Petitioners Sahajeewa Rathnakumara Loku Kankanamge Don (Don), his wife, Shiyamalie Amaratunga Achthi, and their minor son, Minul Thankula Kankanamge,1 natives and citizens of Sri Lanka, legally entered the United States in 2000 as visitors and overstayed their allotted time. They conceded that they are removable, but requested asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on alleged persecution by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a rebel terrorist group in Sri Lanka also referred to as the Tamil Tigers. They also alleged persecution by the Terrorist Detective Bureau (TDB), a special unit of the Sri Lankan government formed by the army and police. They petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopting and affirming the adverse credibility determination of the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the concomitant denial of asylum.2 Because substantial evidence *740supports the adverse credibility determination, we deny the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Don alleges that he and his family received threats of physical harm from both the LTTE and the TDB, because a cook employed at the restaurant owned by Don was arrested by the TDB as a suspected LTTE terrorist. Don testified before the Immigration Judge (IJ) that prior to that incident in January 2000, he and his family were not threatened or harmed by the government or any terrorist groups, he did not support nor was he active in any political group, and he did not know that the cook was a Tamil Tiger until his arrest. Don stated that subsequently his life was threatened by the LTTE once in person outside of Colombo, and repeatedly by telephone, specifically warning that Don would be harmed if he did not get the police to release his former cook. Don speculated that the LTTE believed he had informed the TDB about the cook’s LTTE connection, but offered no direct testimony on that point. The LTTE never came to Don’s home, and neither he nor his family was physically harmed.3 Don agreed to try to get the cook released, and contacted several of his friends at the police station where the cook was imprisoned. He also submitted translated copies of several police reports made by his wife and him reporting death threats from the LTTE.
Don testified that he fled from his home to live in safety with relatives and, in his absence, the TDB came to his home twice to question him and requested that his wife convey a message to him to contact the TDB. Don’s wife testified that the TDB told her that if her husband did not come to the TDB headquarters, he would “know what is going to happen.” Don stated that he fears the TDB because of atrocities committed by the TDB in 1990, and that he told the Colombo police that he was afraid because the TDB was looking for him. He further testified that he spoke to the TDB by telephone and told them about the police reports that he made concerning the LTTE, but he never showed the reports to the TDB.
In support of his application, Don submitted a newspaper article reporting that an LTTE terrorist working at the Chinese Restaurant in Padukka was arrested and the TDB was unable to “interrogate” the unnamed owner of the restaurant, who fled. Don introduced into evidence a copy of his business license to establish that he was one of two partners owning a Chinese restaurant in Padukka. However, the IJ noted a discrepancy between the license date on the translated copy and the original.
The IJ cited material inconsistencies in Don’s testimony and the evidence related to the LTTE threats, and found Don’s account of threats from the TDB to be implausible.
Consequently, the IJ found that Don had not “made a credible and plausible claim for asylum let alone that it is more likely than not that he would be subjected to persecution on any grounds should he return.”
The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision stating: “The Immigration Judge’s conclusions regarding the inconsistencies in the respondent’s testimony form *741a sufficient basis for an adverse credibility finding.” Don timely appealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Where the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision. See Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir.2005). The standard of review for factual findings made by the IJ is a deferential substantial evidence standard, and credibility findings will be upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary result. Id. (emphasis added). This deferential standard of review “precludes relief absent a conclusion that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the agency’s result.” Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir.2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Adverse Credibility Determination
When the IJ denies asylum based “on an adverse credibility determination, he must provide specific, cogent reasons to support his determination ... [which] cannot be peripheral, but rather must go to the heart of petitioner’s claim.”4 Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir.2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Also, the IJ “must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of asylum.” Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 786 (9th Cir.2003).
The IJ based his adverse credibility finding on inconsistency in the evidence presented regarding a crucial date, the implausibility of Don’s account, and Don’s propensity for dishonesty.
1. Inconsistency in Evidence Presented Regarding a Crucial Date
Don provided the police “a date in writing” that the cook started working for him six months prior to the cook’s arrest in 2000, his testimony was that the cook was hired in 1996, and in his interview with the Immigration Officer he stated that the cook began work in 1998. The IJ questioned Don about the discrepancies and Don admitted that he lied to the police in Sri Lanka5 and did not remember the correct date when he was interviewed by the Immigration Officer. Nevertheless, Don professed to remember the actual date at the hearing.6 The IJ made an adverse credibility finding because of the lack of consistency about the important detail (date of employment) regarding the cook. Don’s inability to “state as to when it was that this man who was the source of him having to flee his country started to work for him” went to the heart of Don’s claim because it involved the very event upon which he predicated his claim for asylum. See Chebchoub v. INS, 257 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.2001) (explaining that inconsistencies in the details of events that form the basis for the asylum claim, specifically “testimony about the events leading up to [petitioner’s] departure,” go to the heart of the claim, and support an adverse credibility finding); see also, Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir.2006) (affirming that “[a] single supported *742ground for an adverse credibility finding is sufficient if it relates to the basis for petitioner’s alleged fear of persecution and goes to the heart of the claim,” and “[a]n inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim if it concerns events central to petitioner’s version of why he was persecuted and fled”) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although trivial discrepancies in dates cannot support an adverse credibility determination, see Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1065, the lack of details regarding the event that allegedly spurred the LTTE and the TDB to threaten Don goes to the heart of his persecution claim and is not trivial, particularly since Don’s testimony is vital to his claim that the terrorist cook was in his employ at the time of the arrest.7 See De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393-94 (9th Cir.1997) (affirming that “discrepancies relating] to the basis for [an] alleged fear of persecution ... support [a] negative credibility finding.”) (citations omitted); see also Singh, 367 F.3d at 1142-43 (upholding adverse credibility finding where discrepancy about date of key event “caused doubt about whether the [event] had occurred at all”).
Don’s assertion that lying about the employment date did not enhance his persecution claim and is therefore not relevant to a credibility determination is unpersuasive. Although generally, if the inconsistency does not “enhance” the applicant’s persecution claim, it will not be relevant to the credibility determination, see Lin v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 1158, 1165 n. 2 (9th Cir.2006), “when inconsistencies that weaken a claim for asylum are accompanied by other indications of dishonesty-such as a pattern of clear and pervasive inconsistency or contradiction — an adverse credibility determination may be supported by substantial evidence.” Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1067.
The dissenting opinion excuses this critical discrepancy by referencing Don’s “explanation that he lied to police in Sri Lanka regarding the cook’s hiring date because he was afraid for his life and he did not want the police to accuse him of being affiliated with the LTTE.” Dissenting opin., p. 748. However, this excuse does not explain why Don provided different dates to the asylum officer and to the IJ. Contrary to the dissenting opinion’s argument, dissenting opin., p. 748, the IJ explicitly rejected Don’s testimony because of the IJ’s conclusion that the discrepant dates given by Don were “critical facts” that prevented a “positive credibility finding.” The fact that the IJ admitted the referenced newspaper article and business license into evidence does not mean that the IJ retreated in any way from his adverse credibility determination. Nothing in the IJ’s decision suggests otherwise.
Our colleague in dissent describes the majority’s reliance on Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir.2006), as “mistaken” and “misplaced.” Dissenting Opin., pp. 748^49. However, in Singh, 439 F.3d *743at 1108, we articulated the unremarkable principle that “[a]n inconsistency goes to the heart of a claim if it concerns events central to petitioner’s version of why he was persecuted and fled.” The same premise may be found in other cases cited by the majority, which are not questioned in the dissenting opinion. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (9th Cir.2004); see also De Leon-Barrios v. INS, 116 F.3d 391, 393-94 (9th Cir.1997).
The approach taken in the dissenting opinion amounts to an impermissible reweighing of the evidence. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 969 n. 14 (9th Cir.1998) (“[W]e may not reweigh the evidence ... We merely determine whether the evidence compels such a conclusion.” (emphasis in the original)). The IJ specified “other indications of dishonesty,” including lying to the police and to the LTTE. The evidence does not compel a finding that the IJ impermissibly relied on these “indications of dishonesty” in making his adverse credibility determination. See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1170 (explaining that adverse credibility determinations must be upheld “unless the evidence compels a contrary result.”) (citation omitted).
2. Implausible Story of Fearing the TDB
The IJ pointed to other objective evidence in the record that eroded Don’s credibility, particularly Don’s implausible account of feared persecution from the TDB, a Sri Lankan combined police and army force. The IJ considered Doris story implausible because Don had relatives in the police department and had gone to the police station to report threats from the LTTE. The record further indicates that Don contacted friends who could influence the TDB to release the cook, and spoke to the TDB by telephone, describing filed police reports addressing the LTTE threats. These interactions with the TDB undermine Doris claim that he was evading the TDB. Also, if he feared the TDB, it is implausible that he would bring attention to himself by telling the police in Colombo that he feared the TDB because the TDB was looking for him. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination on this point. See Jibril v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.2005) (noting that “testimony that is implausible in light of the background evidence can support an adverse credibility finding”) (citation, emphasis, and internal quotations marks omitted).
The dissenting opinion also takes issue with the implausibility determination made by the IJ, primarily on the basis that the record does not support the finding that Don had friends in the police department who could influence the TDB. Dissenting Opin., p. 1645. Yet, ten pages earlier the dissenting opinion expressly references the fact that Don contacted his friends in the local police to get the cook released.
The dissent essentially contends that the country reports and other evidence compel the conclusion that the local police have no influence with the TDB. If this is the case, then why did Don seek the help of the local police to earn the cook’s release, even though the cook was arrested by the TDB? Moreover, if the cook was arrested by the TDB, why was he being held in a jail where Don believed his friends in the local police might have influence? Respectfully, the dissent makes a number of points that may well have led a majority of this panel to conclude differently than the IJ, were we reviewing the matter de novo. However, we cannot say that the evidence compels a contrary result.
3. Propensity for Dishonesty
The IJ found that Don had a “propensity for not telling the truth.” Don admitted *744lying to the Sri Lankan police and to the LTTE, because he was afraid of what would happen if he told the truth. See Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1065 (concluding that “[i]t strains credulity to hold that the evidence presented at the asylum hearing compels us to find Kaur believable for the sole reason that she admitted to being a liar.”); see also, Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir.1998) (“If the inconsistency were accompanied by other indications of dishonesty, we might deem the BIA’s finding justified.”); Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1066 (“[W]hen the inconsistency is accompanied by other indications of dishonesty, such testimony might in fact support an adverse credibility finding.”) (citation, alteration and emphasis omitted). “[I]t is incumbent upon the IJ to view each portion of an alien’s testimony, not solely as independent pieces of evidence with no bearing on the testimony as a whole, but in light of all of the evidence presented.” Id.
The dissenting opinion chastises the majority for failing to adequately explore the motivations for Don’s untruths. Dissenting opin., p. 751. However, the IJ did not act inappropriately in questioning whether Don feared the police, when his relatives and friends worked there. In addition, Don insisted that he did not lie to the LTTE even though he previously testified that he lied to the LTTE for the purpose of “buying time.”
In sum, the majority opinion follows the extremely deferential standard of review that guides our analysis. Because we are not compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the IJ, we must deny the petition. See Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1170.
B. Adequate Consideration of All Relevant Evidence
Citing Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir.1984), Don asserts that the IJ abused his discretion by not adequately considering all relevant evidence, including the newspaper article about the cook’s arrest, and the country reports. However, the IJ accepted the newspaper article into evidence, discussed it with Don, and referenced it in his decision. The IJ also admitted the country reports into evidence, heard testimony from Don’s wife that the LTTE remained a strong terrorist group that “can kill everyone in the family,” and accepted the fact that the LTTE was still an active terrorist group in Sri Lanka. Thus, the IJ considered the relevant facts presented by the article and the country reports in conformance with Don’s assertion “that the LTTE and TDB can still pose a considerable threat” generally. The country reports and the article do not, however, support Don’s contention that the LTTE and TDB are a considerable threat to him personally. See Rostomian v. INS, 210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2000) (recognizing that a claim based solely on general civil strife or widespread random violence is not sufficient to establish an objective fear of future persecution).
The IJ adequately considered all relevant evidence in his decision, as he specifically acknowledged, inter alia, the facts and circumstances reflected in the newspaper article and the country reports admitted in evidence. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 (9th Cir.2004) (affirming that “the [IJ] does not have to write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.”) (citation and alteration omitted). The IJ adequately articulated his decision, and did not abuse his discretion by failing to interpret the evidence in the manner advocated by Petitioner.
*745IV. CONCLUSION
Although a reasonable factfinder could have found Petitioner credible, no such finding is compelled by the evidence. Because a reasonable factfinder could have reached this result, we must uphold the IJ’s decision. See Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 874.
PETITION DENIED.
. Don is the principal or lead petitioner; his wife’s and child's petitions are derivative of his petition. Therefore, their asylum claims succeed or fail with Don's claims. See Kumar v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 520, 521, 525 (9th Cir.2006).
. The IJ also denied withholding of removal and CAT protection. However, Petitioner has abandoned these claims by failing to discuss them in his Opening Brief. See United States *740v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2006).
. Don. testified that some "unknown” people were hanging around his house after he left and "unidentified” persons stoned his house, but these people were not identified as individuals affiliated with the LTTE or the TDB.
. The REAL ID Act changed this requirement effective for asylum applications filed after May 5, 2005. See Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1064 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005).
. Admission of prior dishonesty can support an adverse credibility determination. See Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1065.
. A statement that one’s memory is better now than it was earlier supports an inference of untruthfulness. See Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 667 (N.D.Cal.1987) (recognizing that memory is fresher "closer in time to the subject events.”).
. Don submitted a newspaper article which reported that a LTTE terrorist was arrested at a Chinese restaurant in Padukka and the owner fled before the TDB could interrogate him. Only Don’s testimony identified the terrorist as his cook and himself as the owner of the specific Chinese restaurant referred to in the article. However, the business license submitted by Don indicated that there were two owners of a Chinese restaurant in Padukka, and the IJ specifically inquired about discrepancies in the character of the business and the license date. When documentary evidence offered to support a claim is questionable, an adverse credibility determination is supported. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2004) (refusing to credit documents that appeared back-dated, did not show the claimed injuries and omitted described medical treatment).