dissenting:
The Court holds, “Garey never clearly stated his desire to proceed without counsel.” I respectfully dissent. I conclude Garey clearly, unambiguously, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and affirmatively asserted his intent to represent himself.
A. Underlying Facts
Garey had two separate colloquies with the district court before trial. The first colloquy occurred during the district court’s hearing on his motion to disqualify his court-appointed attorney, Scott C. Huggins. The following exchange took place:
COURT: I am not appointing a new lawyer for you. The question is: Do you want to proceed with Mr. Huggins, or do you want to proceed with representing yourself?
GAREY: ... I’m not voluntarily waiving my right to have counsel. Mr. Huggins failed to show me the videotape—
COURT: I need an answer. Do you wish to have Mr. Huggins represent you, or do you wish to represent yourself?
GAREY: Your Honor, if you’ll be fair with me. I want to make one more statement and I’ll answer your question affirmatively.
Garey again explained why he believed Huggins should be disqualified. The colloquy then continued:
GAREY: I am not going to let Mr. Huggins represent me. And if the Court is giving me no other choice, I will have to go along with the choice of involuntarily waiving my right to counsel, involuntarily waive. But I am not going to let Mr. Huggins represent me .... Faretta says the right goes to the accused. 413 U.S. at page 806, 819 through 20, 93 S.Ct. 2607, says it’s the accused who suffers the adversity-if the defense failed.
COURT: [The Defendant wants] [c]on-fliet-free counsel to represent him. He has concluded, in his mind, that Mr. Huggins is not conflict-free; and therefore, he does not wish to have Mr. Huggins represent him. If the Court does not appoint other counsel, and indicates to the defendant that the only counsel that he can be represented by, in an appointed capacity, that the government is going to pay for, is Mr. Huggins, then it’s the Court’s understanding that the defendant wishes [to] proceed with representation of himself without counsel. Is everything I stated accurate?
GAREY: Involuntarily without counsel, yes.
I’ll say it again, Your Honor. I’m going to involuntarily represent myself because I do not feel comfortable with the victim of the crime that I’m accused of—
COURT: ... [T]he Court finds that the defendant has voluntarily and knowingly decided to—
GAREY: Involuntarily, Your Honor.
COURT: You can put your spin on it *1167The Court is going to request that Mr. Huggins remain as stand-by counsel in case that becomes appropriate or necessary.
The second colloquy was the next day, before the trial began. The district court encouraged Garey to allow Huggins to represent him and assured him that even if he accepted Huggins as court-appointed counsel, he had preserved for appeal the issue of whether Huggins had a conflict or was otherwise ineffective. The following colloquy ensued:
GAREY: Your Honor, I’m not voluntarily waiving my Sixth Amendment rights, but I’m not going to allow Mr. Huggins to continue as representation. I mean, if you let him stay on as stand-by counsel for insurance, I’m not going to argue with the Court on that ....
COURT: ... [D]o you wish to represent yourself or do you wish Mr. Huggins to represent you?
GAREY: I’m going to manage my own destiny at that point, Your Honor, because I have no other alternative except to proceed either with an attorney who I believe is a conflict or to represent myself. The Court is only giving me two options, so I have to choose the lesser option, which is to go without counsel, because I don’t want to go with a counsel that we’re not agreeing eye to eye on. I’m strong about my issues.
Garey then tried the case pro se with Mr. Huggins remaining as standby counsel. He now appeals, arguing the district court violated his right to counsel by finding he clearly asserted his right of self-representation and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
B. Standard
In order for a defendant to assert his right to represent himself, he must clearly and unequivocally make the request. Marshall v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 374, 376-77 (11th Cir.1991). This Court employs a reasonable person standard to determine whether the defendant affirmatively stated his intent to represent himself. Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1143 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). A defendant is required to assert the request “unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made.” Id. (quoting Dorman v. Wainwright, 798 F.2d 1358, 1366 (11th Cir.1986)). A defendant need not “use any particular words to invoke the right of self-representation.” Marshall, 925 F.2d at 377. Likewise, there is no “talismanic formula” necessary “to open the eyes and ears of the court to his request.” Dorman, 798 F.2d at 1366.
C. Garey’s Actions
After reviewing both colloquies, I conclude Garey’s actions to be a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se. The district court presented Garey with two constitutional choices after Garey requested new counsel.1 The court gave him *1168the option of representing himself or continuing with his court-appointed counsel. He did not equivocate. Garey affirmatively chose self-representation multiple times, and he never asserted a desire to have Mr. Huggins represent him.
During the first colloquy, in response to the district court asking Garey if he planned to represent himself, Garey stated, “Involuntarily without counsel, yes _ I’ll say it again, Your Honor. I’m going to involuntarily represent myself .... ” The next day, in response to the district court asking Garey whether he wanted to represent himself, Garey stated, “I’m going to manage my own destiny at that point .... The Court is only giving me two options, so I have to choose the lesser option, which is to go without counsel .... I’m strong about my issues.!’2 Finally, Garey never wavered in his intent to represent himself. Garey repeatedly stated his intent to represent himself when presented with the choice of proceeding with Huggins as appointed counsel or proceeding pro se.
As for Garey’s “dogged persistence” in labeling his actions as “involuntary,” Gar-ey’s decision was voluntary because it was the product of a choice between two legally adequate courses of action. Labeling one’s actions as “involuntary” does not make those actions involuntary, unclear, or equivocal. Garey wanted new appointed counsel to which he had no right. Whether Garey continued with Huggins as his lawyer or represented himself, he would have considered either choice “involuntary” because he would not have received what he requested, new appointed counsel. Both courses of action the court presented to him, however, were constitutionally adequate. Therefore, his actions were voluntary.
D. Marshall v. Dugger
Garey and the Court, however, rely on this Circuit’s precedent in Marshall v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 374 (11th Cir.1991). In particular, the Court concludes “[t]he colloquy in both Marshall and this case are strikingly similar.” The Court holds “[t]here was no ‘request,’ written or oral, for self-representation” in this case, just as there was no request in Marshall. Unlike the defendant in Marshall, who never affirmatively requested self-representation, Garey actually requested it clearly and unequivocally multiple times.
In Marshall, the district court presented the defendant with three options: “(1) continue with his appointed counsel; (2) represent himself -with the aid of standby counsel; or (3) represent himself alone.” Marshall, 925 F.2d at 377. In response, the defendant said, “I don’t feel as though Mr. Osteen [his court-appointed counsel] is qualified to handle my case.” Id. at 376. Subsequently, the prosecutor said, “Okay. Then I assume your answer is yes, you don’t want Mr. Osteen advising you in any respect; is that correct?” Id. The defendant then said, “Right.” Id. The district court interpreted the exchange as an assertion of Marshall’s right to represent himself. Id. On appeal, this Circuit properly concluded, “Marshall simply rejected *1169representation or standby representation by his appointed counsel. He did not affirmatively choose self-representation.” Id. at 377.
Following that line of reasoning, the Court now concludes “[t]he closest [Garey] came to asking the court that he be allowed to represent himself was when he stated ‘if the Court is giving me no other choice, I will have to go along with the choice of involuntarily waiving my right to counsel, involuntarily waive.’ ” Citing Marshall, the Court holds “there was no ‘request,’ written or oral, for self-representation.”
In contrast to the defendant in Marshall, Garey actually stated he intended to represent himself.3 As discussed above, Garey stated multiple times that if the district court would not appoint new counsel, he intended to represent himself. The defendant in Marshall never chose to represent himself. He only refused to have appointed counsel, which the district court interpreted as asserting the right to self-representation. See Marshall, 925 F.2d at 377. Unlike the defendant in Marshall, Garey did assert an intention not just to dismiss his appointed counsel but also to proceed pro se, doing so on multiple occasions.
E. Conclusion
This Court has recognized the difficulty district courts face during proceedings such as these and that “shrewd litigants can exploit this difficult constitutional area.” Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.1990). Even after indulging every reasonable presumption against waiver, Garey still clearly and unequivocally stated his intention to represent himself and voluntarily decided to dismiss his court-appointed counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). We are moving toward requiring magic words or a talismanic formula to adequately request self-representation if we deny a defendant his voluntary and repeated request to represent himself solely because he labels his request as “involuntary.” Magic words and talismanic formulas are not necessary. See Dorman, 798 F.2d at 1366. Rather the law simply requires the defendant to assert his request unambiguously so that no reasonable person could say the request was not made. Stano, 921 F.2d at 1143. Applying this standard, I conclude Garey clearly, unequivocally, and voluntarily decided to forego representation and proceed pro se..
. Garey was given two constitutional choices, and his choice between them was voluntary. During his colloquies with the district court, Garey claimed the district court should have disqualified Mr. Huggins because of a conflict of interest. The district court correctly found that Mr. Huggins was not acting under a conflict of interest, and Garey does not challenge this finding on appeal. See Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1401 (11th Cir.1987) (concluding a mere hypothetical conflict will not suffice to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment). The district court, therefore, presented Garey with the constitutional choice of proceeding with Mr. Huggins as his appointed counsel or representing himself. See United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.1997) (holding a reviewing court need only be "confident the defendant is not forced to make a 'choice' between incompetent counsel or appearing pro se.”); Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir.1980) *1168(holding the choice will be considered voluntary so long as the choice is not constitutionally offensive); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir.1976) ("A criminal defendant may be asked, in the interest of orderly procedures, to choose between waiver and another course of action” and just because he does not like his choice does not make that choice involuntary).
. In addition, Garey understood the concepts of standby counsel and agreed to have standby counsel as "insurance.” He also knew the law and cited to the correct page for the holding of Faretta, a controlling Supreme Court precedent.
. The majority is absolutely correct when it states "Marshall was also presented with a choice between constitutional alternatives, but there we looked for something more-specifically, an initial clear and unequivocal request for self representation." In this case, I looked for something more, and I found something more, a defendant who asserted an intention to represent himself multiple times.