dissenting.
As noted by the majority, the statutory entrapment defense applies only when “the ;prohibited conduct of the person was the product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct.” Ind.Code § 36 — 41—3—9(a)(1) (emphases added). The “prohibited conduct” for which the defendant was convicted was operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
Deputy Maxie may have persuaded the defendant to move the vehicle, but not to drive while intoxicated. The defendant had a choice among various means by which to have the vehicle moved and chose to drive it himself while intoxicated. Furthermore, the conduct of Deputy Maxie at most merely afforded the defendant “an opportunity to commit the offense,” which the statute expressly declares “does not constitute entrapment.” Ind.Code § 35-41 — 3—9(b).