James and Rita Vadas occupied and maintained a house James had sold to his father before their marriage. They spent time and money remodeling it in anticipation of buying it back some day. When they divorced, the trial court treated the home as a marital asset. It was not.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 1998, James Vadas needed cash to pay his financial obligation to an earlier wife. His father John Vadas agreed to buy James' house on Cline Ave*1235nue in Crown Point for $128,000, part of which he financed with an $89,600 mortgage.
James and Rita married in April 1995. Within a few months, Rita sold a house she received from a previous divorce settlement and the couple moved into the Cline Avenue home. About $20,000 of proceeds from the sale went into remodeling the Cline Avenue property. James took a four-month leave of absence from his job to work on the remodeling, and throughout their marriage, James and Rita paid the mortgage on the property.
John, James and Rita all expected that James and Rita would buy the house back from John when they were financially able, but this never came to pass. In May 1997, Rita filed for dissolution of the marriage and claimed an equitable interest in the house. The trial court treated the entire net equity of $78,000 1 as a marital asset. It awarded the real estate interest to John and ordered him to pay half the amount to Rita.
On review, the Court of Appeals agreed that "Rita and James held a vested, present interest in said property through their joint efforts and monetary contributions" and affirmed. Vadas v. Vadas, 728 N.E.2d 250, 259 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). We granted transfer.
I. An Expectation Is Not a Vested Interest
A baseline principle of Indiana family law is that "[oluly property with a vested interest at the time of dissolution may be divided as a marital asset." Mullins v. Matlock, 638 N.E.2d 854, 856 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Black's Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed.1999) defines a vested interest as one "[that has become a completed, consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; unconditional; absolute." See also id. at 856.
This basic axiom has been applied to a variety of types of claims. See, e.g., Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind.1990) (pension benefit right properly excluded from property division because it had neither vested nor become nonforfeitable upon termination of employment); Harris v. Harris, 690 N.E.2d 742 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (employer 401(k) plan contributions that are contingent upon retirement at the company are not vested interests, and thus not divisible as marital assets); Hacker v. Hacker, 659 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (value of potential inheritance not includible in marital "pot"); Mullins v. Matlock, 638 N.E.2d at 856 ("A chose in action, not vested but rather contingent and speculative in nature and in value, is not capable of division and thus not marital property subject to equal distribution. ...").
The facts presented here find a close analogy to those of In re Dall, 681 N.E.2d 718 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). There, the wife's parents provided $93,000 to build a home that was to be conveyed to the husband and wife at some indefinite future date. Id. at 719-20. The husband labored 2,400 hours helping to construct the home and, when the couple divorced, the trial court included the home in the marital estate at a value of $150,000. Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that "an equitable interest in real property titled in a third-party, although claimed by one or both of the divorcing parties, should not be included in the marital estate." Id. at 722, Although the couple "may have hoped eventually to acquire legal title to *1236the property ... they did not have a definite agreement that title would be transferred to them." Id. at 721 (distinguishing Sovern v. Sovern, 535 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), where "the owners of record title disclaimed any interest in the real estate."). Therefore, in Dall, "neither Husband nor Wife possessed the definite interest necessary for the home to be included in the marital estate." 681 N.E.2d at 721.
The holding of Dall promotes predictability, consistency and efficiency by excluding "remote and speculative" interests from the marital estate. See 681 N.E.2d at 722. The property at issue here is just such a speculative interest. Rita's investment and James' labor increased the home's value during the marriage, but general market conditions before and after the marriage would also account for some part of the appreciation. (R. at 146-47, 279, 284.) The sale to James and Rita was to occur at some unspecified future date, contingent upon James' getting back "on his feet" financially. (R. at 144.) Neither price nor terms had been discussed, although John wanted to recover what he put into the property (unlike the record owner in Sovern, who did not claim any interest in the property in question). (R. at 147.)
Because James and Rita did not have a vested interest in the Cline Avenue home, the trial court erred in including $78,000 equity as marital property. Of course, the relationship between James and John Va-das and James' occupation of the remodeled residence reflects on the relative housing needs of James and Rita and is a relevant consideration in dividing the property that is a part of the marital pot.
II. A Moot Jurisdictional Challenge
The trial court entered judgment against both James and John in the total amount of $35,261.54, and ordered the judgment attached to the Cline Avenue home. The court allowed thirty days for payment in full, under penalty of forced sale of the property.
On appeal, James and John argue that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over John due to improper service. Vadas, 728 N.E.2d at 256, (Appellant's Br. at 5). Because we have concluded that the residence was not marital property, we reverse both the judgment against John Vadas and the attachment of the judgment to the Cline Avenue real estate, and need not address the question about personal jurisdiction.
III. The Personal Property Division
On appeal, James also challenges the trial court's valuation and division of the parties' personal property, largely attacking the values assigned by the court. We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that there was no error as to valuation. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)@).
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment insofar as it included the residence as a marital asset and remand so the trial court can reconsider division of the other assets.
DICKSON, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. BOEHM, J., dissents with separate opinion, in which SULLIVAN, J., concurs.ON PETITION FOR TRANSFER
. Based on an appraised value of $165,000, (R. at 100), less John's remaining mortgage balance of $87,000, (R. at 101).