dissenting.
Griffin offered the testimony of Lorinda Youngceourt, his former attorney. Younge-ourt, in an offer to prove in question and answer form, testified that she met with William Dulin in the course of preparing to defend Griffin in this case, and in that meeting Dulin confessed that he had committed the carjacking. I think Youngcourt should be viewed as a disinterested party. I also believe her testimony is corroborated by enough other evidence that its exclusion deprived Griffin of his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his *454defense. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the Court's conclusion that this testimony is not sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the basic fairness doctrine enunciated in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
Griffin was denied an opportunity to present Youngcourt's testimony because Dulin's confession was deemed hearsay if offered to prove the truth of Dulin's statement that he was the perpetrator. The same evidence was excluded as impeachment of Dulin under the doctrine that impeachment is improper if the sole basis for calling the witness to be impeached (Dulin) was to lay the groundwork for otherwise inadmissible impeaching evidence (Younge-ourt's testimony). Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899, 904-05 (Ind.2001).
I agree that Youngeourt's testimony does not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule. Her account of Dulin's confession is not permitted as a statement against interest under Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(@8)1 because Dulin was not "unavailable" as that term appears in Indiana Evidence Rule 804(a)2 Indeed, Dulin was present and testified at Griffin's trial. Nor was Youngeourt's testimony admissible as a prior inconsistent statement by a witness under Indiana Evidence Rule 80l(d)(1)3 because Dulin's confession to Youngcourt was not given under oath. For the reasons given in the Court's initial opinion, I also agree that this court correctly applied Indiana precedent which does not permit Youngcourt's testimony as impeachment of Dulin if Dulin was called as a witness solely to obtain his denial of a confession, thereby laying the groundwork for Youngcourt's impeaching testimony. Accordingly, I agreed with the majority and concurred in the original opinion affirming Griffin's conviction under Indiana Evidence Rules. I now believe I was incorrect in that view.
In Hubbard v. State, 742 N.E.2d 919, 922 (Ind.2001), this Court recently repeated the admonition from Huffman v. State, 543 N.E.2d 360, 375 (Ind.1989) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038), overruled on other grounds by Street v. State, 567 N.E.2d 102 (Ind.1991):
[When the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense collides with the State's interest in promulgating rules of evidence to govern the conduct *455of its trials, the merits of the respective positions must be weighed, [and] the State's interest must give way to the defendant's rights if its rules are "mechanistically" applied to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Id. Youngeourt's testimony, although not falling within any of the hearsay exceptions, was required to be permitted if excluding this evidence deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial and specifically the right to present witnesses in his defense. I think it did.
The majority correctly notes that Chambers identified four factors when it required admission of testimony of three witnesses who claimed to have heard confessions to the crime by a third party: (1) whether the confession was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred; (2) whether each statement was supported by other evidence in the trial; (8) whether the confession was against the third party's interest; and (4) whether the third party was present and could be cross-examined. 410 U.S. 284, 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973).
The majority distinguishes Chambers by pointing out that: (1) Griffin was permitted to attack Dulin's credibility; (2) the trial court allowed some testimony alluding to Dulin's favorable evidence; (8) the confession was unlike the confession in Chambers because it was not made to a disinterested acquaintance and because the corroborating evidence was insufficient; and (4) the confession was made to one person as opposed to multiple people.
In my view, these factors are not sufficient to distinguish Chambers. First, permitting Youngeourt to allude to unspecified other evidence "that would strengthen [Griffin's] case" is a far ery from letting the jury hear that someone else admitted to the crime.
Second, there was substantial other evidence corroborating Dulin's statement that he committed the crime. Youngeourt's version is at least consistent with the account given by Patricia Griffin, who also claimed to have heard Dulin admit to the crime. Patricia Griffin further testified at trial that Dulin showed her where the car was after the carjacking. As the majority noted, she, like Dulin, had given police varying accounts of the crime, but at trial she testified that Dulin had admitted to committing the crime 4 Dulin admitted that he met with Youngcourt after Griffin was arrested, although he denied making a confession. Furthermore, Dulin testified that he was dating Patricia Griffin at the time the incident took place and that he had access to her house where the crime was instigated. Patricia Griffin also stated that Dulin lived at her house at the time of *456the crime. From this, the jury may infer that Dulin was present in the house when Wright arrived, or even that Patricia and Dulin had set Wright up with the proposal of easy sex in order to steal his car. Youngeourt also supplied details that fit with other pieces of evidence. She specifically recalled Dulin's statement that he had presented himself to the victim by the name of "James" and that he would not let Patricia's brother James go to prison for a crime he committed. This item, unimportant in itself, nonetheless lends some credence to her account.
Third, the majority points out that Du-lin's confession was not made independently to a large number of people. It was, however, made to two different people, Youngeourt and Patricia Griffin, according to their trial testimony. This is not the overwhelming number of confessions presented in Thomas v. State, 580 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1991).5 But in my view it is enough to require submission of the issue to the jury.
Finally, in coming to its conclusion that Dulin's confession was not reliable enough to be admitted over hearsay rules, the majority relies heavily on the fact that, at the time she met with Dulin, Youngeourt was Griffin's counsel. I disagree with the majority's characterization of Youngcourt as an interested witness. At the time Youngeourt testified, she was no longer Griffin's attorney. Additionally, Younge-ourt, as an officer of the court, would face serious disciplinary consequences in addition to the sanctions for perjury applicable to other witnesses. Moreover, I see no reason to suppose that Youngeourt, a public defender, had anything to gain by giving false evidence. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979) (witness' testimony regarding an admission from a third party that defendant was not present during the vie-tim's murder was permitted for several reasons including because the witness had no ulterior motive in making the statement).
In sum, Chambers teaches that hearsay rules may not shield trustworthy evidence from being admitted at trial. Younge-ourt's testimony seems to me to be sufficiently reliable and corroborated by other evidence. Its conflict with other accounts is for the jury to sort out, not for the trial court or this Court to resolve as a matter of evidentiary ruling. The Court's initial opinion noted explanations and denials of Dulin's James/William identifications. Griffin, 754 N.E.2d at 904 n. 12. That issue too is for the jury. Applying the four factors emphasized in Chambers, (1) Dulin's confession to Youngeourt was supported by other evidence at Griffin's trial; (2) the confession was against Dulin's interest; (8) Dulin was present and was cross-examined at Griffin's trial; and (4) the confession appears to be made within months of the crime, although not to a cloge acquaintance. As a result, I believe Youngeourt's testimony was required to be admitted to avoid depriving Griffin of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. I would grant rehearing, reverse *457Griffin's conviction, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
. Rule 804(b) sets out four situations that are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declar-ant is unavailable as a witness. Rule 804(b)(3) provides the following exception:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
Ind. Evidence Rule 804(b)(3).
. Rule 804(a) defines "unavailability of a witness" as situations where the declarant: (1) is exempt from testifying due to a court ruling that the testimony is privileged; (2) refuses to testify despite an order from the court; (3) testifies that he or she has a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or illness; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance. Evid. R. 804(a).
. Rule 801(d) provides in pertinent part:
A statement is not hearsay if ... [tlhe de-clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... inconsistent with the declarant's testimony and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition....
Evid. R. 801(d).
. The majority and I differ as to the proper reading of Patricia Griffin's testimony in the transcript. Immediately before Patricia Griffin's testimony quoted by the majority, the following took place:
State: Ma'am, did Mr. Dulin ever tell you that he took Mr. Wright's car?
Defendant's attorney: Your honor, I'm going to-I'm going to object for Hearsay and beyond the scope.
Court: I think it is hearsay.
State: Well, Your Honor-
Court: But if there's an exception, I'd be glad to listen to it.
State: Withdraw the question. Well, Your Honor, can we approach?
Court: Sure.
[Counsel Approach the Bench]
State: I'll ask you again, Miss Griffin, did Mr. Dulin tell you he committed any crime?
P. Griffin: Yes.
It seems to me that in this context, a fair reading of Patricia Griffin's testimony is that she was referring to the carjacking crime during the State's questioning. If so, she testified that she heard Dulin admit to the carjacking.
. Thomas involved a bank robbery in which two people were implicated. A cashier at a liquor store located close to the bank identified one Eric Nelson as the perpetrator, but the bank tellers picked the defendant out of a lineup that did not include Nelson. The defendant was arrested for the crime. Subsequently, Nelson was arrested on different charges and bragged to some twenty people that he committed the robbery for which the defendant was to be tried. When the defendant called Nelson as a witness, Nelson invoked his Fifth Amendment right. Id. at 225. This Court held it was error for the trial court to exclude testimony of Nelson's confession because Nelson had originally been identified as the perpetrator, he had bragged of the crime to some twenty people, and he described the crime in great detail. Id. at 227.