No. 82-222
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NONTANA
1983
LOWELL A. RATHBUN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
GARY G. ROBSON, GEORGE A. CALRSON
and ELEANOR L. CAXLSON, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Musselshell,
The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Jon A. Oldenburg, Lewistown, Montana
For Respondents:
Lynaugh, Fitzgerald & Skaggs; William P. Fitzgerald,
Eillings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 10, 1933
Decided: April 7, 1983
Filed: 4 p 7 - 1385
~
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
This case comes from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the Fourteenth
Judicial District, County of Musselshell. Plaintiff commenced
t h i s a c t i o n s e e k i n g a judgment d e c l a r i n g him t o be t h e h o l d e r of
a n e a s e m e n t a c r o s s p r o p e r t y owned b y d e f e n d a n t s . A t the trial
c o u r t , and i n t h i s C o u r t , t w o e a s e m e n t t h e o r i e s were p r e s e n t e d ;
easement by prescription, and easement by necessity. The
District Court held against plaintiff in both instances.
Additionally, we a r e asked to d e c i d e w h e t h e r t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n
verbatim adoption, and by photographic reproduction, the
d e f e n d a n t ' s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n of law.
A p p e l l a n t i s t h e owner of a t r a c t of land d e s c r i b e d a s the
east 1/2 of the west 1/2 of s e c t i o n 34. The a t t a c h e d map shows
a p p e l l a n t s p r o p e r t y and t h e c l a i m e d e a s e m e n t r o u t e .
A p p e l l a n t h a s h e l d a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e l a n d s i n c e 1 9 5 7 when
h i s mother, Mrs. Rathbun, t r a n s f e r r e d o w n e r s h i p to him and h i s
brother. Since t h a t t i m e , a p p e l l a n t h a s become t h e sole o w n e r .
There a r e t w o r o u t e s t o t h e property; a western a c c e s s r o u t e over
w h i c h a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s a n e a s e m e n t , and a n e a s t e r n r o u t e which is
s t e e p and s e a s o n a l l y i m p a s s a b l e . Use of either route requires
o n e t o cross p r o p e r t y owned by a t l e a s t o n e of the respondents.
In other words, a p p e l l a n t 1s property is land-locked .
The l a n d was i n i t i a l l y p u r c h a s e d from M u s s e l s h e l l County in
1 9 3 4 b y T.D. Cox. The p u r c h a s e by Cox i n c l u d e d t h e west Sr;! o f t h e
west o f s e c t i o n 34; h o w e v e r , i n 1 9 4 2 t h a t p o r t i o n was s o l d by
Cox and was e v e n t u a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d to r e s p o n d e n t s J e r r y C a r l s o n
and Kathleen Beslanowitch. It is over this portion that
a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s a n e a s e m e n t by n e c e s s i t y .
From 1934 t o 1946 Cox l i v e d on s e c t i o n 34. I n t h e 1 9 3 0 ' s he
c o n d u c t e d f a r m i n g and l o g g i n g o p e r a t i o n s . D u r i n g t h e s e y e a r s he
used the western access route frequently. I n 1946 h e s o l d t h e
land t o Mrs. R a t h b u n , appellant's mother. She owned t h e land
u n t i l 1957. D u r i n g t h e s e e l e v e n y e a r s t h e l a n d was v a c a n t . Her
v i s i t s t o t h e p r o p e r t y were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e c o u r t as s p o r a -
d i c and i n t e r m i t t e n t .
A p p e l l a n t h a s n e v e r l i v e d on t h e p r o p e r t y . Much of t h e t i m e
s i n c e 1957, a p p e l l a n t has resided o u t - o f - s t a t e . He has v i s i t e d
t h e l a n d o n t h e a v e r a g e o f o n c e or twice a y e a r , and t h e r e w e r e
y e a r s i n w h i c h he would make no v i s i t . T h e s e v i s i t s were made t o
"check the property." A p p e l l a n t owns o t h e r n o n a d j o i n i n g l a n d i n
t h e v i c i n i t y which is l e a s e d f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , h o w e v e r ,
concerning the land in section 34, neither appellant nor his
lessee have used t h e land f o r any p r o d u c t i v e u s e .
This dispute arose in the l a t e 1 9 7 0 ' s when a real estate
a g e n t on b e h a l f of a p p e l l a n t went t o view t h e property. The
a g e n t l e a r n e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t i t l e d i d n o t include an easement.
The testimony indicates t h a t a p p e l l a n t wished t o s u b d i v i d e and
sell the parcels. The r e s p o n d e n t s d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h t h i s pro-
p o s e d l a n d u s e and made t h e i r f e e l i n g s known. The r e s p o n d e n t ' s
p o s i t i o n was t h a t a n y access a c r o s s t h e i r l a n d was p e r m i s s i v e ,
and t h e r e c o u l d be no access to a n y s u b d i v i s i o n . However, the
r e s p o n d e n t s also t e s t i f i e d that if a p p e l l a n t wished t o put the
land to other productive uses, such as logging or mining or
a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s , t h e y would allow access.
To e s t a b l i s h a n e a s e m e n t by p r e s c r i p t i o n t h e b u r d e n is on t h e
moving p a r t y to show s e v e r a l e l e m e n t s . He o r h i s predecessors in
i n t e r e s t must have used the route openly, notoriously, exclu-
sively, adversely, c o n t i n u o u s l y and uninterrupted for the full
s t a t u t o r y period. S c o t t v. W e i n h e i m e r ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 1 4 0 Mont. 5 5 4 , 3 7 4
P.2d 91. Once the moving party establishes these elements
a d v e r s e u s e i s presumed and t h e b u r d e n is t h e n on t h e o w n e r to
show t h a t t h e u s e w a s p e r m i s s i v e . O I C o n n o r v. B r o d i e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3
Ga be /
Mont. 1 2 9 , 454 P.2d 920; Glantz v. Gab&?- ( 1 9 2 3 ) , 6 6 Mont. 134,
212 P. 8 5 8 . If t h e owner shows p e r m i s s i v e u s e , no e a s e m e n t c a n
b e a c q u i r e d s i n c e t h e t h e o r y o f p r e s c r i p t i v e e a s e m e n t is b a s e d o n
adverse use. W i l s o n v . C h e s t n u t ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 4 Mont. 4 8 4 , 5 2 5 P.2d
24.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t u s e of t h e w e s t e r n access
r o u t e f r o m 1 9 3 4 t o t h e p r e s e n t time h a s b e e n p e r m i s s i v e , there-
f o r e a n y p r e s u m p t i o n o f a d v e r s e u s e was e f f e c t i v e l y r e b u t t e d . We
agree.
T h e r e was e v i d e n c e to i n d i c a t e p e r m i s s i v e use beginning in
1934. S e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d c o n c e r n i n g local customs t h a t
b e g a n i n t h e homes t e a d i n g d a y s c o n c e r n i n g access across a n o t h e r ' s
land. T h e r e e x i s t e d a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g among l a n d o w n e r s t h a t p e r -
m i s s i o n was n o t r e q u i r e d e v e r y time a p e r s o n needed to cross h i s
neighbor 's land. Permission was automatic if the individual
closed the gates and respected his neighbor's property.
" ' * * * A u s e of a n e i g h b o r ' s l a n d b a s e d upon
mere n e i g h b o r l y a c c o m m o d a t i o n or c o u r t e s y is
n o t a d v e r s e and c a n n o t r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p -
t i v e e a s e m e n t . T h u s w h e r e t h e u s e of a way by
a n e i g h b o r was b y e x p r e s s o r i m p l i e d p e r -
m i s s i o n o f t h e o w n e r , it was h e l d t h a t t h e
c o n t i n u o u s u s e o f t h e way by t h e n e i g h b o r was
n o t a d v e r s e and d i d n o t r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p -
t i v e r i g h t * * * I u Wilson v. C h e s t n u t , 164
Mont. a t 4 9 1 , 5 2 5 P.2d a t 2 7 . (Citing 2
Thompson on Real P r o p e r t y ( 1 9 6 1 R e p l a c e m e n t ) ,
Easements, 5345). S e e a l s o Ewan v . S t e n b e r g
( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 6 3 , 5 4 1 P.2d 6 0 .
Evidence of t h i s l o c a l custom, w i t h o u t more, w a s s u f f i c i e n t
t o e s t a b l i s h permissive use. I n T a y l o r v. Petranek (1977)r 173
Mont. 4 3 3 , 4 3 8 , 568 P.2d 120, 123, t h i s Court s t a t e d :
"Here t h e r e c o r d is r e p l e t e w i t h t e s t i m o n y
f r o m b o t h p l a i n t i f f ' s and d e f e n d a n t ' s w i t -
n e s s e s t h a t t h e h o m e s t e a d e r s who i n i t i a l l y
l i v e d i n t h e a r e a d e v e l o p e d common p r a c t i c e of
a l l o w i n g o t h e r s to c r o s s t h e i r l a n d s t o r e a c h
Suffolk. T h i s e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o sup-
p o r t a u s e p e r m i s s i v e i n i t s i n c e p t i o n and n o t
u n d e r a claim o f r i g h t ."
Notwithstanding local custom, there was o t h e r evidence to
show that use of the western access began and remained per-
missive. T h e r e were s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of c o n t r o l e x e r c i s e d by
r e s p o n d e n t s and t h e i r predecessors ; the f i r s t occurred i n 1934
when b o t h f o r k s o f t h e w e s t e r n access a t t h e G o u l d i n g C r e e k Road
were l o c k e d by t h e R o b s o n s . Apparently, t h e g a t e s were l e f t o p e n
a n d c a t t l e g o t loose. T h e r e w e r e two o t h e r g a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d and
m a i n t a i n e d by r e s p o n d e n t s . On t h e map t h e y are d e s i g n a t e d a s g-1
a n d g-2. In the early 1960's J.W. Travis, who t h e n owned the
west 1/2 of the w e s t 1/2 o f s e c t i o n 34 d r o v e a p o s t i n t o t h e m i d d l e
of g-2, with the intention of preventing further vehicular
traffic. Also, i n t h e 1 9 6 0 ' s G e o r g e C a r l s o n p a d l o c k e d g-1 w i t h a
chain. He retained t h e o n l y key. The g a t e h a s r e m a i n e d locked
to the present time.
Although the presence of gd.tes alone will not defeat a
prescriptive easement, t h e y are s ' t r o n g e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g p e r -
missive use. Hayden & H i l l v. Snowden & Walters ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176
Mont. 1 6 576 P.2d 1115. The e v i d e n c e o f l o c a l c u s t o m , c o u p l e d
w i t h t h e e x i s t e n c e of gates, c l e a r l y support the trial court's
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t use of t h e w e s t e r n access h a s a l w a y s b e e n per-
missive.
Next, a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t a n e a s e m e n t by n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s
over the w e s t 42 of t h e west a of s e c t i o n 34. T h i s Court h a s
recently stated:
" G e n e r a l l y , a way o f n e c e s s i t y i s d e f i n e d as
follows: ' [ w l h e r e a n owner of l a n d c o n v e y s a
p a r c e l t h e r e o f w h i c h h a s no o u t l e t to a h i g h -
way e x c e p t o v e r t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d s o f t h e
g r a n t o r or o v e r t h e l a n d o f s t r a n g e r s , a way
o f n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s over t h e remaining l a n d s
of the grantor.' (citations omitted )
S i m i l a r l y , a way o f n e c e s s i t y is found when
t h e owner o f l a n d s r e t a i n s t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n
c o n v e y i n g t o a n o t h e r t h e b a l a n c e , across which
h e m u s t go f o r e x i t and a c c e s s . " Schmid v.
McDowell ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont .
P.2d 4 3 1 , 4 3 3 , 3 9 - 3 t ; ~ e p . 1 3 1 ~ - - 1 3 i 6 ; - - - . -
, 649
Appellant bases his argument on the second part of the
d e f i n i t i o n ; where t h e owner r e t a i n s an inner portion. In t h i s
case a p p e l l a n t ' s p r e d e c e s s o r t r a n s f e r r e d t h e west 1/2 of the w e s t 1/2
i n 1942, r e t a i n i n g t h e i n n e r p o r t i o n , the east % of t h e west %.
Appellant's claim must fail for the same r e a s o n discussed in
Schmid; the reason for allowing a way of necessity does not
exist. The l a n d o v e r w h i c h t h e way o f n e c e s s i t y is c l a i m e d h a s
n o access t o a p u b l i c r o a d . I n o t h e r words, even i f appellant
were g r a n t e d a way o f n e c e s s i t y across t h e west % of t h e west %
t h e r e would be no b e n e f i t ; " t h e b a s i c r e a s o n f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of
a way o f n e c e s s i t y , n a m e l y , t o p e r m i t c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e o u t -
s i d e world, i s n o t p r e s e n t ."' Schmid ,
-
. - -- -. - Mont. a t - 649
P.2d at 433, 39 St.Rep. at 1317. ( C i t i n g Daywalt v. Walker
F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t asserts e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t s p h o t o g r a p h i c
r e p r o d u c t i o n and v e r b a t i m a d o p t i o n of the respondent's proposed
f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w . W h i l e w e d i s a p p r o v e of
the practice, " [olur ultimate test . . . is w h e t h e r they are
s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e h e n s i v e and p e r t i n e n t t o t h e i s s u e s t o p r o v i d e
a b a s i s f o r d e c i s i o n , and w h e t h e r t h e y a r e s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i -
dence presented." I n R e M a r r i a g e of J e n s e n (1981)' - - Mont .
I ---- I 6 3 1 P.2d 700, 703, 38 S t . R e p . 1109, 1113. They
c l e a r l y m e t the test.
The t r i a l c o u r t is a f f i r m e d .
W e concur:
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, concurring:
I join the opinion of the majority but merely want to
comment on the last issue, that of the trial court's
reproducing the proposed findings and conclusions of the
prevailing party and adopting them as its own. The judicial
trial process is demeaned when the trial courts engage in
these practices. It shows that the trial courts have given
little or no thought to the decision making process other
than to decide who wins.
Winning counsel can, of course, be proud that the trial
court has adopted verbatim their proposed findings and
conclusions. But losing counsel and their clients have a
reasonable expectation that the trial court, before deciding
the case, carefully considered their case. Verbatim
parroting of proposed findings and conclusions can do nothing
but deflate these expectations.