dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in two respects from the Court's opinion.
*824I
I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in entering an order prohibiting Laux from contacting Heidi's family, including Heidi's parents and Heidi's and Laux's children. Under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act, Ind.Code § 34-26-5-1 (2004) et seq., and particularly Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(b)(2), a court is authorized to order the relief that the trial court ordered here. Indeed, the Act specifically contemplates that its relief can be entered in conjunction with a criminal case. Ind. Code $ 34-26-5-6(1) & (4) (2004). The Court's rationale appears to be that the persons protected by the order here did not request it in the form specified in the Act. However, there is no question but that they sought the protection granted (after sentencing, Heidi's father expressed his gratitude to the trial court for the order (Tr. at 597)) and also no due process concerns; the evidence that caused the trial court to enter the order was presented in open court and Laux had 2a chance to defend against it. (Tr. at 508, 505, 528, 529, 580-31, 533-34.) Given that the parties benefiting from the relief granted desired the relief and that Laux's due process rights were not violated, I believe the trial court acted within its discretion in entering an order prohibiting Laux from contacting Heidi's family.
II
The Court reviews Laux's request that the sentence of life without parole be revised. The Indiana Constitution provides that "the Supreme Court shall have, in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review and revise the sentence imposed." Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4. Our rules authorize revision of a sentence "if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Unlike the Court, I would grant limited relief.
I turn first to "consideration of the trial court's decision."
When imposing a sentence of life without parole, the same heightened standards used in death penalty cases apply. Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind.1998) ("The statute provides that life without parole is imposed under the same standards and is subject to the same requirements."), after remand, 722 N.E.2d 339 (Ind.2000); see also Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (2004). Because a sentence of life in prison without parole is imposed under the same standards as the death penalty, we require the same specificity from a trial court sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole as we would a court sentencing a person to death. Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 936. Neither Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) nor recent statutory changes 1 lessen these requirements. Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 (Ind.2003).
As the Court points out, after briefing on this case was completed, we remanded this case to the trial court for a new sentencing order because the one originally entered by the trial court did not comply with these requirements. As the Court also points out, the trial court's revised sentencing order is sufficient to satisfy the general requirement that the trial court find that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance. It is certainly the case that a proper statutory aggrava*825ting cireumstance was charged and submitted to the jury ("the defendant committed murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing burglary"). The jury found that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. I conclude that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute exists. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(k)(1) (1998). As such, I believe the sentence imposed is authorized by law. Furthermore, given the nature of Laux's attack on Heidi, I would assign this aggravating cireumstance weight in the highest range.
However, in my view, cumstances present in this case are such as to warrant a sentence less than life without parole. The trial court itself found that Laux had "no significant history of prior criminal conduct." Indeed, there is absolutely nothing of record to suggest that Laux ever had any difficulty with the law whatsoever-either as a juvenile or an adult. In my view, absence of eriminal history is the weightiest of all mitigating cireumstances. One who has conformed his or her conduct to the dictates of our society is entitled to consideration upon committing a first offense. Laux maintained a blemish-free legal history throughout his childhood and adulthood. The record indicates that following graduation from high school and Purdue University, Laux was hard-working, honest, and responsible. Under these cireumstances, I would assign weight to the absence of any prior criminal history in the highest range.
Laux clearly was unable to deal with the separation from Heidi and must face severe consequences as a result of his terrible, violent behavior. It appears that he recognizes that fact and has expressed sincere remorse. The aggravating circumstance here is weighty indeed but in my view does not outweigh the mitigating circumstance. In light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender, I would revise the sentence imposed to 65 years in prison.
. "If the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly." Pub.L. No. 117-2002, § 35-50-2-9(e) (2004).