also Specially Concurring.
I write separately to highlight some of the troubling aspects of package or tied plea agreements, and to emphasize the importance of the role of the trial court in assessing whether to accept such a deal.
A. Package Plea Agreements
In package plea agreements, “several confederates plead together and the government gives them a volume discount — a better deal than each could have gotten separately. Consistent with the package nature of the agreement, defendants’ fates are often bound together: If one defendant backs out, the deal’s off for everybody.” United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 658 (9th Cir.1993). Though package plea deal agreements are not per se impermissible, they pose an additional risk of coercion not present when a defendant is dealing with the government alone. Quite possibly, one defendant will be happier with the package deal than his codefendant(s); looking out for his own best interests, the lucky one may try to force his codefendant(s) into going along with the deal. Id. at 659. The Supreme Court has also observed that “a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the risks a defendant must consider.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 (1978).
Package plea deals therefore impose special obligations: the prosecutor must alert the district court to the fact that co-defendants are entering a package deal; and the district court must carefully ascertain the voluntariness of each defendant’s plea. United States v. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d 719, 733 (1st Cir.1995); see also Caro, 997 F.2d at 659; United States v. Castello, 724 F.2d 813, 815 (9th Cir.1984). Because package-type plea agreements increase the risk that one defendant may coerce another to plead guilty, the trial court is obligated to closely scrutinize whether the defendants are in fact entering their pleas without compulsion or other coercions. See United States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir.1987); Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d at 734.
Accordingly, the state is charged with the minimal duty of informing the court that the plea agreement is part of a package deal. Caro, 997 F.2d at 659-60. Some jurisdictions require specific additional inquiry by the court as to the circumstances surrounding the package deal, including whether “1) the inducement to plead was proper in that the prosecutor acted in good faith and had a reasonable case against the third party to whom leniency is promised; 2) there is a factual basis for the plea in terms of supportable evidence and proportionality of the sentence; 3) the nature and degree of coercion and psychological pressure upon the defendant indicate that the plea is involuntary; 4) the promise of leniency to another was a significant concern to the defendant in choosing to plead guilty; and 5) any other factor impermissibly influenced the defendant’s plea.” Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 335-36 (Tenn.2006) (collecting criteria from other jurisdictions and declining to adopt specific extra inquiries due to the sufficiency of the current voluntariness inquiry). Courts in California are required to look to the totality *541of the circumstances regarding the package plea to insure that it is in fact voluntary. Id. Other jurisdictions require more careful scrutiny of the voluntariness of the plea than in non-package cases, “to insure that the accused understands the plea agreement and the consequences not only to himself, but to such third persons as may be affected by the plea bargain.” Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 838 (4th Cir.1982); see also Caro, 997 F.2d at 659 (“ ‘[T]he trial court should make a more careful examination of the voluntariness of a plea when [it might have been] induced by ... threats or promises’ from a third party.”); People v. Sandoval, 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 911, 921 (2006) (“Because such considerations do not bear any direct relation to whether the defendant himself is guilty, special scrutiny must be employed to ensure a voluntary plea.”).
B. Automatic Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea
While package deals appear to be rather in vogue, the distinct term of a deal that if one defendant can show “good cause” for withdrawal of the plea, then the other defendants’ pleas will be automatically set aside, does not appear to be as common. The First Circuit discussed the withdrawal of pleas under such a package deal, and allowed two defendants to withdraw their pleas on the grounds that the Rule 11 plea colloquy by the court was insufficient to determine that the pleas were not coerced. Martinez-Molina, 64 F.3d at 733-34. The court affirmed the denial of a third defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he failed to show a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Id. at 733. The court acknowledged that the two pleas must be withdrawn and “the case must be remanded for further Rule 11 proceedings or trial.” Id. at 734. However the court did not discuss what would happen with the eight remaining defendants’ guilty pleas.10
In our case, the district judge was the first to mention the wording that “if either defendant shows good cause for withdrawal of the pleas, then the other defendant’s plea would automatically be set aside as well.” The state agreed that this was what it was hoping for out of the package deal. Neither defendant nor their attorneys objected.
The potential problems and issues with this prong of the package deal are obvious. To begin with, the term continues the already inherently coercive atmosphere of the package plea by purporting to deprive the codefendant(s) of the deal they are relying on if one of their group successfully withdraws his/her plea. Defendants who want to maintain their plea may act to encourage a co-defendant not to file a motion to withdraw. And how long does this automatic withdrawal of plea last: prior to sentencing; after sentencing but prior to appeal; after appeal and/or a successful UPCPA?11 Can this term be asserted by only the state; or do the codefendants have an automatic right to withdraw? Can just the state waive this automatic plea withdrawal, or must all parties waive?
Additionally, the term presents itself as grounds for prejudice to the state if any defendant produces a just reason or cause prior to sentencing. It sets up a form of security for the state to avoid withdrawal of any of the pleas where such prejudice might not otherwise exist. The state should not be allowed to manufacture prejudice as one of the terms of the plea agreement. Finally, the language effectively contracts around Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(c) and well-established case-law by eliminating the requirement that a defendant show a just reason to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing or manifest injustice after sentencing. Instead, co-defendants may automatically have their guilty pleas withdrawn if one of them can satisfy Rule 33(c). It has been stated repeatedly, in this state and other jurisdictions, that there is no automatic right to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, yet by its plea agreement the state and the *542defendants seemingly create such an automatic right.
While I don’t mean to open up a “Pandora’s Box” of legal hobgoblins, the bottom line is simply this: the trial judge will need to take a proactive role in addressing and assessing some of these issues before accepting a Rule 11 plea package bargain.
. The agreement stated that "should any of the defendants decide to change his plea according to the offer, the plea is automatically withdrawn as to all of the defendants.”
. At oral argument, counsel for the state argued that the automatic plea withdrawal provision could apply after sentencing as well as before sentencing.