dissenting.
When interpreting an insurance policy, Oregon courts examine the terms and conditions contained in the policy to determine the intentions of the parties. Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 Or 303, 307, 985 P2d 1284 (1999). In this case, the majority concludes that the term “roof’ in a homeowner’s insurance policy can include an arrangement of polyethylene plastic sheeting, six one-thousandths of an inch thick, that the homeowner temporarily stapled to the plywood sublayer of what had been his roof after removing the existing wood shakes.* 1 If the homeowner and a representative of the insurance company had examined the house together before the policy was issued, observed temporary plastic sheeting rather than wood *48shakes covering the sublayer, and discussed whether the policy’s term “roof’ would apply to the temporary plastic sheeting — and thus that the policy would cover a loss from damage to the plastic sheeting for the same premium that would cover a loss from damage to an intact wood shingle or shake roof — they undoubtedly would have agreed that it did not.2 It follows, in my view, that no reasonable juror could conclude that the term “roof’ in the policy includes the plastic sheeting at issue here. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
The majority accurately describes the coverage, exclusions, and exceptions that, when considered together, determine the kinds of losses — and the causes of those losses — that are covered by the policy at issue here. The dispute is over the meaning of the term “roof’ as used in the policy.
The majority begins well enough with the proposition, “No roof is permanent.” 349 Or at 41. It certainly is true that, at some level, nothing human is permanent, and, even at a more mundane level, we can all agree that house roofs need to be replaced from time to time. But the majority then jumps off a roof of its own by declaring that the concept of permanency is “unhelpful” in determining the definition of “roof.” Id. at 44. How can that be? “Permanency” is one aspect of determining whether the materials and arrangement of the covering of a dwelling constitute a “roof,” as that term is used in a homeowner’s insurance policy. Simply put, there are differences in useful life — as well as in strength and imperviousness to the elements — of plastic tarps used as the covering for a dwelling, compared to a wood shake or shingle roof.
The majority instead adopts what it calls a “functional approach” to defining a roof: “When a roof is sufficiently durable to serve the functional purposes [of covering and protecting a building against weather-related risks], it is still a ‘roof within the ordinary understanding of that term,” *49even if it is not necessarily permanent. 349 Or at 41. It is true, of course, that, in some “ordinary’ sense, any material that covers the top of a structure is a “roof’ — whether it be a sheet of galvanized steel over a backyard shed, a canvas tarp atop a tree house, or a piece of plywood over a chicken coop. But context is key, and here the term “roof’ is not used in an advertisement for a garden shed or an ordinance setting standards for keeping chickens. Rather, the context here is a homeowner’s insurance policy and, although the term itself is not defined in the policy, it is a “term[ ] of a writing,” and therefore is “presumed to have been used in [its] primary and general acceptation,” ORS 42.250, in such a policy. See Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 470, 836 P2d 703 (1992) (When examining a disputed term in an insurance policy, this court considers “the particular context in which that term is used in the policy and the broader context of the policy as a whole.”). The “functional approach” adopted by the majority glosses over the context in which the term “roof’ is used.3
This policy covers a “dwelling” and describes the roof of the covered dwelling as “wood shingle or shake.” No reasonable juror could conclude that the insurer and the homeowner, when they entered into the insurance contract, intended the term “roof,” as it applies to this insured “dwelling,” to cover a single sheet of galvanized steel, a canvas tarp, or a piece of plywood. Similarly, no reasonable juror could conclude that the parties intended the term “roof’ to include the plastic tarps that the homeowner stapled to the plywood sublayer after he removed the wood shakes as a temporary measure until he could install new wood shakes.4
*50In deciding this case, we must, of course, put to one side the fact that the plastic tarps at issue here obviously did not adequately cover or protect the house — indeed, although the homeowner’s expert stated that the arrangement “was adequate to protect the home for one or two years in normal circumstances” and that it was “functionally permanent,” the plastic sheeting in fact was partially blown off the very next day after the homeowner had installed it.5 We can also put to one side the question of just how much difference there is between the concept of “permanent” relied upon by the insurer and the Court of Appeals and the majority s concept of “durable.”
Even without those considerations, the majority still returns to the very concept of permanency that it had just rejected in relying on the opinion of the homeowner’s expert that the plastic sheeting stapled to the plywood was “functionally permanent.” 349 Or at 45 (quoting expert affidavit). The expert’s wording reveals what should be apparent to all: that no roof lasts forever, but that homeowners and insurers routinely distinguish between materials and types of construction that are intended to be “permanent” and materials and types of construction that are intended to be “temporary.” The majority, appropriately, does not want to decide whether “permanency” is one or two years or five or ten. 349 Or at 44. And this case does not require us to make that distinction. Rather, notwithstanding the expert’s affidavit, it is plain that the plastic tarps were not intended to be permanent — they were a temporary expedient, which the homeowner installed on his own after he removed the shakes as part of “replacing the roof.” In agreeing to provide coverage for certain losses when the “roof’ was damaged, the insurer *51did not undertake the increased risk of insuring the kind of temporary covering that the homeowner substituted for the roof referred to in the policy. Because the policy does not cover losses that resulted from damage to the covering at issue here, the trial court correctly granted the insurer’s motion for summary judgment.
Linder, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.In his complaint, homeowner tellingly states that he had removed the shakes because he was “replacing the roof.”
To be sure, the insurer might have been willing to provide coverage for the dwelling and its contents, notwithstanding the fact that plastic sheeting rather than wood shakes covered the sublayer, but the insurer likely would have required a higher premium to offset the greater risk that the less robust material would be damaged by a storm.
This dissent responds to the analysis undertaken in the majority opinion. One might also question, however, the majority’s premise that “whether a particular material is ‘suitable for the construction of a roof is a factual issue for the jury.” 349 Or at 45. On the contrary, this court has said that the interpretation of an insurance policy is “a question of law.” Hoffman, 313 Or at 469. Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals concluded, the determination of whether the temporary covering over plaintiffs house was a “roof’ for purposes of the insurance policy is for the court, not for the jury. Certainly, if there was a dispute over what the covering consisted of, when it was installed, or some other issue of fact, that question would be for the jury. But here, where there is no such dispute, to submit to the jury the legal question of whether the covering came within the meaning of the term “roof’ in the policy seems inconsistent -with. Hoffman.
The majority reviews three cases cited by the insurer, which it either dismisses as not persuasive because they rely on “permanency” as an aspect of a *50“roof’ — a proposition that the majority had earlier rejected- — or because they differ on the facts. See, e.g., 349 Or at 44 (distinguishing contrary holding in Aginsky v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 409 P Supp 2d 1230 (D Or 2005), because the temporary roof structure, consisting of walls and a ridge and joisting system, was put over a roof that had been completely removed, in contrast to the plastic here that was attached to the sublayer). The majority ignores the larger point: federal and state courts around the country have held, on summary judgment, that a temporary covering put in place while a “more permanent” roof is repaired or replaced is not a “roof’ for purposes of a homeowner’s insurance policy. This court should follow those decisions.
The expert also inaccurately described the plastic sheeting as being six millimeters thick, rather than six mils thick- — an error of approximately 3,930 percent.