dissenting.
In Bader v. Johnson this court was called upon to determine whether Indiana recognized the tort of "wrongful birth." 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.2000). We declared, "[llabeling the [parents'] cause of action as 'wrongful birth' adds nothing to the analysis, inspires confusion, and implies the court has adopted a new tort." Id. at 1216. Thus, we decided to treat a so-called wrongful birth cause of action the same as any other claim for medical negli-genee. In doing so, we determined that existing law controlled the nature and extent of available damages.
At the time Bader was decided, at least twenty-two states and the District of Columbia had recognized a claim of wrongful birth, while at least eight states had barred such claims either by statute or judicial decision. See Bader v. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (vacated by Bader, 7382 N.E.2d 1212, but setting forth those jurisdictions allowing or disallowing a claim for wrongful birth). As one might expect, those jurisdictions recognizing a tort of wrongful birth differed not only on the elements of the tort but also on the recoverable damages. For example, some courts allowed recovery for extraordinary medical and related expenses associated with a child's disability, while others did not. See id. at 1125. At least one state that permitted such recovery, applied a benefits rule, which offset the recovery of expenses by the value of the benefit that parents receive as parents. Id. (citing Euisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich.App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kurapati, 236 Mich.App. 315, 600 N.W.2d 670, 673 (1999)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920 (1977). Too, several states recognizing the tort of wrongful birth differed over whether to allow recovery for emotional distress damages.
By treating the plaintiffs' claim no differently than any other claim of medical negligence, this court declined to engage in the foregoing debate. Today's decision changes course, enters the debate, and retreats from the principle we announced in Bader.
I acknowledge a distinction between Bader and the case before us. In Bader we declined to recognize the alleged tort of "wrongful birth" and thus analyzed the claim under traditional principles of medical malpractice. By contrast, more than a decade ago this jurisdiction determined *710that the cause of action labeled "wrongful pregnancy" existed in Indiana.3 See Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). Although declaring, "[sluch a cause of action is indistinguishable from any other medical negligence action," id. at 7, citing policy considerations, the court nonetheless concluded "the costs of rearing a child born after an unsuccessful sterilization procedure may not be recovered from the health care provider." Id. at 9.
Although the claim in this case alleges a "wrongful pregnancy" as opposed to a "wrongful birth" the rationale the majority uses to limit the recoverable damages is equally applicable to both. It is true, as the majority points out, in Bader this court was not confronted with and thus did not address "a challenge to the anticipated ordinary costs of rearing and raising the child." Slip op. at 3. Nonetheless, we were clear that if the parents proved negligence then they were "entitled to damages proximately caused by the tortfeasor's breach of duty." Bader, 732 N.E.2d at 1220.
By today's decision the majority appears to have endorsed the view that an action for wrongful pregnancy exists in Indiana, and has decided that for policy reasons child-rearing expenses are not recoverable under such an action. Because I see no reason to depart from Bader, I would apply here the same analysis used for other medical malpractice cases. If Seslar proves negligence, then she is "entitled to damages proximately caused by the tort-feasor's breach of duty." Id. The expense of raising and educating a child falls in this category. Therefore I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. The label "wrongful birth" generally refers to claims brought by the parentis of a child born with birth defects alleging that due to negligent medical advice or testing they were precluded from making an informed decision about whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child, or, in the event of pregnancy, to terminate it. Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind.1991). The label "wrongful pregnancy" refers to claims for damages brought by the parents alleging that the conception of an unexpected child resulted from negligent sterilization procedures or a defective contraceptive device. Id.