dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Justice Rucker's interpretation of the Legislature's intent is highly plausible and, indeed, essentially one to which I onee subscribed when I concurred in Justice Dickson's dissent from the denial of transfer in Ellis v. Catholic Charities, 685 N.E.2d 476, 477 (Ind.1997) (Dickson, J., dissenting from the denial of transfer). However, I believe that the State's proffered interpretation of the Legislative intent is equally plausible *286and the doctrines of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence warrant affirming the trial court's decision here, a decision that reflects established practice in Indiana juvenile courts.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case reflects the first time an Indiana appellate court has held that a parent has the automatic right to withdraw a prior voluntary consent to an adoption or to the termination of his or her parental rights. Neal v. Termination of the Parent Child Relationship of M.N., 768 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Compare Rhodes v. Shirley, 234 Ind. 587, 593, 129 N.E.2d 60 (Ind.1955) (adoption); In re J.W.W.R., 712 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (termination of parental rights); Ellis v. Catholic Charities, 681 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (adoption), transfer denied, 685 N.E.2d 476; In re Snyder, 418 N.E.2d 1171, 1180 (1981), 1981 Ind.App. LEXIS 1515 (adoption and termination of parental rights). The Court of Appeals justified its departure from precedent at least in part on the fact that Justice Dickson and I had dissented in Willis and Justice Rucker, as a member of the Court of Appeals, had dissented in J.W.W.R. However, precedent remains that a parent cannot set aside his or her consent "unless it was obtained by fraud or duress or unless the parent is incompetent." J.W.W.R., 712 N.E.2d at 1085 (quoting Ind.Code § 31-385-1-12(1)). The Legislature has not changed this longstanding interpretation.
Indiana law is clear that a parent's consent to the termination of his or her parental rights must be voluntary and a parent who contends that a consent given was not voluntary has a statutory right to a hearing on that issue. The statute-if not the Constitution-mandates that this right is entitled to vigorous protection. But stare decisis and legislative acquiescence have long since established that a parent cannot set aside his or her consent unless it was obtained by fraud or duress or unless the parent is incompetent.
Over the years, authorities on Indiana juvenile court practice have also adopted this interpretation of statute and precedent. See Frances G. Hill & Derelle Watson-Duvall, The CHINS Deskbook 2001, ch. 10-4; Judicial conference of Indiana, Juvenile Justice Benchbook, § T-100 at 2-5 (1999); J. Eric Smithburn & Ann-Carol Nash, Family Law-Children In Need of Services, § 26.14 at 369-370 (West 2002). That is what Judge Cherry did in this case. I would affirm his decision.
BOEHM, J., concurs.