dissenting.
¶38 I join Justice Leaphart’s dissent and also dissent because I believe the Court has erroneously interpreted the statute at issue.
¶39 Section 61-3-301, MCA, requires that a vehicle must have “the proper number of plates, conspicuously displayed, one on the front and one on the rear ....” The Court reasons that our only function when interpreting statutes “is to give effect to the intent of the legislature,” and concludes that the statute “simply requires that license plates be visible from both the front and the rear of the vehicle.”
¶40 First, our duty in interpreting statutes is to apply the plain meaning, if unambiguous. Here, it is not necessary to discern legislative intent or otherwise look beyond the words of § 61-3-301, MCA. The plain meaning of the words requires a license plate to be conspicuously displayed “on the front” of the vehicle. The statute does not create a test for visibility from the front of a vehicle. It requires attachment of the plate “on the front.” Lacasella’s plate was not attached “on the front” of his pick-up truck, and he therefore violated the statute. I would affirm.