defense counsel moved for a directed verdict arguing that:
I would argue that, you know, insufficient evidence that the Defendant committed the crime of armed ... of attempted murder. That there’s been a total lack of evidence that he had the intent ... the requisite intent required by statute.
Id. at 612. And finally, during his closing argument, Garth’s counsel went straight to the heart of the issue of intent:
[tjhey’ll instruct you about intent and knowingly. Heavy, heavy burdens that you’ve got there when you start to analyze those. What constitutes the actual intent of this, I don’t know, but you know there was ... I don’t think there was any intent there ever, on the part of *720anybody, certainly not on the part of Faraji over here in that, except for the intent to maybe commit a robbery on it.
Id. at 680.
Clearly the majority’s conclusion that “intent was never seriously disputed” is incorrect. The majority’s conclusion that Garth’s defense “centered on whether Ah-man actually tried to kill Hardy” is not inconsistent with a defense of lack of intent. Ante at 712. Garth’s defense that his brother never pointed the gun at the victim’s head and never pulled the trigger is precisely a defense about intent — it is intent to the nth degree. Garth argued that no one took any steps toward the commission of murder because no one intended to harm the clerk.
The PCA court’s conclusion that the jury instruction error could not have prejudiced Garth was plainly unreasonable. But for counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction, there is more than a reasonable probability that Garth would not have been convicted as an accomplice to attempted murder, as the evidence of intent was weak at best. In fact, the lawyer for the state admitted that he could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Garth intended that the clerk would be killed:
Jury, there’s one fact out here that screams out in this case. I can’t prove it to you beyond a reasonable doubt, but I want you to think about it. Why would somebody go into a store, in their neighborhood, and try to rob a clerk that they knew, with no mask on his face? ... You’re not going to get caught if you murder the guy. There’s not going to be any witnesses then. That fact cries out, and tells you, compels you, to the conclusion that you knew from the beginning they were going to kill James Hardy.
(R. at 20, p. 692-93) (emphasis added).
During closing arguments the state offered no other proof of Garth’s intent other than this theory which it conceded could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Garth’s guilt or innocence on this count hung entirely on his intent, yet Garth’s attorney failed to raise one single objection to the multiple erroneous instructions on intent, even in the face of a concession from the state that it could not prove intent. Such a failure prejudiced Garth and no reasonable court could have found otherwise. For this reason I respectfully dissent.
. The PCA court’s unreasonable application of Strickland was compounded by its inaccurate conclusion that Garth challenged only jury instruction number eleven. Because of this error, the PCA court failed to review the errors in the instructions on attempted murder. The PCA court’s conclusion on this matter was wrong. Garth did not limit his objection to jury instruction number eleven which specifically defines accomplice liability in Indiana, but rather stated generally that the "jury instructions given at his trial failed to adequately advise the jury that, in order for it to find Faraji Garth guilty of attempted murder as an accomplice or accessory, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Garth had 'specific intent to kill’ the alleged victim, James Hardy.” See Post-conviction Relief Brief at 13 (R. at 27, Ex. G to Ex. A, p. 13). In order to be convicted of accomplice liability for attempted murder in Indiana, the state had to prove that both the principal and the accomplice had the intent to kill the victim. Consequently any error in describing the mens rea for attempted murder was an error in describing the mens rea for accomplice liability for attempted murder. In any case, jury instructions must be viewed as a whole, so even if Garth failed to highlight other instructions, glaring errors in those instructions could not be ignored. A reviewing court may not look only at the jury instructions that mitigate an error and ignore those that intensify it. The PCA court's conclusion that there was "no compound error here” was plainly incorrect. See (PCA Decision at 10) (R. at 27, Ex. J to Ex. A, p. 10).