dissenting.
I dissent on two grounds. First, I do not agree that our precedent requires the Mirandas to produce evidence on all essential elements of their cause of action to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s holding is inconsistent with the distinction Bland draws between requiring the plaintiff to prove preliminary facts as a predicate to the trial court’s power to entertain the merits, and requiring her to present the merits themselves on pain of dismissal. Bland Indep. School Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex.2000).1
Second, I cannot agree that the Mi-randas’ pleading has alleged sufficient facts to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. The Mirandas assert that the Department was aware that branches fall from trees, but consciously chose not to post warnings. Is that gross negligence? No. Texas law does not impose on landowners a duty to warn trespassers about all conceivable dangers inherent in nature. What if you add the allegation that the Department did not inspect or prune trees in Garner State Park? The Court today makes clear that the Department has no duty to inspect trees in state parks. 133 S.W.3d 242. If there is no duty, a complaint about the failure to inspect or prune cannot possibly constitute a gross negligence pleading sufficient to invoke the courts jurisdiction. But the Mirandas used the words “gross negligence.” Not enough. The Mirandas pleaded no facts even remotely suggesting the Department was aware the limb ivas about to fall, much less that it would injure Maria.
I
Bland, in Proper Context
In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court must consider evidence “when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. That quote must be read in context. We noted that when a defendant challenges an organization’s standing to sue, the organization must present evidence of its nature and purpose before it can pursue its claims — a burden that “does not involve a significant inquiry into the substance of the claims.” Id. at 554. Similarly, we *235observed that a challenge to personal jurisdiction may “touch on the merits of the case,” but is not aimed at “whether the defendant may be liable as alleged.” Id. at 555. That theme — that a plaintiff is not required to litigate the merits to establish jurisdiction — was emphasized throughout our opinion. Id. at 554. We cautioned that “the proper function of a dilatory plea does not authorize an inquiry so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction.” Id.
I interpret Bland to mean that if a plea to the jurisdiction requires the trial court to wade deeply into the lawsuit’s merits, it is not a valid plea. Yet today the Court immerses itself in the merits by reaching and deciding the ultimate issue in the case: “... the evidence in the record establishes that the Department was not grossly negligent and that the Mirandas have failed to raise a fact question regarding the Department’s alleged gross negligence.” 133 S.W.3d at 221 (emphasis added). This holding misapplies Bland because it permits a defendant, on painfully short notice and before evidence has been developed, to force the plaintiff either to present evidence on the ultimate issue in the lawsuit, or lose the right to a jury trial on the merits.
The Court asserts that its standard “mirrors that of a summary judgment. ...” 133 S.W.3d 228. It is a poor reflection. Our summary judgment rule, unlike the Court’s standard, contains procedural safeguards to ensure that the merits are not determined before the nonmov-ant has had an adequate time for discovery and an opportunity to respond. Tex.R. Crv. P. 166a(c) (“Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing. Except on leave of court, the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.”); 166a(i) (“After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense....)”. As a uniform rule of procedure, the summary judgment rule leaves little to the imagination. A party whose claim is subject to adjudication on the merits is entitled to advance notice that it must present evidence and has an adequate opportunity to respond.2 The procedure the Court adopts today, in contrast, will vary from county to county and from judge to judge.
The Court cites a number of federal decisions holding that when jurisdictional facts are intertwined with the merits, the trial court, in considering evidence, should either employ the standard applicable to a summary judgment or leave the jurisdic*236tional determination to trial. 133 S.W.3d 228; see also 2 James Wm. MooRE Et al., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[3], at 12-37 to 12-38 (3d ed.2003). I do not disagree with that proposition, but it does not answer a fundamental question. This Court must decide what procedure governs in Texas when a plea to the jurisdiction is treated like a motion for summary judgment.
As Justice BRIsteR observes, no procedural rule currently requires a trial court to advise the plaintiff that evidence may or must be presented in opposition to a plea to the jurisdiction, and no rule requires an adequate time for discovery before the court dismisses a case on the merits. 133 S.W.3d at 237. By default, then, trial courts will turn to Rule 21. Tex.R. Civ. P. 21. Presumably, if a trial court’s ruling comports with Rule 21⅛ minimum procedural requirements, a dismissal on the merits will survive any challenge based on an abuse of discretion standard. We should ask ourselves, then, whether the Rule’s minimum requirements are adequate when the stakes are no less than a party’s ability to present its case on the merits.
Under Rule 21, a plea to the jurisdiction may be served “three days before the time specified for the hearing unless otherwise provided by these rules or shortened by the court.” Id. The rule does not mention an adverse party’s right to present opposing evidence, which may explain why the Mirandas did not controvert the Department’s plea with their own evidence. Compiling evidence of simple negligence on three days’ notice — evidence that typically requires months of discovery — would be daunting in itself; but where, as here, a plaintiff must prove gross negligence, her ability to contest the Department’s jurisdictional plea could be essentially non-existent.
The Mirandas had no reason to suspect that a summary judgment standard applied, requiring them to controvert the Department’s evidence, because the Department’s plea to the jurisdiction was subject to Bland. 34 S.W.3d at 554-55 (trial court not authorized to inquire so far into the substance of the claims presented that plaintiffs are required to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction). At a minimum, I would hold that if a summary judgment standard applies, the trial court must so advise the parties and employ Rule 166a procedures.
II
Pleading Requirements Under Recreational Use Statute
Rather than dismiss the case on the merits under a summary judgment standard, I would examine the pleadings to determine whether the Mirandas alleged facts sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass’n Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (plaintiff has burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction). In my view, the Mirandas’ pleading falls short. Just as the Department owes no duty to warn trespassers that rattlesnakes may strike, it owes no duty to advise statutory trespassers that tree limbs fall in state parks. The Mirandas did not allege that the Department had so much as an inkling that the branch in question would fall. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 41.001(7); see also Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 21-22 (Tex.1994) (explaining that gross negligence requires at a minimum that the defendant subjectively “have actual awareness of the extreme risk created by his or her conduct”). Rather, she alleges that the Department is generally aware that tree limbs fall, just as it must know of countless other natural *237perils in state parks. Because the Department owes no duty to warn trespassers that forces of nature may cause random harm, I would hold, contrary to the Courts conclusion, that the Mirandas pleading does not invoke the trial courts jurisdiction.
The Mirandas did not allege that the Department was subjectively aware of any specific risk of injury. See id. Instead, they alleged:
Defendant knew of the dangers of its falling tree branches, failed to inspect, failed to prune, failed to alleviate or remove the danger, and consciously and deliberately failed to warn Plaintiffs of the extremely dangerous condition. Plaintiffs paid a campsite rental fee and specifically asked defendant to assign them a safe campsite. Defendant knew that its property contained hidden, dangerous defect (sic) in that its tree branches which have not been inspected or pruned regularly fall. Defendant did not warn Plaintiffs of the hidden danger.
Plaintiffs would show the court that the occurrence made the basis of this suit and the resulting damages set out below were a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligence and its agents, servants, and officers, both of commission or omission, or both separately and collectively, in failing to properly maintain and inspect the campsite where Plaintiffs were injured, in failing to properly maintain the campsite in a safe condition and/or in failing to exercise ordinary care to protect Plaintiffs from the danger.
The Mirandas’ gross negligence allegations stated:
Plaintiffs would show the court that the occurrences made the basis of this suit and the resulting injuries and damages set out below were a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligence in failing to make safe the dangerous condition of its campsite trees. Defendant’s conduct was willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. Defendant failed to warn or make reasonably safe the dangerous condition of which it was aware and which Plaintiffs were unaware.
We can accept as true the Mirandas’ allegation that the Department knew “its tree branches which have not been inspected or pruned regularly fall” and did not warn them about that contingency. That pleading, however, is of neutral value in a suit against the Department, which would owe no duty to warn unless it had actual knowledge that the branch would fall yet nevertheless instructed Maria to camp beneath it. See id.; see also Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.Sd 778, 785 (Tex.2001) (reiterating that gross negligence requires that “the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.”). Indeed, nowhere in their pleadings do the Mirandas assert that the Department was aware of any risk associated with either the tree or the campsite below. Instead, they simply recast allegations of simple negligence into a claim for gross negligence.
We are bound, however, to analyze their claims in light of the policies underlying the recreational use statute. The statute exists to encourage landowners to allow the public to enjoy outdoor recreation on their property by limiting their liability for personal injury. City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex.2002) (Hankinson, J. dissenting). To accomplish that objective, the Legislature has placed stringent parameters around the duty landowners owe “trespassers.” See Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem Code § 75.002. The duty implicit in the Mirandas pleading, however, would re*238quire the Department to warn all visitors of all perils commonly confronted by human interaction with nature. The scope of that proposed duty — obligating the Department to post warnings about all naturally occurring dangers — would create such an insurmountable practical and economic burden as to frustrate the legislatures intent to encourage landowners to make property available for recreational use.
Without allegations that the Department was aware that the limb would fall and nevertheless instructed Maria to camp below it, the Mirandas have not pleaded facts sufficient to proceed on their claim under the recreational use statute. I do not mean to suggest that merely because the injury is alleged to have resulted from a natural condition, the trial court is thereby deprived of jurisdiction. For example, the trial courts jurisdiction would be properly invoked by a pleading that the Department told the plaintiff it was safe to dive into waters the Department knew were so shallow that the dive posed a likelihood of serious injury, and that the plaintiff was severely injured diving in reliance on that assurance. Here, by contrast, the Mi-randas did not plead that the Department directed Maria to a campsite knowing that an overhanging tree branch would likely fall on her and cause serious injury.
I understand fully the Courts holding that the Mirandas gave “fair notice” that they were pursuing a gross negligence claim. Fair-notice pleadings, however, must be viewed in this case through the prism of sovereign immunity, which deprives a court of jurisdiction unless the State has expressly waived immunity. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). The plaintiffs’ pleadings against the State must affirmatively establish jurisdiction to overcome the contrary presumption. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.2001)(quoting Tex. Assn. Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446). The plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, would establish that the claims come within an express waiver of sovereign immunity before the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed. Just as mere reference to the Texas Tort Claims Act is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587, the trial court’s jurisdiction is not satisfied by mere notice that the plaintiff is pursuing a gross negligence claim. The Mirandas have failed to affirmatively establish the court’s jurisdiction because, even if all of the facts alleged in their pleading were true, those facts would not amount to gross negligence and therefore would not establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the recreational use statute.
When a plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing jurisdiction, the issue is ordinarily one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002). A court may grant a plea to the jurisdiction without affording an opportunity to amend only when the pleadings “affirmatively negate” the existence of jurisdiction, a circumstance not presented here. Id. In this case, however, the trial court overruled the Departments plea to the jurisdiction, concluding implicitly that the Mirandas pleadings were sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. Consequently, the Mirandas have never been placed on notice that they must cure the jurisdictional defect. It may well be that the facts will not lend themselves to a pleading that would confer jurisdiction, but we are not equipped to make that determination at this stage of the proceedings.
Ill
Conclusion
We need not and should not inquire into the ultimate merits of this case. I would *239remand the cause to the trial court to give the Mirandas an opportunity to amend their petition to plead facts establishing jurisdiction.
Justice BRISTER, joined by Justice O’NEILL and Justice SCHNEIDER, dissenting.
The Legislature has provided that state park visitors are owed the same duty of care as trespassers;1 thus, the plaintiffs in this case had to prove the Parks and Wildlife Department caused deliberate, wilful, or malicious injury.2 All members of the Court agree that either their petition or their summary judgment evidence fails to do so, though we disagree which.
The Mirandas alleged Maria suffered severe injuries caused by the Department’s gross negligence; specifically, they alleged the Department knew tree limbs could fall, and failed to warn them of that fact or assign them a campsite where none would. I have grave doubts whether such facts could possibly constitute gross negligence — natural conditions usually cannot be unreasonably dangerous (much less wanton),3 and trespassers do not have to be warned of what everyone should know.4 Nor does the Parks Department appear to have a duty to provide campsites safely away from trees;5 indeed, one has to ask whether anyone would want to use such “parks” if it did.6
Faced with what appears to be an insupportable allegation like the gross-negligence pleading here, litigants normally have two options: (1) demand more specific facts by special exception, or (2) demand more specific facts by motion for summary judgment. Instead, the Department filed three motions, including a “plea to the jurisdiction” — the white elephant7 of current Texas motion practice. By use of this plea, the Department was able to force the trial judge (and ultimately this Court) to make an ad hoc decision whether our jurisdiction should be determined by reference to pleadings or evidence. Because it should be litigants rather than judges making that choice, I respectfully dissent.
Pleas to the jurisdiction are nothing new. In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone lists them as a category of dilatory pleas that (along with pleas of disability and abatement) deny the *240propriety of the remedy rather than the injury.8 One hundred years ago, this Court addressed a variety of matters ■ as pleas to the jurisdiction, including objections based on personal jurisdiction,9 subject-matter jurisdiction,10 dominant jurisdiction,11 venue,12 capacity,13 and conflict of laws.14
Since then, there has been a steady shift away from the common-law forms of pleading to the more specific motion practice set out in the rules of civil procedure. For example, a defendant objecting to venue today must file a motion to transfer that complies with the form requirements of Rule 86 and the deadlines of Rule 87.15 Similarly, a nonresident objecting to personal jurisdiction must file a special appearance that meets the requirements of Rule 120a.16 In substance, these motions could still be categorized as “pleas to the jurisdiction;” but in form, they must comply with the current rules of civil procedure.
Case law as well as rule amendments have contributed to the trend away from the common-law plea to the jurisdiction. For example, we have held that a complaint based on dominant jurisdiction in another court must be raised by plea in abatement in the second court, or it is waived.17 Again, though this complaint could be characterized as a plea to the jurisdiction, a more specific motion and procedure has rendered the common-law term obsolete.
But pleas to the jurisdiction have enjoyed a recent resurgence in the field of governmental immunity. For many years, governmental units were not very particular about the vehicle for asserting immunity, raising it sometimes by—
• general demurrer;18
• special demurrer;19
*241• special exception;20
• plea to the jurisdiction;21
• plea in abatement;22 or
• summary judgment.23
In 1997, the Legislature amended the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to allow interlocutory appeals “from an interlocutory order ... [that] grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.”24 We have held this section must be strictly construed, as it is an exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable.25
As a result, almost overnight a “plea to the jurisdiction” became the motion of choice for asserting immunity;26 indeed, some appellate courts have refused to consider any other.27 This development exalts form over substance. For example, before the Legislature’s amendment, one governmental entity unsuccessfully asserted immunity by means of a summary judgment and special exceptions; immediately after the effective date, the entity filed the same objection as a “plea to jurisdiction” — and prevailed.28
For several reasons, we should put a stop to this resurgence of common-law pleadings in immunity cases. First, it is fraught with uncertainty. Despite hundreds of haphazardly-numbered rules, only once do the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure mention pleas to the jurisdiction, and then only in a rule regarding permissible parts of an answer rather than permissible mo*242tions.29 There is no rule — no case and no code — that specifies the form, deadlines, or evidentiary requirements for pleas to the jurisdiction generally.
In Bland Independent School District v. Blue,30 we attempted to bring some order to this resurgence by setting guidelines for handling such pleas. But due to the broad range of issues a plea to the jurisdiction might address, that was not easy to do. As we pointed out in several examples, consideration of some pleas should not go beyond the pleadings, but consideration of others must.31 When necessary, trial courts must consider evidence relating to the jurisdictional facts, but should not consider evidence relating to the merits,32 even though the two are sometimes the same. Nor could we be specific about when pleas should be decided, leaving it to the trial court’s discretion whether to address the issue at a preliminary hearing or after fuller development of the merits.33
The examples given in Bland certainly provided more procedural guidance than existed before. But without considering all possible pleas to the jurisdiction, we could not prescribe more definitive rules; until all those disputes come before us, we should probably not try. In the meantime, it will often be unclear what the trial court should consider, or when it should do so, until the plea is decided (or perhaps even later on appeal). To some observers, this may appear to be drawing up the rules after the game has been played.34
From almost any vantage point, the resurgence of pleas to the jurisdiction creates problems in immunity cases. For governmental entities, it results in unnecessary repetition. In this case, the Parks and Wildlife Department could not be sure whether the trial court would consider evidence necessary, so it filed three motions — a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, a traditional motion for summary judgment, and a plea to the jurisdiction. But as counsel for the Department admitted at the hearing, “all three relate to the same set of issues.”
Such repetition is unnecessary for interlocutory review. Nothing in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code suggests the Legislature intended to specify a form motions had to take for that purpose, rather than their substance. Indeed, the opposite is suggested by the Legislature’s selection of a common-law term applicable to a broad category of motions, rather than a term pointing to any particular motion in the current rules of civil procedure. It has long been our practice to consider the substance of motions rather than their form;35 nothing in the legislative history *243suggests the interlocutory appeal statute was intended to be an exception to that rule.
For plaintiffs, the problems created by the resurgence of pleas to the jurisdiction are even more acute. Defendants uncertain about how to present an immunity defense can simply try a little of everything; plaintiffs, by contrast, may lose their case if they guess wrong. In this case, for example, the Mirandas did not attach any evidence to their responses to the various motions. The lower courts agreed they did not need to, but if we hold otherwise, then the Mirandas will learn three years too late that they should have presented evidence at the jurisdictional hearing.
From a trial judge’s vantage point, pleas to the jurisdiction create uncertainty, not just about the rules to be applied but about the role of the judge. This case is one of many in which immunity from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act is coextensive with immunity from liability.36 As a result, deciding the jurisdictional question bears a strong resemblance to deciding the merits.
In these circumstances, it is difficult for Texas judges to detect the line between jurisdictional questions they must decide before going further and liability questions they cannot decide without usurping the function of the jury. Here, the Mirandas convinced the lower courts that whether their pleadings were supported by any evidence was a question solely for the jury. But that is not true if they raised no material facts that could establish a waiver of immunity.37
By contrast, returning to standard motions as the vehicles for asserting governmental immunity would clarify what the jurisdictional hearing will be like and simplify many procedural questions. For decades, governmental units have asserted immunity by special exceptions38 or motions for summary judgment.39 In many cases (including this one), they still do so today.40 Relying on standard procedural *244motions would eliminate many questions about deadlines, forms, and evidence. It would make government entities rather than trial judges decide whether the jurisdictional challenge is directed to the plaintiffs pleadings or the underlying facts. If a governmental unit chooses wrong,41 it may always try again. But the plaintiff is not required to guess what rules or procedures the trial judge might apply.
Returning to pre-resurgence practice would not change the incidence of governmental immunity. As we recently held, if a plea to the jurisdiction is directed only to the plaintiffs pleadings, we construe them in the plaintiffs favor and allow an opportunity to amend unless they affirmatively negate jurisdiction.42 This is, of course, identical to the rules governing special exceptions.43 And when governmental entities wish to rely on evidence, any questions of fact that affect jurisdictional issues must be settled by the jury,44 the same standard that applies to summary judgments.
Nor can it be argued that courts exceed their jurisdiction by requiring immunity pleas to be brought in standard motions according to settled rules of procedure. As we stated shortly after the rules of civil procedure were enacted:
Since [the trial court] had the power to sustain the demurrers and grant the motions, it had the power to overrule them. The jurisdiction of a court must be determined, not upon the court’s action in deciding the questions presented in a case, but upon the character of the case itself. Jurisdiction is the power to decide, and not merely the power to decide correctly.45
Of course, returning to established procedural motions will not remove all difficulties with issues of governmental immunity. Judges of goodwill and intellect will still disagree about whether a particular pleading is sufficiently specific, as Justices JeffeRSON and Wainwright do here. Governmental units may incur unnecessary discovery costs and delays unless judges agree to hear summary judgment motions on jurisdictional matters as early in the case as they might hear a plea to the jurisdiction. And appellate courts must still distinguish between immunity from suit (as to which an interlocutory appeal will he) and immunity from liability (as to which it will not).46 But simplification of our procedures should not be rejected because we cannot simplify everything.
If the Texas Legislature mandated interlocutory review of “pleas in bar asserting limitations” (a development devoutly to be wished against), few would suggest such review was available only for motions entitled “Plea in Bar” instead of the summary judgment or special exception forms that have long been used to raise such issues.47 We should stop making the as*245sumption that the Legislature intended something different for pleas of governmental immunity.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for (1) the Parks and Wildlife Department to specify whether its plea to the jurisdiction is a challenge to the pleadings (by special exception) or the evidence (by summary judgment), (2) the Mirandas to respond in compliance with the rules of civil procedure, and (3) the lower courts to address the governmental immunity issue in accordance with the usual rules governing disposition and review of those motions.
. I agree that the court of appeals’ holding conflicts with Bland to the extent it holds that the trial court was prohibited from inquiring into the merits because "... the Department did not specifically allege that the Mirandas allegations were pled merely as a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction.” 55 S.W.3d 648, 652. Bland does not require that form of defensive pleading as the sole gateway through which the trial court may consider evidence. If that were so, we could not have held that there are limited circumstances in which, even in the absence of a defendant's pleading that the plaintiff's pleadings were a sham, the trial court is required to consider evidence. I depart from the Courts holding, however, that this is such a case.
. The prevailing view appears to be that the timeline is strictly enforced. See Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, no writ) ("Because summary judgment is a harsh remedy, we strictly construe the twenty-one day time limit.”). Accord Burns Motors, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 975 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998) rev’d on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 417 (Tex.2000); Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997) rev’d on other grounds, 989 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. 1998); Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ denied); Stephens v. Turtle Creek Apartments, Ltd., 875 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); Wawell v. Caller-Times Pub. Co., 809 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied); Williams v. City of Angleton, 724 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ refd n.r.e.) disapproved of on other grounds, 876 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.1994).
. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 75.002(c)(2), 75.003(g).
. Id. §§ 75.002(a)(2), 75.003, 101.022, 101.058.
. See Johnson County Sheriff’s Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex. 1996) (holding rock in dirt arena did not create unreasonably dangerous condition).
. Cf. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 558 (Tex.2002) (holding darkness caused by failed streetlights was not open and obvious hazard precluding recovery by licensee because it could not be seen from entrance to causeway).
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 75.002(c)(1) (providing landowners who grant permission for recreational use do not assure that the premises are safe for that purpose).
. See Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc. v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 33 (Tex.2002) (holding question of legal duty is question of law requiring balance of factors such as risk, utility, consequences of the duty, and other relevant individual and social interests).
. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines "white elephant” as:
a. A rare albino variety of elephant which is highly venerated in some Asian countries. b. fig. A burdensome or costly possession (from the story that the kings of Siam were accustomed to make a present of one of these animals to courtiers who had rendered themselves obnoxious, in order to ruin the recipient by the cost of its maintenance). Also, an object, scheme, etc., considered to be without use or value.
. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 301-03 (1768).
. See, e.g., Rice v. Peteet, 66 Tex. 568, 1 S.W. 657, 657 (1886).
. See, e.g., McIlhenny Co. v. Todd, 71 Tex. 400, 9 S.W. 445, 446 (1888) (objecting that amount at issue fell below court’s jurisdictional limits); Juneman v. Franklin, 67 Tex. 411, 3 S.W. 562, 562 (1887) (objecting that forcible entry and detainer action was not filed in justice court).
. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1072 (1926), disapproved on other grounds, Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992); Grathaus v. Witte, 72 Tex. 124, 11 S.W. 1032, 1032 (1888).
. See, e.g., Pecos & N.T. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 106 Tex. 456, 167 S.W. 801, 801 (1914); Baines v. Jemison, 86 Tex. 118, 23 S.W. 639, 640 (1893); Watson v. Baker, 67 Tex. 48, 2 S.W. 375, 375-76 (1886).
. See, e.g., Brown v. Gay, 76 Tex. 444, 13 S.W. 472, 472-73 (1890).
. See, e.g., Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627, 629 (1887).
. Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 86 (requiring unverified motion that is filed first and states counties of improper, proper, or mandatory venue); Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 87 (requiring 45-days' notice of hearing, 30-days' notice of respondents affidavits, and 7-days’ notice of movants affidavits).
. Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 120a (requiring sworn motion that is filed and heard before any other matter, with affidavits served seven days before the hearing).
. Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 563 n. 2 (Tex.1991); Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.1988).
. See, e.g., State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1941); Herring v. Houston Nat’l Exch. Bank, 113 Tex. 264, 253 S.W. 813, 814 (1923); Stephens v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 100 Tex. 177, 97 S.W. 309, 310 (1906); Thomson v. Baker, 90 Tex. 163, 38 S.W. 21, 22 (1896).
. See, e.g., Thomson, 38 S.W. at 22.
. See, e.g., Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1980); Dir. of Dep’t of Agric. & Env’t v. Printing Indus. Ass’n of Tex., 600 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1980); Stephens, 97 S.W. at 310.
. See, e.g., Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.2001); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976); State v. Lain, 162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 580 (1961); Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960); Short v. W.T. Carter & Bro., 133 Tex. 202, 126 S.W.2d 953, 955 (1938).
. See, e.g., Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. 1980); Lowe, 540 S.W.2d at 298; Griffin v. Hawn, 161 Tex. 422, 341 S.W.2d 151, 152 (1960); W.D. Haden Co. v. Dodgen, 158 Tex. 74, 308 S.W.2d 838, 838 (1958); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 710 (1945); Short v. W.T. Carter & Bro., 133 Tex. 202, 126 S.W.2d 953, 955 (1938).
. See, e.g., Overton Mem’l Hosp. v. McGuire, 518 S.W.2d 528, 528 (Tex.1975) (per curiam); Tex. Dept. ofCorr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tex.1974).
. Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 51.014(a)(8).
. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex.2001).
. See, e.g., Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 852 (Tex. 2002); Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d at 594; McClain v. Univ. of Tex. Health Ctr. at Tyler, 119 S.W.3d 4, 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied); Dallas County Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton, 990 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist. v. Obayashi Corp., 980 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept. v. Garrett Place, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.); Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Callaway, 971 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
. See, e.g., Thomas v. Long, 97 S.W.3d 300, 302-03 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. granted) (refusing interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction as no order granted or denied a plea to the jurisdiction); Baylor Coll. of Med. v. Tate, 77 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (refusing interlocutory appeal because trial court’s order was summary judgment based on immunity from liability rather than plea to the jurisdiction based on immunity from suit).
. Lamar Univ. v. Doe, 971 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.).
. Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 85:
The original answer may consist of motions to transfer venue, pleas to the jurisdiction, in abatement, or any other dilatory pleas; of special exceptions, of general denial, and any defense by way of avoidance or estop-pel, and it may present a cross-action, which to that extent will place defendant in the attitude of a plaintiff. Matters in avoidance and estoppel may be stated together, or in several special pleas, each presenting a distinct defense, and numbered so as to admit of separate issues to be formed on them.
(Emphasis added).
. 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex.2000).
. Id. at 555.
. Id.
. Id. at 554.
. See id. at 555 (rejecting plaintiffs' demand for remand for full evidentiary hearing because they did not contest evidence at original plea to the jurisdiction hearing).
. See, e.g., Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam) (considering plea to jurisdiction even though misnamed plea in abatement); see also Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 71 (stating "[wjhen a party has mistakenly designat*243ed any plea or pleading, the court, if justice so requires, shall treat the plea or pleading as if it had been properly designated”). Some courts themselves appear to use the possible terms for immunity motions interchangeably. See, e.g., State v. Executive Condos., Inc., 673 S.W.2d 330, 331-32 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refused n.r.e.) (referring to immunity motion as "plea to the jurisdiction” when it was filed, "plea in abatement” when it was denied, and "motion to dismiss” when it was reversed).
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.025(a) (waiving immunity to suit to the extent of liability under chapter 101), § 101.021 (creating governmental liability for specified acts resulting from negligence, premises conditions, and use of property to the extent private persons would be liable).
. See Tex.R. Civ. Proc. 166a(c).
. See, e.g., John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem’l Found, v. Mauro, 921 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied); Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Winters, 765 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied); Martine v. Bd. of Regents, State Senior Colleges of Tex., 578 S.W.2d 465, 469 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1979, no writ); Harrison v. Bunnell, 420 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1967, no writ); State v. McDonald, 220 S.W.2d 732, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1949, writ refused); Porter v. Langley, 155 S.W. 1042, 1043 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1913, writ refused).
. See, e.g., Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 681-83 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied); Russell v. Tex. Dep’t of Human Res., 746 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied); Gay v. State, 730 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
. See, e.g., Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.2003) (sovereign immunity asserted by plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment); County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tex.2002) (sovereign immunity asserted *244by plea to the jurisdiction and special exceptions).
. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Corr. v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 9-10 (Tex. 1974) (reversing summary judgment based on immunity as plaintiff was not allowed opportunity to replead).
. Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 555; Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002).
. See Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 559; Herring, 513 S.W.2d at 9-10.
. See, e.g., Brown, 80 S.W.3d at 556 (holding foreseeability issue raised by plea to the jurisdiction presented-fact question for jury).
. Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (1947).
. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex. 1999).
. See Baker v. Monsanto Co., 111 S.W.3d 158, 159 (Tex.2003) (per curiam) (asserting limitations by summary judgment); City of Port Arthur v. Tillman, 398 S.W.2d 750, 751 *245(Tex. 1965) (asserting limitations by special exception).