With the court, I agree that juries must be instructed on which factors to consider in *319assessing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony. I write separately on two matters: (1) in my view, the court should give the instruction as a matter of course whenever eyewitness identification testimony is critical to the case, and (2) such an instruction should be given in this case and its omission would not be harmless. I therefore respectfully dissent in these two respects to the opinion expressed in Part II (hereinafter “majority”).
A.
When a defendant claims error in the giving or omission of a jury instruction, the question is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i 327, 334, 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006). In this ease, the lack of an eyewitness instruction rendered the instructions as a whole prejudicially insufficient. Since no physical evidence was collected from the stolen truck or the tools, Petitioner was connected to the theft of the truck and tools only through Officer Tomimbang’s testimony. Officer Domingo testified that he was near Officer Tomimbang when the suspect was seen driving the white truck, but Officer Domingo did not get a good look at the driver and was unable to identify him.
At trial, Officer Tomimbang identified Petitioner as the man he saw driving the truck, fleeing from the scene, and who was shortly thereafter found by the police lying in a ditch in the subdivision to which the suspect fled. The remainder of the evidence against Petitioner was extremely weak. It consisted of Officer Tomimbang’s description of the suspect to the dispatch, “local male, short hair, dark clothing” or “local male, dark clothing,” which would have fit any number of individuals, and of the circumstances surrounding Petitioner’s arrest. As to the latter, Petitioner’s presence in the subdivision at the time of his arrest was suspicious, but, had Officer Tomimbang not identified Petitioner as the man who fled into the subdivision, the jury could have believed that Petitioner was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Ultimately, it was the testimony of Officer Tom-imbang that established the crucial link between Petitioner and the man in the stolen truck. Officer Tomimbang’s testimony was therefore “critical” to Respondent’s case and necessitated, under the rule we adopt today, an eyewitness identification instruction.
The majority, however, would only require courts to give the instruction if the defendant requests it. See Majority Opinion at 316-16, 277 P.3d at 1040-41. But trial courts, not the parties, have the duty to ensure that juries are properly instructed on issues of criminal liability.28 Nichols, 111 Hawai'i at 336 n. 5, 141 P.3d at 983 n. 5. There are good reasons to require an eyewitness identification instruction even in the absence of a request by a defendant. As noted in Part I of the court’s opinion, juries are generally not aware of the extent to which factors such as the passage of time, witness stress, duration of exposure, etc., affect an individual’s ability to make an accurate identification, and thus tend to “over believe” witness identification testimony. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (citing research); see also Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 732 (“ ‘Regardless of how the initial misiden-tification comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent ... courtroom identification.’ ”) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (emphasis in original)). Statistical data demonstrate *320that jurors place undue weight on eyewitness testimony, which can greatly influence the outcome of. a prosecution. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (citing research). To avoid prejudice to defendants we, along with many other jurisdictions, have abandoned the discretionary approach to trial courts’ cautionary instructions in eyewitness situations. See Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 729 (citing other jurisdictions that have rejected a discretionary approach to instructions relating to eyewitness identification testimony). Inasmuch as courts have the ultimate responsibility to ensure juries are properly instructed, courts should give the cautionary instruction when eyewitness identification is relevant to the ease regardless of whether the defendant requests it.
The majority, however, justifies the additional requirement that a defendant must ask for the instruction on the ground that defendants may wish to forgo the instruction as a matter of strategy. Majority Opinion at 315-16, 277 P.3d at 1040-41. This is one of those instances, however, in which the public interest in ensuring fair outcomes outweighs the interest of any particular defendant in obtaining a tactical advantage at trial. See State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 414, 16 P.3d 246, 255 (2001) (holding that juries must be instructed on lesser included offenses even against defendants’ wishes because “[t]he judicial objectives within the context of the criminal system are to assess criminal liability and to determine the appropriate punishment” and allowing the defendant to gamble on an “all or nothing strategy” runs counter to those objectives); State v. Davis, 63 Haw. 191, 194, 624 P.2d 376, 378 (1981) (“The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not a poker game in which [the] players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.”).29 Nothing undermines our criminal justice system more than the conviction of innocent defendants based on unreliable evidence. See Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 732 (“The empirical evidence demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). To preserve the integrity of criminal trials it is therefore necessary that our courts instruct juries on how to weigh such evidence, in the same way that courts instruct juries on other fundamental matters, such as the credibility of witnesses. Here, where eyewitness testimony was at the crux of Respondent’s case, the jury should have been instructed on how to assess such testimony, regardless of whether Petitioner asked for an instruction.
B.
Once an error in the jury instructions is demonstrated, a defendant’s conviction should be vacated, “without regard to whether the defendant objected to the erroneous instruction, if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the convietion[.]” Nichols, 111 Hawai'i at 337, 141 P.3d at 984 (emphasis added). Erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the error was not prejudicial. Nichols, 111 Hawai'i at 334, 141 P.3d at 981.
*321The failure to give an instruction in this case was not harmless. The circumstances in which Officer Tomimbang’s identification was made illustrate why a jury instruction was necessary. On the night in question, Officer Tomimbang was standing at the recreation center across from Ka'ahele Street when he saw a man driving a white truck down the road. It was dark and the only lighting in the area came from two street lamps, but Officer Tomimbang claimed he saw the man’s face briefly as the man drove down the street. The man turned off Ka'ahele Street, parked the truck about 60 to 70 yards away from Officer Tomimbang, and began walking towards the recreation center. When the man was about twenty feet away, Officer Tomimbang shone his flashlight toward the man and ordered him to stop. Officer Tomimbang said he observed the man for a few seconds before the man fled. Officer Tomimbang’s description of the suspect to the dispatch was vague—“local male, maybe short dark hair, dark clothing.”
Under these circumstances, the reliability of Officer Tomimbang’s identification was questionable. In view of the distance, the lighting, the short time Officer Tomimbang had to observe the suspect, and, in particular, in view of Officer Tomimbang’s generic description of the suspect to the dispatch, a properly instructed jury could have concluded that Officer Tomimbang did not have an opportunity to commit the features of the suspect to memory. The centerpiece of Respondent’s case against Petitioner, Officer Tomimbang’s eyewitness identification, thus stood on unsure grounds.
Without a cautionary instruction, the jury was left to assess the reliability of the only testimony linking Petitioner to the charged offenses without the guidance that we today, joining many other jurisdictions, have decided is necessary, see Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728 (explaining that jury instructions adopted by many jurisdictions are safeguards built into our adversary system that caution juries against placing undue weight on questionable eyewitness testimony). There is no reason to believe from the record or otherwise that this jury knew, without an instruction from the court, the factors to consider in weighing Officer Tomimbang’s testimony. It is not for us to speculate about what the jury would have done had it been properly instructed, for it is the jury’s role, not that of the appellate courts, to weigh the evidence. See State v. Kikuta, 125 Hawai'i 78, 89, 253 P.3d 639, 650 (2011) (“[Assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and a weighing of the evidence [is] not within the province of an appellate court, but [is] a function of the fact finder at trial.”). The failure to provide a cautionary instruction was thus not harmless.
C.
The majority disagrees on two grounds. First, the majority asserts that the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the eyewitness identification issue at trial. Majority Opinion at 317-18, 277 P.3d at 1042-43. Second, the majority contends that because the supervisory power of the court is the basis for the adoption of the eyewitness identification instruction, the instruction must be given prospectively only. Majority Opinion at 315-16, 277 P.3d at 1041-42. Respectfully, I cannot concur on either account.
1.
In my view, the jury’s attention was not adequately drawn to the eyewitness identification during trial. The majority maintains that during opening argument, cross-examination, and closing arguments, Petitioner’s counsel “highlighted for the jury the conditions in which Officer Tomimbang made his observations, as well as perceived weaknesses in Officer Tomimbang’s testimony.” Majority Opinion at 318, 277 P.3d at 1043. Thus, the majority concludes, “the factors that could have affected the reliability of the identification were pointed out by defense counsel.” Id.
Counsel’s ability to focus the jury’s attention on the issue of identification, however, is the same rationale that was used in the line of cases beginning with Padilla to justify giving courts the discretion to decide whether to give a cautionary instruction.30 See, *322e.g., Padilla, 57 Haw. at 162, 552 P.2d at 365 (“Here the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court adequately directed the jury’s attention to the identification evidence and made unnecessary the more specific instructions requested by the defendant.”). This exclusive reliance on lawyer argument is precisely what today we hold to be inadequate to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial.31 Further, we do not rely on counsel to instruct the jury. Kassebeer, 118 Hawai'i at 510, 193 P.3d at 426 (“ ‘Arguments by counsel are likely to be viewed as statements of advocacy,” as opposed to “a definitive and binding statement of law[.]” (quoting Nichols, 111 Hawai'i at 340 n. 8, 141 P.3d at 987 n. 8)). It is inconsistent on the one hand to hold that from now on the court must provide a cautionary instruction upon the defendant’s request because lawyer argument is insufficient to alert the jury to the factors it ought to weigh in considering the reliability of eyewitness testimony, but on the other to hold that the argument of Petitioner’s counsel was sufficient in this case to be assured that the jury was informed of all of the relevant factors.
The same is true of the majority’s contention that the general witness credibility instruction adequately drew the jury’s attention to the identification issue. Majority Opinion at 1043. The reasoning that underlies our holding is that the general witness credibility instruction is not sufficient to apprise the jury when it comes to considering eyewitness testimony; a more specific instruction is needed to assist juries in order to safeguard a fair trial. As is apparent from the discussion, supra, credibility is different from reliability. A witness may wholeheartedly believe that he or she has identified the defendant, but may nevertheless be wrong. By highlighting credibility and nothing else, the jury may have been misled into thinking that confidence is correlated with reliability, even though no correlation has been shown between the two. See Long, 721 P.2d at 490 (citing research). Further, with respect to reliability, the credibility instruction given here only directed the jury to consider “the witness’s means and opportunity of acquiring information,” which are only two of the at least ten factors we now hold juries must be instructed to consider.
In addition to all of this, the general witness credibility instruction did not apprise the jury that the Respondent bore the burden of proving Petitioner’s identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the court did instruct the jury, generally, that Petitioner was innocent “unless and until the prosecution proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court did not draw the jury’s attention specifically to Respondent’s *323burden of proving that Officer Tomimbang’s identification of Petitioner was reliable by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court’s instructions were therefore not complete in terms of informing the jury how to weigh the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony—the critical issue in this case.
2.
The majority holds that because this court is exercising its supervisory powers to require courts to give a special jury instruction on eyewitness identification, today’s ruling will apply only prospectively and not to Petitioner. Majority Opinion at 316-17, 277 P.3d at 1041-42. Supervisory powers are derived from HRS § 602-4 (1993), which states that the supreme court shall have the general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to prevent and correct errors and abuses where no other remedy is expressly provided by law. Castro v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 97 Hawai’i 463, 40 P.3d 865 (2002).
Although the majority suggests that the invocation of supervisory powers results in the prospective application of a legal principle, we have, in fact, used our supervisory powers to correct errors that occurred in the particular ease from which the appeal arose. Thus, for example, in State v. Pattioay, 78 Hawai'i 455, 469, 896 P.2d 911, 925 (1995), we invoked our supervisory powers to hold that the “evidence at issue in the instant case, which was obtained in violation of [a federal statute] and then proffered in criminal proceedings against the Defendants-Appellees, must be suppressed under the authority of this court’s supervisory powers in the administration of criminal justice in the courts of our state.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 273-77, 281, 686 P.2d 1379, 1385-87, 1390 (1984), this court exercised its supervisory power to vacate the Petitioner’s sentence and remanded the case to the trial court where a condition of probation made the probationer subject at all times during the period of her probation to a warrantless search. See also State v. Moniz, 69 Haw. 370, 371-74, 742 P.2d 373, 375-77 (1987) (addressing petitioners’ question of whether court approval was required before committed person could seek leave from hospital even though the case was not ripe and remanding for court to determine whether authorization for leave should be approved); State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 227-28, 738 P.2d 812, 828 (1987) (invoking supervisory powers and holding that judge’s practice of personally entering jury room to answer questions was improper). These eases show that this court can and will exercise its supervisory powers to correct errors that arise in the case before it.
Respectfully, it is unfair to craft a new rule in this ease but not give Petitioner the benefit of it.32 In my view, the better approach would be to apply the new rule to the instant case and retroactively “to those defendants who are similarly situated[,]” i.e., defendants in “ ‘all eases pending on direct review or not yet final’ ” where identification is disputed, as of the date of this decision. State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 214, 29 P.3d 919, 933 (2001) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987)) (brackets, ellipsis, and emphasis omitted). For one, “ ‘the nature of judicial review precludes us from simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new [rules], and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule.’ ” Id. at 213, 29 P.3d at 932 (quoting State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai'i 403, 410 n. 3, 886 P.2d 740, 748 n. 3 (1994)). Under the circumstances of this ease, “‘selective application of [the] new rule[ ] violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Respectfully, in the instant ease, the majority has “ ‘simply fish[ed this] case from the stream of appellate review1 ” and “ ‘us[ed] it as a vehicle for pronouncing [a] new rule[ ],’ ” but then leaves *324Petitioner, the one whose efforts resulted in the creation of the new rule, and the “ ‘stream of similar cases ... to flow by unaffected by that new rule.’ ” 33 Id. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority’s refusal to apply the rule in this ease and to those defendants similarly situated as Petitioner.
. The majority asserts that the instruction at issue in this case is different from other jury instructions that this court has held trial courts are required to give sua sponte, because the instruction here "does not articulate a type of defense, but rather directs the jury to consider certain factors in evaluating identification testimony.” Majority Opinion at 315 n. 23, 277 P.3d at 1040 n. 23. However, mistaken identification is a type of defense and the jury instruction here is necessary to assist the jury in assessing the strength or weakness of such a defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cuffie, 414 Mass. 632, 609 N.E.2d 437, 438, 441 (1993) (recognizing that defendant was entitled to jury instruction when raising misidentification as a defense and modifying pattern instruction), abrogated in part by Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 680 N.E.2d 1116 (1997) (modifying content of instruction required by Cuffie).
. The majority distinguishes these cases, claiming that the absence of an eyewitness jury instruction does not result in an "all or nothing” approach, see Majority Opinion at 315 n. 24, 277 P.3d at 1040 n. 24, and that by foregoing an eyewitness jury instruction, the parties cannot be described as "players concealing their cards until played,” id. (internal ellipsis and brackets omitted). Respectfully, this is a narrow reading of the cases inasmuch as the fundamental principle underlying these cases is that the parties’ strategies must yield to the imperative of ensuring fair and just outcomes. Eyewitness misidentification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions, PeRRy, 132 S.Ct. at 732, and any party's desire to deflect the jury's attention from identification issues is far outweighed by the need to ensure that juries are properly instructed on eyewitness identification testimony. Furthermore, in Haanio, 94 Hawai'i at 414, 16 P.3d at 255 (2001), this court explained more generally that neither the defendant nor the prosecution had the right to incomplete instructions. Id. (citing, among others, People v. Barton, 12 Cal.4th 186, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531, 536 (1995) (stating that "neither the defendant nor the People have a right to incomplete instructions”) (citation omitted); State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 643, 618 P.2d 306, 310 (1980) ("[I]t is well settled that the trial court must correctly instruct the jury on the law.... This requirement is mandatory to insure the jury has proper guidance in its consideration of the issues before it.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, HRS § 707-713).
. The majority states that whether jury instructions on eyewitness identification actually have a positive effect on juror sensitivity has not been conclusively proven. See Majority Opinion at *322316 n. 25, 277 P.3d at 1041 n. 25. But the research cited by the majority only appears to allude to the United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (1972) instruction, whereas the instruction prescribed herein is modeled after a California model instruction that contains variables that were not mentioned in Telfaire, such as the witness’s stress and the cross-racial or ethnic nature of the identification. Further, recognizing that eyewitness identification evidence may be unreliable, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of juiy instructions in ensuring that defendants have an opportunity to test the reliability of such evidence. Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 721 ("When no improper law enforcement activity is involved, it suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and juiy instmctions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added). As the Court stated in Perry, the weight of authority favors specific eyewitness jury instructions. Id. at 729 n. 7 (citing twenty-five other jurisdictions that use specific eyewitness instructions). Finally, in this jurisdiction, we have relied on the long established proposition that juries are presumed to follow instructions. Klinge, 92 Hawai'i at 592, 994 P.2d at 524 (2000) ("[Jjuries are presumed to ... follow all of the trial court’s instructions.”) (citation omitted).
. Although the majority purports to rely on its examination of "all aspects of the trial” in concluding that the jury’s attention was "adequately focused on the relevant factors affecting eyewitness identification,” see Majority Opinion at 318 n. 27, 277 P.3d at 1043 n. 27, respectfully, it cannot escape the premise of today’s holding that a specific eyewitness instruction is necessary because cross-examination, lawyer argument, and general credibility instruction are insufficient to ensure that juries understand how to assess the reliability of eyewitness evidence.
. It is undisputed that this case establishes a new principle of law because it overrules our clear precedent as set forth in Padilla. State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 221, 857 P.2d 593, 598 (1993) (holding that new rule was established because clear precedent set forth in another opinion had been overruled).
. The majority disagrees relying on Haanio, 94 Hawai'i 405, 16 P.3d 246, and Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200, 29 P.3d 919, but, respectfully, those cases are not of help to the majority. In Haanio, we held that the court must instruct the jury on lesser included offenses when there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant for the offense charged and convicting the defendant for the included offense. 94 Hawai'i at 413, 16 P.3d at 254. The rule before Haanio was that the court had discretion to instruct juries on lesser included offenses if the prosecution did not ask for an instruction and the defendant objected to it. Id. at 412, 16 P.3d at 253. In that case, we applied the new rule prospectively, inasmuch as the court had already instructed the jury that convicted the defendant on the lesser included offense. Id. at 415-16, 16 P.3d at 256-57. In this case, unlike in Haanio, Petitioner has not had the benefit of the specific eyewitness instruction, and thus Haanio is distinguishable.
In Garcia, we noted that our decision in State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 987 P.2d 268 (1999), held that blood alcohol test results should be excluded in driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) cases where the defendant was misinformed by the police of the consequences for failing to take a chemical test. 96 Hawai'i at 208, 29 P.3d at 927. We said in Garcia that this exclusionary rule should be applied retroactively to DUI cases pending when Wilson was decided. Id. Garcia explained that retroactive application of the Wilson rule would not prejudice the Garcia defendant and that it would be unfair to give the Garcia defendant the benefit of the Wilson rule, while denying it to similarly situated defendants. Id. at 214, 29 P.3d at 933. Thus, inasmuch as, in Garcia, this court held that a new rule benefitting the defendant should be applied retroactively, in this case too, the rule that the jury should be given a specific eyewitness identification instruction, which would benefit Petitioner, should be applied to Petitioner and retroactively to all similarly situated defendants.