dissenting in part and concurring in part.
[¶ 27] I dissent from the majority opinion with the exception of part VII. In my opinion, the Bureau’s conduct in this case is the type of adversarial action we have cautioned against and which we have indicated may require reversal. Scott v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1998 ND 221, ¶20, 587 N.W.2d 153; Blanchard v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1997 ND 118, ¶ 23, 565 N.W.2d 485.
[¶28] The Bureau’s final order relied primarily on a letter written by Dr. Turner to Bjerke on October 7, 1996, in which he stated:
Please use this correspondence as a letter to document your restrictions for return to work. Dr. Pinto’s office did contact me and based on the content of their recommendations, it is my opinion that you are permanently disabled and *337will not be returning to work at Ima-tions. (Emphasis added.)
Based on this language, the Bureau concluded Bjerke was totally permanently disabled because of her non-work-related back condition.
[¶ 29] Bjerke argues Dr. Turner’s letter is conclusory and does not comply with N.D.C.C. § 65-05-08.1. She also argues there is a difference between permanent “partial disability” and permanent “total disability.” I agree. The Bureau’s decision to terminate her vocational rehabilitation services and disability benefits because she was permanently disabled from all work as a result of her non-work-related back injury is rooted in Dr. Turner’s letter. Dr. Turner’s letter, however, is “based on the content of their [Dr. Pinto’s] recommendations.” Dr. Pinto’s letter of October 1, 1996, advised Dr. Turner of some restrictions:
I doubt very much if this patient is able to work on an assembly line at 3M. I also believe it would be very hard for her actually to do any work as she requires constant changing of position and also because she has constant symptoms. I do not know if there would be a job at the sedentary level of duty on a part time basis for her. (Emphasis added.)
Clearly Bjerke potentially was able to perform some amount of labor at a sedentary level of duty on a part-time basis within her back restrictions according to Dr. Pinto. She was not able to return to Imation, but the potential existed for her to do something else part-time in another line of work. When Dr. Turner’s letter is read ' with Dr. Pinto’s letter, it can only be fairly read to mean Bjerke was unable to return to any work at Imation or similar work, but there may be part-time sedentary work she could do in another line of work.
[¶ 30] The Bureau had a statutory obligation to provide services necessary to assist the claimant in the adjustments required by the injury, which include rehabilitation services. N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(2) (1991). We have said that when the Bureau is terminating benefits it has a statutory duty to “request” updated medical reports about the claimant’s disability before terminating further disability benefits. Frohlich v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 556 N.W.2d 297, 303 (N.D.1996). We have also said the Bureau has an affirmative duty to clarify any inconsistencies and to explain its reasons for disregarding medical evidence favorable to the worker. Blanchard, 1997 ND 118, ¶ 23, 565 N.W.2d 485. In this case, where Bjerke potentially retains some earning capacity despite her work-related injury and non-work-related condition, the Bureau has the obligation to clarify the extent of that retained earning capacity before it terminates her benefits. In this case, it did not. Instead, although the Bureau serves as the fact finder as well as the advocate in resolving and weighing evidence, it persists in diminishing its role in clarifying inconsistencies in medical evidence. I find this indicative of a purely adversarial approach.
[¶ 31] I would reverse and remand for reinstatement as of November 1, 1996, of her disability and rehabilitation benefits. For these reasons, I dissent.
[¶ 32] Mary Muehlen Maring