concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The plaintiffs name may suggest this case is about religion, and in a sense that is true. It is about Oklahoma high school football. And there is only one path to the honor and the glory of interscholastic football competition in Oklahoma: membership in the Oklahoma Secondary School Activity Association (OSSAA). Members of the Association enter the promised land of regularly scheduled games with neighboring schools and the prospect of championship competition with the leading teams in the State; those not of the elect are thrown into the outer darkness of few teams to play against and long bus rides to get to them. For public schools, membership in the OSSAA is sola gratia: all they have to do is knock, and the door is opened unto them. For nonpublic schools, narrow is the gate and difficult is the way. They may be admitted only according to the inscrutable will of a majority vote. The question is whether this violates the Equal Protection Clause.
I cannot agree with the majority that the OSSAA rule automatically admitting public schools but requiring majority approval for nonpublic schools fails rational-basis review, and I therefore dissent from Part II.B.1. I would reach a similar result, however, by finding that Christian Heritage has suffered discrimination as a “class of one.” See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per cu-riam). Christian Heritage has intentionally been excluded from the OSSAA even as other small nonpublic schools have been admitted. The only reason the OSSAA advanced for this differential treatment, concern over the size of the geographic district chosen by Christian Heritage, is flatly contradicted by the record. Moreover, assuming that a class-of-one claim requires a showing of subjective ill will — a question we need not resolve in this case— summary judgment in favor of the OSSAA was inappropriate because Christian Heritage has submitted evidence from which a reasonable factfinder might conclude that its exclusion from the OSSAA was a product of animus or hostility against nonpublic schools.
I therefore concur in the judgment under a class-of-one theory.1
*1038I. The Equal Protection Challenge to Requiring Nonpublic Schools to Obtain Majority Support for Admission to the OSSAA
Christian Heritage challenges the OS-SAA’s disparate treatment of public and nonpublic schools as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Public schools can obtain membership automatically by paying a fee and filing any other required reports. Nonpublic schools, by contrast, “must be approved by a majority vote of the existing membership” in addition to satisfying the fee and reporting requirements. OSSAA Const. art. Ill, § 1(b), App. Yol. 1, at 57. Because Christian Heritage concedes that nonpublic schools do not form a suspect class and are not otherwise entitled to heightened scrutiny, we apply ordinary rational-basis review, asking whether “there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).
That standard is highly deferential. Under rational-basis review, a classification enjoys “a strong presumption of validity,” and the challenging party must negate “ ‘every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973)). Because the courts “never in-siste ] that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute,” it does not matter whether an asserted rational basis actually motivated the classification. U.S.R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). A classification does not fail rational-basis review merely because it is over-or under-inclusive, lacking “ ‘mathematical nicety.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911)). In other words, a rational classification may be predicated on a generalization, even if that generalization “is subject to exceptions.” Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822-23 (11th Cir.2004). Finally, we may not “speculate as to whether some other scheme could have better regulated the evils in question.” Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir.2004). The question is whether the classification rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose, not whether it is the best or exclusive means of accomplishing that purpose.
The OSSAA argues that the distinction between public and nonpublic schools serves its interest in “preserving equitable competitive opportunities.” Appellee’s Br. 23. Surely that is a legitimate state purpose. High school athletic associations exist not only to crown champions, but to further students’ educations and their development as individuals. See OSSAA Const, art. II, § 2(a), App. 57 (setting forth the objectives of the OSSAA, which include “[t]he promotion of important educational and cultural values, attitudes, appreciations, and skills”). Football and basketball are no fun-and are thus less valuable as an educational and developmental experience-if one school or small group of schools defeats everyone else in competition, year after year. Indeed, the goal of approximate competitive parity has become a driving force even at the professional level. See Tom Pedulla, NFL Dynasties Go ‘Way of Dinosaurs, ” USA Today, Jan. 24, 2003, at 1A (“For leagues, parity is the holy grail of sports.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It may be wrong, but it is not irrational, for the OSSAA to believe that nonpublic schools, as a class, enjoy unfair competitive advantages. A petition distributed in *1039March 1998 by a public-school superintendent identified five potential advantages: (1) “Non-public schools[’] ability to offer financial aid (scholarships),” (2) “Non-public schools[’] district size”; (3) “Non-public schools[’] student transfer restrictions”; (4) “Non-public schools[’] membership audits for verification of OSSAA classification”; and (5) “Percentage of students who participate in OSSAA activities.” App. 1137. The record suggests other possible advantages as well, including superior facilities and coaching staffs, selectivity of admissions, grade school athletic programs, parental support, and financing. Id. at 535-36.
Whatever the reasons, it is evident that nonpublic schools as a class, in Oklahoma and throughout the country, have a track record of exceptionally strong athletic performance. During the run-up to Christian Heritage’s application, Bishop McGuinness Catholic High School, one of twelve nonpublic schools admitted to the OSSAA, won the boys Class 4A basketball championship for four years straight, from 1998 to 2001. Nonpublic schools make up just 2% of the OSSAA’s 471 members, but between 1995 and 2003, they won 15% of boys basketball championships, over 20% of boys and girls cross country championships, and a whopping 69% of volleyball championships. During the same period, nonpublic schools also won a disproportionate share of state championships in spring baseball, fast-pitch softball, boys and girls golf, and boys and girls track. A survey of high school athletic associations conducted in 1999 reveals that nonpublic schools have enjoyed similar competitive success in other states: in Indiana, “[pjrivate sehool[s] win an inordinate number of state championships”; in Hawaii, “[bjasically, private schools have been winning more state championships than the public schools”; in New York, “[sjehools are getting frustrated that the Parochial and Private schools are winning our State Championships in many sports”; in South Carolina, “private schools ... seem to win the state championships”; in Oregon, there has been “friction” due to “increased successes that private schools are having in our state championship.” Id. at 544-45.
It is not irrational for the public schools that make up the vast majority of OSSAA members to vote for measures designed to ensure that athletic competition in Oklahoma not be dominated by schools that enjoy what they consider to be inherent and unfair advantages. See Archbishop Walsh High Sch. v. Section VI of the N.Y. State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 88 N.Y.2d 131, 643 N.Y.S.2d 928, 666 N.E.2d 521, 523-24 (1996) (upholding a similar nonpublic school admission rule against an equal protection challenge); Denis J. O’Connell High Sch. v. Va. High Sch. League, 581 F.2d 81, 85-88 (4th Cir.1978) (upholding blanket exclusion of all nonpublic schools from public athletic association).
The majority nonetheless concludes “that OSSAA’s majority voting requirement is not rationally related to a legitimate purpose.” Maj. Op. 1036. It reaches this judgment for essentially two reasons.
First, the majority points to various OS-SAA rules prohibiting athletic scholarships and recruiting and requiring transfer students to refrain from competition for a year. Id. at 1035. Because these rules effectively counteract the supposed advantages nonpublic schools may enjoy, the majority says, the more draconian remedy of excluding nonpublic schools unless they can summon a majority vote for admission is unnecessary and irrational. That argument does not warrant a finding of unconstitutionality.
To begin with, the availability of “some other scheme” to address the problem is irrelevant on rational-basis review. Pow*1040ers, 379 F.3d at 1217. Even if OSSAA rules better address — or even fully address — the competitive advantages enjoyed by nonpublic schools, that does not make the majority voting requirement irrational. State actors are free, under the Equal Protection Clause, to adopt blunderbuss procedures rather than narrowly tailored regulations, or to enact redundant policies that serve the same legitimate state purpose. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam) (acknowledging that by adopting a mandatory age limit of 50 years for uniformed police officers, rather than “individualized testing after age 50,” the State “perhaps has not chosen the best means to accomplish [its] purpose,” but holding that “where rationality is the test, a State ‘does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect’ ” (quoting Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153)).2
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the OSSAA rules do not fully address the competitive advantages enjoyed by nonpublic schools. OSSAA rules do nothing to rectify imbalances in admissions selectivity, in financing, in facilities or coaching between public and nonpublic institutions. Although some individual OSSAA members may not consider these advantages “unfair,” see App. 526 (noting that “ability to pay” constrains private-school admissions and that public school districts in “[vjibrant communities” also provide “donations, support and comparable sacrifices” for athletics), OSSAA as an association is free to reach a different conclusion. It is not irrational for the OSSAA to adopt case-by-ease applications as a backstop to generally applicable but difficult-to-police rules.
Second, the majority asserts that the member-voting procedure is “complete[ly] disconnected]” from any legitimate purpose OSSAA may be trying to achieve. Maj. Op. 1034. The majority opinion complains that “there is no possible way to know [in a referendum voting system] whether an applicant was excluded for a [valid] reason ... or for some other discriminatory purpose.” Maj. Op. 1036 (quoting Archbishop Walsh, 643 N.Y.S.2d 928, 666 N.E.2d at 525 (Titone, J., dissenting)). This argument, however, pertains most directly to due process rather than equal protection, and the plaintiffs failed to preserve their due process claim. The U.S. Supreme Court has in other contexts questioned policy enforcement through referendum voting — but as a due process problem. And it is worth noting that the Court ultimately found the mechanism constitutionally valid. City of Eastlake v. *1041Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976) (rejecting contention that a citywide referendum on zoning laws constituted a deprivation of due process because “voters were given no standards to guide their decision” and “no mechanism existed, nor indeed could exist, to assure that the voters would act rationally”). Recast as an equal protection claim, the majority’s argument sweeps too broadly. If a voting mechanism is completely disconnected from legitimate state ends simply because we cannot be sure why voters make the decisions they do, no vote by secret ballot will survive rational-basis review in an equal protection challenge.
Surely the majority does not mean to suggest that referenda are per se irrational. Perhaps it means, instead, that given the potential for abuse, final OSSAA approval ought not to have been entrusted to public schools, which have a vested interest in the outcome. Yet this too is a due process rather than an equal protection argument. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) (holding that the Due Process Clause bars trial by potentially biased judges); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) (elaborating the due process test for bias); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (trial by judges who have a “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in the case violates the Due Process Clause). In any event, whether the state has adopted the best possible means of enforcing its policy is not the issue before us. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1217. We must determine whether the enforcement mechanism selected bears some rational connection to the state interest at issue. Given that the State may refuse to admit nonpublic schools automatically, Maj. Op. 1031, someone must decide for each nonpublic applicant whether admittance is appropriate. Some person or group of persons must vote. Perhaps the State was unwise to entrust that vote to the majority of OSSAA members, but there is hardly a “complete disconnect” between the majority voting requirement and the State’s legitimate interests.
Indeed, the connection is relatively strong. Member schools are familiar with the actual operation of the OSSAA guidelines: they must implement the rules day-to-day. Moreover, they are familiar with the competitive balance among member schools at any one time. They arguably are therefore better positioned than an OSSAA staff employee, for example, or any other person lacking hands-on experience administering OSSAA’s rules, to determine whether a new applicant is institutionally capable of meeting OSSAA requirements. They are also well suited to judge whether a new entrant would adversely affect competitive parity. True, this exercise of discretion by member schools is, like all exercises of discretion, open to abuse. But that potential for abuse does not render the voting mechanism as a whole irrational.
Besides the problems inherent in referendum voting, the majority contends that the OSSAA voting requirement is irrational for another reason — because many OS-SAA member schools harbor an irrational “distrust” or “hostility” towards nonpublic schools. Maj. Op. 1035. The majority points to the fact that even after Christian Heritage submitted a revised application responding to the supposed concerns of member schools, the Association denied Christian Heritage admittance a second time. Id. But this fact, though admittedly troubling, does not impugn the rationality of the voting mechanism. Instead, it calls into question the treatment Christian Heritage received relative to other similarly situated applicants. Put another way, it *1042suggests the Association discriminated against the plaintiff as a class-of-one. But a class-of-one allegation constitutes a separate claim and necessitates a separate inquiry. The only question here is whether the OSSAA’s majority-voting requirement, on its face, rationally serves a legitimate public purpose. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 668, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981). Because I believe that the answer is “yes,” I would affirm the judgment of the district court rejecting the challenge to OSSAA voting procedures.
II. The Class-of-One Challenge to Christian Heritage’s Rejection as a Member of the OSSAA
Although I cannot regard as irrational the OSSAA’s decision to require nonpublic, but not public, schools to obtain majority support for admission to the Association, I would hold that Christian Heritage Academy has submitted evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that its exclusion from the Association violates the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (per cu-riam).
Having decided to admit at least some nonpublic schools to the OSSAA, the organization must have a lawful and rational basis for its decisions. The OSSAA is an agency of the state, see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001), and therefore cannot grant or withhold the privilege of participating in the public benefit of its programs on an arbitrary or invidious basis. As an arm of the state, the OSSAA cannot pick and choose its members like a fraternity or a private club.
Under the Supreme Court’s opinion in Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, a plaintiff may state a “class of one” equal protection claim by alleging that it “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” The OSSAA has admitted other nonpublic schools that are materially identical to Christian Heritage: of similar size, located in comparable suburban areas, and — so far as the record discloses— sharing the same competitive advantages as other nonpublic schools. The only reason for this differential treatment offered by the OSSAA, both in its brief and under persistent questioning at oral argument, is that members may have harbored concerns about the geographic district identified in Christian Heritage’s application.
Two factors undercut this explanation. First, the OSSAA has admitted comparable nonpublic schools, both in urban and suburban areas, with identical or even larger geographic districts. Second, after its 1998 application was defeated by a vote of 153-184, Christian Heritage attempted to address members’ concerns by shrinking its proposed geographic district. Yet its 1999 application was defeated by an even more lopsided vote of 113-188. Far from explaining the decision, Christian Heritage’s geographic district tends to show that the exclusion was arbitrary. With no other explanation offered by the OSSAA, see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County, 440 F.3d 1202, 1211 n. 4 (10th Cir.2006) (declining to consider a possible rational justification in a class-of-one case where the defendants did not raise it in court), it appears that Christian Heritage has been “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated” without any rational basis. I therefore would reverse the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the OSSAA.
*1043There is (or has been) uncertainty in this and other courts over whether the plaintiff in a class-of-one equal protection suit must show that its discriminatory treatment was motivated by some form of subjective malice, vindictiveness, or ill will, in addition to being arbitrary and irrational. See Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383 F.3d 1199, 1210-11 (10th Cir.2004) (describing but not resolving the issue). The Supreme Court in Olech held that allegations of “irrational and wholly arbitrary” action state a claim under a class-of-one theory, “quite apart from the Village’s subjective motivation.” Olech, 528 U.S. at 565, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted). It therefore declined to consider the role that “subjective ill will” might play in a class-of-one claim. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In a separate opinion, not commanding a majority, Justice Breyer concurred specifically on the ground that the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants took “vindictive action” resulting from “illegitimate animus” and “ill will.” Id. at 566, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). On two occasions, this Court has adopted Justice Breyer’s suggestion and has rejected class-of-one claims in the absence of evidence of subjective ill will. Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 848-49 (10th Cir.2005); Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Sch., 263 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (10th Cir.2001).3
On the facts of this case, it is not necessary to wade into this doctrinal morass. Christian Heritage has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of its applications for membership in the OSSAA was motivated by subjective ill will. Various OSSAA reports indicate that its members harbored “strong negative feelings” toward nonpublic schools, and “placed ALL non-public schools into an unfavored group status.” App. 530. One document explicitly suggests that “bias and prejudice” might have motivated opposition to nonpublic schools’ admission. Id. Whether or not these statements are tantamount to party admissions, as Christian Heritage claims, they serve as sufficient evidence at summary judgment to allow a jury to conclude that ill will or vindictiveness actually motivated the decision. Thus we need not resolve whether subjective ill will is an essential element of a class-of-one claim; Christian Heritage prevails under any formulation. The best course, I think, is to follow our decisions in Jicarilla and Jennings by reserving the question for a case in which the outcome actually matters. See Jicarilla, 440 F.3d at 1210 (holding that “it is not necessary to resolve” whether animus is “a necessary con*1044dition for a class-of-one claim” because “it is not a sufficient one”); Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1211-12 (noting that the plaintiff “could not prevail” if subjective ill will is required, but “not restfing] our decision on that ground”).
III. Conclusion
I CONCUR in the reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the OSSAA. I respectfully DISSENT from the equal protection analysis of Part II.B.l which culminates in a grant of summary judgment for Christian Heritage. Instead, I would remand to the district court for further proceedings on Christian Heritage’s class-of-one claim.
. I also agree that Christian Heritage waived its due process argument by failing to brief it on appeal. Because the argument is waived, I do not consider it necessary or appropriate to comment on whether Christian Heritage has "identified a property or liberty interest at stake.” See Maj. Op. 1031.
. The majority distinguishes Archbishop Walsh, which is on all fours with this case, on the ground that the OSSAA rules regarding geographic areas, transfers, athletic scholarships, and recruiting eliminate the concerns that underlay the New York rule upheld in that case. See Maj. Op. 1035-36. This is tantamount to holding that a state athletic association is constitutionally required to adopt a more narrowly tailored rule — a proposition flatly inconsistent with precedents governing rational-basis review. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316, 96 S.Ct. 2562; Powers 379 F.3d at 1217. Oddly, the majority distinguishes Denis J. O’Connell on the opposite ground that it involved an even less narrowly tailored rule than the OSSAA rule in this case, namely, a blanket exclusion of nonpublic schools. Maj. Op. 1036. All three cases— this case, Archbishop Walsh, and Denis J. O’Connell — involve the same concerns about nonpublic schools, which the majority concedes are rational. Somehow the majority concludes that it is rational to exclude all nonpublic schools, and rational to adopt rules designed to eliminate the supposed unfair advantages of nonpublic schools, but irrational to adopt the intermediate course of subjecting the admission of nonpublic schools to a majority vote. I find these distinctions wholly unconvincing.
. Other courts of appeals have divided on the question. One circuit appeared to reject a requirement of subjective ill will, see Jackson v. Burke, 256 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam) ("To be sure, proof of subjective ill will is not an essential element of a 'class of one’ equal protection claim.”), but has since called its early statements "merely dicta” and determined that the question remains open, Bizzarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir.2005). Another has explicitly construed Olech as requiring subjective animus, see Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir.2000) ("glossfingj” Olech as requiring animus), although subsequent panels have attempted to change course, see Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 683-84 (7th Cir.2005) (noting competing lines of cases within the circuit and reserving the question). Two courts of appeals have adopted an approach similar to that of the majority, recognizing two or three types of class-of-one claims, only one of which requires subjective ill will. See Mikeska v. City of Galveston, 451 F.3d 376, 381 & n. 4 (5th Cir.2006); TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, Hamilton County, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir.2005). But see Shipp v. McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 916 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that Olech requires "illegitimate animus or ill-will”), overruled in part on other grounds, McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc).