dissenting.
Relying on Teegarden v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bur., 313 N.W.2d 716 (N.D.1981) and the record in this case, the majority concludes there is no direct evidence Anderson was informed by her doctor that her work activities are a substantial contributing factor in the development of her injury. The facts in this case are distinguishable from Teegar-den and I dissent.
Because of the date of the “injury,” before 1993, the majority rejects application of the *5011993 amendment to section 65-05-01, NDCC. That amendment provides that when the date of the actual injury cannot be determined with certainty, the date of the injury is the first date a reasonable person knew or should have known that “the employee suffered a compensable injury and the employee was informed by the employee’s treating health care provider that the employee’s work activities are a substantial contributing factor in the development of the employee’s injury or condition.” Emphasis added. It appears to me that the Legislature simply codified the Teegarden holding and the majority’s reliance on Teegarden implements the 1993 amendment. See 1993 minutes of the House and Senate Industry, Business and Labor Committees Re: SB 2040 (amending § 65-05-01, NDCC).
Neither Teegarden nor the 1993 amendment determine the burden of proof. The employee has the burden of proving he or she is eligible for worker compensation benefits. NDCC § 65-01-11. I am unconvinced the Legislature or Teegarden intended to change that statutory requirement. I particularly disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which analyzes and seems to introduce into the worker compensation law the concept of “defense based on the statute of limitations in a civil proceeding is an affirmative defense.” It can only blur what heretofore has been a straightforward statutory provision. If the affirmative-defense concept applies, and if an issue of timely filing of a claim is raised, then the employer or the Bureau will not only have to prove when an employee knew or should have known the disease was work related but also when, for example, the employee fell and broke a leg at work!
Significantly, in Teegarden this court noted the “Bureau made no specific finding of fact as to when the claimant knew or should have known that his disability was fairly traceable to his employment, nor are we aware of any evidence that establishes this fact.” Teegarden, 313 N.W.2d at 719. Significantly, the employee’s pneumonia and bronchitis problem in Teegarden could have been caused by smoking, the grain dust at the place of employment, or both, and, as the opinion noted, “are diseases common to the general public.” Teegarden, 313 N.W.2d at 719. Like Teegarden, the doctor’s notes here indicate the injury was job related. Concededly, in Teegarden, that was determined insufficient evidence the doctor had informed the patient, perhaps a strange determination in view of today’s “full disclosure” by physicians.
But, unlike Teegarden, here the Bureau did make specific findings as to when Anderson should have known the carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by her work. Unlike Teegarden, there is evidence to support that finding not only from the doctor’s notes but in Anderson’s own admission on a questionnaire that she had been told her pain was related to her work and that she had been told that “in the early 80’s.” Anderson attempts to minimize this admission by arguing that had she filed a claim in 1984, the Bureau would have likely denied payment on the ground that the consultation was for ánother purpose and on the ground the doctor “had not stated an opinion that the work as a beautician caused the carpal tunnel syndrome.” Not only is that speculation on Anderson’s part, it does not excuse a delay of 10 years in filing a claim. If, as I understand, carpal tunnel syndrome is progressive, Anderson’s position is that although she knew it was work related, she could choose her own time to have surgery and that is the time when “she knew or should have known” the carpal tunnel problem was work related. I do not believe that is what the Legislature intended, for that position bodes poorly for those situations in which the injury or disease is one for which preventive measures at work may be implemented to avoid further injury. That is, as I understand, for purposes for example, true for some carpal tunnel problems caused by keyboarding. Preventive measures and training may avoid further injury.
I believe that applying Teegarden and section 65-05-01, NDCC, as amended, there is ample evidence to sustain the Bureau’s findings- under our standard of review. This case is factually comparable to Evjen v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 418 (N.D.1988) and factually distinguishable from *502Teegarden and White v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 441 N.W.2d 908 (N.D.1989). I would reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate the Bureau’s decision. I therefore dissent.