United States v. Paul Askew

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

The Fourth Amendment To The United States Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
First Principle
“The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries.” Sibron v. New. York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
A Simple Truth
A police officer may not detain a person on the street and, with no probable cause or warrant, insist that the person remove his or her clothing; nor, in these circumstances, may the officer undo the person’s clothing without his or her consent. If this is not the law, then the Fourth Amendment is a dead letter in our Constitution.

This appeal is about a citizen’s right to enforce Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches of his person. The case is important, because, as is clear from the argument presented to this court, the Government seeks to wreak havoc with the law under the Fourth Amendment. The majority holds that, following a Terry stop and a protective pat down that produces nothing, police officers may — without probable cause or a warrant — search a suspect, not for self-protection, but solely to facilitate an “investigation.” Because this holding reflects an extraordinary departure from well-established Supreme Court precedent, I respectfully dissent.

I. The Facts

The facts in this case, which are largely undisputed, are set forth in the District *549Court’s opinion. See United, States v. Askew, 313 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2004). The material facts bear repeating here, if only to show precisely how the Government seeks to strip the Fourth Amendment of content.

On the night of December 19, 2003, around 11:00 p.m., a radio run alerted Officer Anthony Bowman of the Metropolitan Police Department to a report of an armed robbery in the 700 block of 9th Street, S.E., in Washington, D.C. Officer Bowman canvassed the area in his patrol car, looking for individuals matching the description of the perpetrator: a black male, approximately six-feet tall, wearing a blue sweatshirt and blue jeans. The radio report reflected that the perpetrator had been last seen moving on 9th Street, S.E., in an unknown direction.
... [Wjithin approximately ten minutes of the robbery, Officer Bowman spotted defendant Paul Askew walking in the 200 block of 9th Street, S.E., five blocks from the scene of the robbery. ... While the description of the perpetrator mentioned a blue sweatshirt and blue jeans, Officer Bowman testified that the defendant was wearing blue sweatpants, “a navy blue jacket[, and] a darker blue fleece type jacket underneath. He had on two jackets.” Officer Bowman reported to the dispatcher that Askew “vaguely match[ed] th[e] description.” After noticing that the defendant had a moustache, Officer Bowman checked with the dispatcher to determine whether the robber also had a moustache. When the dispatcher responded affirmatively, Officer Bowman stopped the defendant.
Officer Bowman asked the defendant to come to the patrol car, and he complied. The defendant also complied with Officer Bowman’s further requests that he produce some identification, take his hands out of his pockets, and place his hands on the top of his head. Officer Bowman then told the defendant that he was being stopped because of his physical similarity to the description of a robber. When back-up units arrived, Officer Bowman returned to the interior of his car to check whether the police department computer returned any information on the defendant....
Officer James Koenig conducted a pat-down of the defendant and found nothing.[FN 2]
[FN 2] ... The government acknowledges that when Officer Koenig patted the defendant down, he did not find anything. The subsequent discovery of the gun at issue here was not the result of this pat-down.
Shortly afterwards, another officer, Officer Benton, drove the robbery victim to the place where the defendant was being detained, for the purpose of conducting a show-up. The victim remained in the car while Officer Koenig and Officer Anthony Willis brought the defendant to a place where he could be seen by the victim. The defendant was not in handcuffs at that time. Preparatory to the show-up, Officer Willis attempted to unzip the defendant’s outer jacket to reveal the sweatshirt underneath so the victim could better determine if the defendant was the robber. Officer Willis testified that he remembered the “blue hooded sweatshirt” described in the radio run and “wanted the complainant to see what [the defendant] had on to make sure that he wasn’t zipping nothing up to cover up. So I went to unzip it down so that ... they could see what he had on.” Officer Willis had difficulty, however, in unzipping the jacket when the zipper hit what he described as a “hard” or “solid” object and “didn’t go past [the object]. It stopped there. And at that time, that’s when [the defendant] *550knocked my hand down,” away from the zipper.
After the show-up, Officer Willis and Officer Edward Snead walked the defendant backwards toward the car, placed him on the hood of the car, and unzipped his jacket. Visible once the jacket was unzipped was an open black waist pouch, or “fanny pack,” with a silver object sticking out. On further inspection, the silver object was identified as a gun, and the defendant was handcuffed and arrested.

Id. at 1-3 & n. 2 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

In reviewing the District Court’s findings, there are several important points that are worth highlighting:

• The police requested Askew’s identification, which he produced without protest. The police next conducted a lawful Terry pat-down search, to determine whether Askew posed a danger to the officers on the scene. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
• The police officers’ pat down of Askew produced nothing.
• The police then brought Askew in front of the robbery victim and, without his consent and with no fear of danger, an officer partially opened Askew’s jacket to display what he was wearing underneath.
• The robbery victim who was brought to the scene for the show-up did not identify Askew as the perpetrator of the crime.
• Following the pat down and the show-up, the police officers no longer had reasonable suspicion to detain Askew pursuant to Terry, and they did not have probable cause or a warrant to further detain, arrest, or search him.
• However, after the show-up, when they had no reasonable suspicion and no probable cause, the officers continued to detain Askew against his will. As the District Court found: “Officer Willis and Officer Edward Snead walked the defendant backwards toward the car, placed him on the hood of the car, and unzipped his jacket.” Askew, 313 F.Supp.2d at 3.
• The officers found a gun on Askew’s person only after they unzipped his jacket without his consent.

It is important to emphasize here that the police officers engaged in two separate acts of unzipping Askew’s jacket. And in each instance, the officers acted without Askew’s consent. The first search occurred when an officer partially unzipped the jacket to reveal Askew’s sweatshirt to the robbery victim who was at the show-up. See id. at 4-5; Tr. of Motions Hr’g 8-10, Mar. 26, 2004 (Officer Anthony Willis describing two distinct unzippings of Askew’s jacket); Br. for Gov’t at 5-6 (describing two distinct unzippings). The second search occurred after the show-up was completed, and it was done to determine whether Askew had contraband on his person. Askew, 313 F.Supp.2d at 4-5; Tr. of Motions Hr’g 18-20, Mar. 26, 2004; Br. for Gov’t at 6. Thus, the second unzipping could not have facilitated the show-up, because it did not occur until “after the show-up procedure had ended.” Br. for Gov’t at 6.

II. The GoveRnment’s Argument

During oral argument, counsel was asked to explain how the Government could justify the officers’ searches of Askew’s person without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. The Assistant United States Attorney’s exchange with a member of the court is illuminating:

JUDGE: Is there a single case in the history of the United States [issued by either a] Court of Appeals [or the] Supreme Court, that says [that an officer may], post pat down, having found *551nothing [during the pat doum] get into [the defendant’s] clothing either by unzipping it, unbuttoning it, or removing it under Terry. Is there a single case that says that?
AUSA: There might not be a case directly on point as a show-up procedure if you’ve already had a pat doum.

Although the Assistant United States Attorney grudgingly acknowledged that she could cite no case law to support the officers’ search of Askew, she still went on to amplify an astonishing view of the Fourth Amendment on behalf of the Government:

JUDGE: Suppose [the officers] know from the [dispatcher’s] report that the [robbery suspect] wasn’t wearing a whole lot [and] a tattoo was clearly seen [on] her or his top of the chest.
JUDGE: Then the officers say [to the suspect], “Remove your clothing. ”
AUSA: They might be able to do that under the totality of the circumstances.
JUDGE: Really? Wow.
AUSA: Yes.
JUDGE: Under the Fourth Amendment, [an officer can require a person to remove his or her clothing], with no probable cause? ... That’s the Government’s position? No probable cause, pat down produces nothing, and under Terry [an officer] can say to someone on the street, “remove your clothes?”
AUSA: Under the totality of the circumstances, it’s a
JUDGE: Wow.
AUSA: It may be ... feasible.

This is the Government’s theory of this case. And, as counsel initially indicated, there is no case law to support this stunningly dangerous reading of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, later in her oral argument, counsel appeared to understand the breathtaking sweep of the Government’s position:

JUDGE: [In the hypothetical that we were discussing earlier], we know there is a tattoo on [the] skin [off the person [who has been detained], so [the officers can] start removing clothes?
AUSA: Well, maybe under the totality of the circumstances it would not be reasonable to remove his clothes.

The Assistant United States Attorney was surely correct in offering this belated concession that it would not be reasonable for an officer to remove clothes. It is quite clear under Fourth Amendment law that it is not reasonable for an officer to detain a person on the street and then, with no probable cause or warrant, insist that the person remove his or her clothing or, even worse, undo the person’s clothing without his or her consent.

III. The Controlling Legal Principles

Almost 60 years ago, the Supreme Court reminded us that the Fourth Amendment’s

guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike. It marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values of our civilization and, with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause supported by oath or' affirmation. And the law provides as a sanction against the flouting of this constitutional safeguard the suppression of evidence secured as a result of the violation ....

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). These fundamental precepts have not faded with time. Just this past Term, the Court again made it clear that “ ‘[warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless “the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reason*552able under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

“Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer’s action must be justified at its inception, and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 185, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted). Terry authorizes “protective searches.” Terry does not, however, authorize other searches as being within a class of “steps to investigate further.” Rather, Terry

held that when an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is invest gating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, the officer may conduct a patdown search to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon. The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. Rather, a protective search — permitted without a warrant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause — must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby. If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).

The Government argues that the disputed searches in this case were permissible, because they were only “minimally intrusive” and “taken for the sole and legitimate purpose of facilitating the show-up procedure.” Br. for Gov’t at 18. The majority agrees, holding that a show-up authorizes investigative searches which are to be assessed according to a balancing test.

This is not the law. The Court’s rationale in support of the decision in Terry always has been that “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added).

The majority cites a number of cases in an attempt to create an exception to or gloss on Terry that gives police officers authority to search a suspect in furtherance of a show-up during a Terry stop. Were such an exception to be indulged, it would inevitably swallow the Court’s holding in Terry. The meaning of Terry and its very limited scope are clear:

The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. *553In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.

Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64, 88 S.Ct. 1889. And nothing in the cases the majority relies upon changes the basic requirements of Terry. Terry allows only limited “protective searches,” not “investigative searches.”

IV. The Officers’ Unzippings Of Askew’s Jacket Were “Searches”

The Government does not dispute that the officers’ unzippings of Askew’s jacket were “searches” under the Fourth Amendment. This is unsurprising, because the Court in Terry made it clear that even a “frisk” rises to the level of a “search” that is within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. The Court said:

[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a “petty indignity.” It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-17, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (internal footnotes omitted); see also Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45, 88 S.Ct. 1889 (officer’s “thrust[ing] his hand into [the suspect’s] pocket, discovering several glassine envelopes, which, it turned out, contained heroin” was an illegal search).

V. The Officers’ Unlawful Unzipping Of Askew’s Jacket During The Terry Stop

Askew first contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers partially unzipped his jacket during the show-up:

On reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous, police officers may briefly detain the person and may conduct a limited pat-down search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons. The police officer violated the Fourth Amendment here when, after the pat-down search failed to reveal any weapon, he unzipped Mr. Askew’s jacket during a show-up procedure for the purpose of revealing to the victim what was underneath. The district court erred when it held the search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all because it occurred during a show-up identification procedure.

Appellant’s Br. at 8. Appellant is correct in what he asserts. The partial unzipping of Askew’s jacket constituted a warrantless search; and the search was unlawful because it did not adhere to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

The majority argues that the Government’s interest in identification of an armed robber tends to outweigh the intrusion on privacy at issue in this case. This is not the test to determine the legality of a search during a Terry stop. Rather, the only search authorized by Terry is a “protective search” which “must be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Terry does not authorize police officers to search the person of a suspect without a warrant solely to facilitate a show-up investigation. *554As Government counsel conceded, no federal appellate court has ever held that police officers can continue to search a suspect after a Terry pat-down search produces nothing. “If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” Id.

The majority then suggests that the officers’ partial unzipping of Askew’s coat was permissible because it was not a “full search.” There is no less-than-a-full-search exception to Terry. Indeed, the Terry decision categorically rejects talis-manic distinctions between a so-called “full-blown search” and conduct short of it. 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The Court was even clearer in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), rejecting the suggestion that only victims of “full-blown” warrantless searches deserve protection under the Fourth Amendment:

[The] dissent suggests that we uphold the action here on the ground that it was a “cursory inspection” rather than a “full-blown search,” and could therefore be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. As already noted, a truly cursory inspection — one that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it — is not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. We are unwilling to send police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description that is neither a “plain view” inspection nor yet a “full-blown search.”

Id. at 328-29, 107 S.Ct. 1149. Under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing [of any great personal value to the suspect].” Id. at 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149. And if a search done pursuant to a Terry stop does not satisfy the strictures of Terry, then it is illegal. The Court has noted time and again that “[t]he sole justification of the search in [a Terry stop and frisk] situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868.

In an effort to employ a balancing test with a de minimis exception for less than full-blown investigative searches, the majority is faced with the task of trying to find support for its claim that Terry allows more than just “protective searches.” This is an impossible task, because the law is not what the majority claims.

The majority first suggests that the strictures of Terry can be modified if necessary to facilitate a show-up procedure. But this supposition finds no support in the case law, and neither the majority nor the Government cites a single Supreme Court or Court of Appeals decision endorsing this view. The majority cites Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), in support of the proposition that a witness show-up may be permissible in some circumstances. But Summers does not say that police officers may search a suspect solely to facilitate a show-up. The requirements of Terry remain inviolate even during a show-up, and there is no case that says otherwise. This explains why Government counsel backpedaled during oral argument from first asserting that a police officer can insist that a suspect take off her clothing during a Terry stop to facilitate a show-up, to a concession that, “[w]ell, maybe under the totality of the circumstances it would not be reasonable to remove ... clothes.”

*555The majority also contends that, because police officers may take reasonable investigative steps during a lawful Terry stop, it necessarily follows that they may search a suspect solely to facilitate a show-up. The majority cites Hiibel, apparently to suggest that the decision somehow carves out an exception to the rules governing Terry stops. There is nothing in Hiibel to support this reading of the decision. Hiibel’s reference to “investigate further” certainly was not meant to loosen Terry from its moorings. Hiibel says that “questions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops.” 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451. But it does not say that a police officer may search a suspect’s person solely to facilitate a show-up. As the Court made clear in Dickerson, police officers may not use a Terry stop to conduct an “evidentia-ry search that Terry expressly refused to authorize.” 508 U.S. at 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130. Officers may not “rummage and seize at will” during a Terry stop. Id. It is noteworthy that the Government does not cite Hiibel at all, much less for the proposition that it creates an investigative-search gloss on Terry.

In amplifying on investigative techniques that may be utilized during Terry stops, the majority additionally cites United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). But this case does not hold that police officers may search a suspect solely to facilitate a show-up. In Hensley, the Court merely holds that, “if police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.” Id. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. Nothing in Hensley even hints that police officers may conduct an investigative search of a suspect’s person during a Terry stop. The Hensley Court simply confirms that police officers are “authorized to take such steps as ... reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop,” Id. at 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, which of course is the rationale underlying Terry. The Hensley decision also notes that the “police [are] entitled to seize evidence revealed in plain view in the course of [a] lawful [Terry] stop,” id., but this is a far cry from saying that a warrantless search is permissible under Terry after a lawful pat down has given the officers no cause for concern over their safety.

For want of any authority endorsing the legality of the officers’ search of Askew during the show-up, the majority looks to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985), for support. Indeed, the portion of the majority opinion upholding the officers’ first unzipping of Askew’s jacket appears to rest almost entirely on Hayes. This is unfathomable.

Hayes involved a situation in which the petitioner was the principal suspect in a burglary-rape. The police went to petitioner’s home to obtain fingerprints. When petitioner expressed reluctance to accompany officers to the station house, one officer said that they would arrest him. Petitioner replied that he would rather go to the station than be arrested. He was then taken to the station and fingerprinted. When it was determined that his prints matched those taken at the scene of the crime, he was arrested. The Supreme Court found that, because there was no probable cause to arrest petitioner, no consent to the journey to the police station, and no prior judicial authorization for detaining him, the investigative detention at the station for fingerprinting purposes violated petitioner’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. The majority gives Hayes new meaning, however, claiming that the *556case stands for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to take fingerprints during a Terry stop. This is not what Hayes says. Rather, the Court in Hayes held that

the line is crossed when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes. We adhere to the view that such seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.

Id. at 816, 105 S.Ct. 1643. Following this holding, the opinion goes on to say, in passing, that “[n]one of the foregoing implies that a brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting, where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable cause, is necessarily impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has never held that fingerprinting during a Terry stop is lawful, neither in Hayes nor in any other decision. And, in the 22 years since Hayes was decided, the fingerprints comment upon which the majority relies so heavily in this case has never been invoked by the Court. One need only look at the Court’s decision in a case like Minnesota v. Dickerson — decided eight years after Hayes— to understand that the comment in Hayes has been of no moment to the Court, and that it certainly has not altered the analytical framework governing cases involving Terry stops. It is also noteworthy that the Government’s brief relegates Hayes to a “cf.” citation, with the following cryptic parenthetical: “(suggesting that ‘brief detention in the field for the purpose of fingerprinting’ may be permissible ‘where there is only reasonable suspicion not amounting to probable cause’).” Br. for Gov’t at 20 (emphasis added). This is unsurprising, because no good authority has ever attributed so much to Hayes as does the majority here. To say that reliance on Hayes is a reach is an understatement, which may be why the majority appears to go out of its way in attempting to explain how Hayes governs the judgment in this case.

The simple, uncontested point here is that there is no worthy precedent supporting the Government’s claim that a police officer may search a suspect’s person solely to facilitate a show-up during a Terry stop. And, neither Hayes, Hiibel, Hensley, Summers, nor any other decision issued by the Court offers any support for the majority’s investigative-search gloss on Terry. As Government counsel conceded during oral argument, there is no case under the Fourth Amendment that allows an officer to detain a person on the street and then, with no reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, to undo the person’s clothing, searching the person without his or her consent. Warrantless searches during Terry stops are appropriate in only one circumstance — where officers, though lacking reasonable cause for arrest, must search for weapons to ensure their own safety. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Terry does not otherwise condone the physical search of a person. In other words, the only search allowed during a Terry stop is a “protective search” that is demonstrably necessary for the discovery of weapons. There is no such thing as an investigative search under Terry. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (“If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.”).

*557In the instant case, the officers had no basis to conduct a search of Askew’s person by partially unzipping his jacket. The pat down did not reveal a gun, so the officers had no grounds to fear for their safety. The sole justification for a search following a Terry stop and frisk is the protection of police officers and others who are nearby. If the frisk or pat down produces nothing, then the officers have no reason to be concerned about their safety or the safety of others nearby. When Askew pushed the officer’s hand away from the zipper on his jacket, he was merely giving vent to his Fourth Amendment right to avoid an unwarranted search of his person. He had already been frisked, so the officers were not entitled to pursue a further search of his person. Terry and its progeny make it clear that the officers were forbidden from attempting to partially unzip Askew’s coat without his permission, which they neither sought nor received.

At bottom, the majority’s decision rests almost entirely on its interpretation of Hayes. As the majority sees it, Hayes allows the police during a Terry stop to take fingerprints for identification purposes, so it follows that the police during a Terry stop may unzip an individual’s jacket for identification purposes. This is very much akin to the argument advanced by Government counsel that, if police officers are told that a suspect has a tattoo on her chest, the officers during a Terry stop may order the suspect to remove her clothing for identification purposes. Neither Hayes nor any other Supreme Court decision supports this extraordinary view of the Fourth Amendment.

“Before [a police officer] places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so.” Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64, 88 S.Ct. 1889. The officers discovered nothing during their pat down of Askew and thus had no “reasonable grounds to believe that [he] was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 63, 88 S.Ct. 1889. Therefore, when they acted to partially unzip his coat without a warrant without probable cause, and without consent, their initial search of Askew violated the Fourth Amendment.

VI. The Officers’ Unlawful Searoh Of Askew After The Show-Up Had Ended

Because it is clear that the police officers violated Askew’s Fourth Amendment rights when they partially unzipped his jacket during the show-up, there is nothing more that need be decided. There is no dispute over the fact that the police officers never would have uncovered the gun but for their initial search of Askew. Therefore, the District Court should have granted Askew’s motion to suppress on this ground alone. Nonetheless, Askew presses the claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were additionally violated when the officers unzipped his jacket after the show-up was completed:

Although the seizure and the pat-down were justified by a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Askew resembled the robber, the reasonable suspicion, tenuous to begin with, was dissipated by the additional information: the pat down did not reveal a gun, and the show-up procedure did not result in a positive identification of Mr. Askew as the robber. Taking all the circumstances together, the officers’ particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity had vanished. At that point, there was no basis for further detention. The officers knew that their original suspicion that Mr. Askew had committed an armed robbery — the very basis for the stop — was wrong, and they knew that a pat-down *558search for weapons produced nothing. Mr. Askew was entitled to be released after the robbery victim did not identify him as the person who had robbed her.

Appellant’s Br. at 13-14 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Askew is right in what he asserts. See, e.g., United States v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that “instead of terminating the seizure when their suspicions concerning contraband proved unfounded, the Agents continued to detain the defendants while they embarked upon [an] expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.... This continued detention was nothing more than an unlawful fishing expedition. The fact that it happened to be successful does not, of course, make it lawful.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

The majority argues that the officers who conducted the second search of Askew may not have known of the results of the show-up when'they unzipped Askew’s jacket in search of contraband. This supposed ignorance on the part of the officers surely did not justify their second unlawful search of Askew. Were the courts to endorse such a rule, police officers would be free to extend Terry stops into indefinite detentions. It goes without saying that the Constitution does not condone this.

Apparently recognizing the fragility of this line of analysis, the Government wisely does not pursue it. In dodging the issue, the Government first acknowledges that “it is undisputed that appellant was not identified as the robber,” and then “assume[s] for purposes of this appeal” that the facts support appellant’s contention that “the officers’ reasonable suspicion justifying the Terry stop ... ‘dissipated’ when ‘the pat down [of appellant] did not reveal a gun, and the show-up procedure did not result in a positive identification of Mr. Askew as the robber.’ ” Br. for Gov’t at 24-25 & n. 12 (quoting Appellant’s Br. at 13). It is easy to understand why the Government chose to present its argument on these terms. It is clear from the record here that, after the show-up concluded, the robbery victim and the officer with her simply drove away without implicating Askew. In these circumstances, it would have been obvious to any reasonable officer on the scene that Askew had not beem identified by the victim as the armed robber. Why? Because if the robbery victim had identified Askew as the armed robber, it is inconceivable to think that the officer in the car with her would have left the show-up without first alerting the remaining officers on the scene that Askew had been identified as the armed robber. Therefore, when the officer in the car left without indicating a positive identification, the officers on the scene had no further grounds to hold Askew.

Under established Fourth Amendment law, it is not reasonable for an officer to detain a person on the street and then, with no reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant, insist that the person remove his or her clothing or, even worse, undo the person’s clothing without his or her consent. Neither the majority opinion nor the Government’s brief to this court offers any authority to suggest otherwise. Askew should have been released after the show-up was completed. He certainly would have posed no threat to the officers at that point. Askew undoubtedly would have continued on his way, just as he had been doing before he was stopped by the police.

The Government argues that, because an officer felt a hard object near Askew’s waist when the officer partially unzipped his jacket during the show-up procedure, “the police developed reasonable articula-ble suspicion during the show-up that appellant had a weapon near his waistband, which was independent of their suspicion *559that he had committed the robbery.” Br. for Gov’t at 25. Thus, according to the Government, the officers could search Askew after the show-up. And the majority, in turn, advances a claim (not raised by the Government) that the officers could search Askew after the show-up to protect themselves while disengaging from their encounter with him. These claims are fatally flawed. It is quite disingenuous for the Government to claim that any alleged risk faced by the officers during the show-up allowed the officers to search Askew after the show-up had ended. If there was any risk, it arose during the show-up — when a witness and several officers were nearby— not afterwards. And if the police officers had an “objectively reasonable” basis to believe that a protective search was necessary, they would have acted immediately, during the show-up, to diffuse any potential for danger. They did not do this. Therefore, once the officers patted down Askew and found nothing and then completed the show-up without Askew being implicated in the robbery, Askew should have been free to leave.

The crucial point that the Government simply ignores is that an

officer’s continued exploration of [a suspect’s clothing] after having concluded that it contained no weapon [is] unrelated to “the sole justification of the search [under Terry, namely,] the protection of the police officer and others nearby.”

Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868). A continued search by the officers in these circumstances is “the sort of eviden-tiary search” that has been “condemned” by the Supreme Court. Id.

The majority concedes that the officers’ second search of Askew was conducted only because of the officers’ initial unzipping of Askew’s jacket. In other words, the officers had no new information justifying the second search. The second search would not have occurred if the officers had not partially unzipped Askew’s jacket during the show-up. As the Court made clear in Dickerson, police officers may not use the fruits of one unlawful search to justify a further search:

Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondent’s pocket, because Terry entitled him to place his hands upon respondent’s jacket, the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was not immediately apparent to him. Rather, the officer determined that the item was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Because this further search of [the suspect’s] pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.

Id. at 379, 113 S.Ct. 2130. “In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantee[ ] ... of the ... inviolability of the person,” the Supreme Court has made it clear “that evidence seized during an unlawful search [cannot] constitute proof against the victim of the search. The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C.Cir.1978) (en banc). Because the initial unzipping of Askew’s jacket constituted an unconstitutional search of his person, it could not provide a lawful ground for the second search.

Conclusion

During oral argument, the Government conceded that the District Court erred in holding that “the Fourth Amendment presents no impediment to show-ups in*560volving suspects who are constitutionally detained.” Askew, 313 F.Supp.2d at 5. And the majority acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment should control the disposition of this case. The concession and acknowledgment are of little solace, however, because the majority’s decision effectively holds that procedures relating to show-ups are not subject to the strictures of Terry. The Supreme Court has never held that police officers may search a suspect during a Terry stop merely to facilitate a show-up. And no federal appellate court has held that the Court’s decision in Hayes allows police officers to continue searching a suspect after a Terry pat-down search produces nothing. The majority ignores this legal landscape and reaches a result never before condoned by a federal appellate court.

We are bound to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (per curiam) (holding that “only [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents”). The Court has not overruled Terry and its progeny, nor has it ever endorsed an investigative-search gloss on Terry. This court has no authority to rewrite Fourth Amendment law.

I fear that, if this judgment survives as precedent, the Fourth Amendment soon will be a dead letter in our Constitution, at least with respect to cases brought before this court.