concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 33] I concur in that part of the majority opinion concluding the trial court misapplied the law with regard to the first factor. I am of the opinion, however, the trial court also misinterpreted and misapplied the law with regard to the fourth factor, and therefore, I would remand for *85the trial court to correctly apply the fourth factor as well as the first factor.
[¶ 34] Under the fourth factor, “the trial court must determine whether a visitation schedule can be devised which can reasonably provide the foundation for maintaining and developing a parent-child relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent.” Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 37, 560 N.W.2d 903. Although a proposed move may adversely affect the noncustodial parent’s relationship with his child, when the move is sought in good faith and to gain legitimate advantages for the custodial parent and the child, the move must not be denied because visitation cannot continue in its existing pattern. Id.; Hentz v. Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶ 7, 624 N.W.2d 694 (quoting Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 37, 560 N.W.2d 903). To hold otherwise would result in “an unintentional automatic reason to deny relocation.” Keller v. Keller, 1998 ND 179, ¶16, 584 N.W.2d 509.
[¶ 35] We have continually recognized that even though distance may make it impossible to maintain the same visitation schedule presently enjoyed by the noncustodial parent and the child, allowing liberal visitation during summer months and vacations can foster a meaningful relationship between the noncustodial parent and the child. Keller, 1998 ND 179, ¶ 16, 584 N.W.2d 509; see also Burich v. Burich, 314 N.W.2d 82, 88 (N.D.1981). A visitation schedule which provides less frequent, but extended visitation periods can preserve a noncustodial parent’s right to foster and develop a relationship with the child. Matter of B.E.M., 1997 ND 134, ¶20, 566 N.W.2d 414. Extended periods of visitation provide the noncustodial parent and the child longer periods together, whereby they can nurture and develop their relationship. State ex rel. Melling v. Ness, 1999 ND 73, ¶ 23, 592 N.W.2d 565.
[¶ 36] It is not an appropriate consideration that it is more convenient for the noncustodial parent to maintain the status quo. When both parents have lived in the same city, any proposed relocation will result in a less convenient visitation schedule. Today modern transportation and instant communication through telephone and computers are available to foster the noncustodial parent-child relationship. Tibor v. Tibor, 1999 ND 150, ¶26, 598 N.W.2d 480. A trial court’s analysis of factor four which indicates its belief that any restructuring must provide the same visitation schedule and convenience after a relocation as was experienced before the relocation is an incorrect interpretation of the law. Goff v. Goff, 1999 ND 95, ¶ 18, 593 N.W.2d 768; Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶ 9, 624 N.W.2d 694. The frequency of visitation and closeness between the noncustodial parent and the child are to be considered in the context of re-fashioning the visitation schedule. If there has been frequent contact, then liberal extended visitation in summers, on school breaks, and on holidays should be scheduled.
[¶ 37] It appears the trial court in the present case did not consider frequency of visitation and closeness in the proper context, however. In its analysis applying factor four, the trial court stated:
As stated beforehand, the parties have both been residing in Bismarck since the time of the divorce, except for the brief period of time in 1995 when the plaintiff moved to New York. Therefore visitations have been convenient for the defendant, and he has been able to keep close and frequent contact with the child. With the proposed move to California, naturally the closeness and frequency of visitations would drastically change. (Emphasis added.)
[¶ 38] The trial court’s misinterpretation and misapplication of factor four is *86evident in its statement of its conclusion of factor four: “Lastly, the proposed move would have a negative impact on the defendant’s ability to maintain and preserve a close relationship with the minor child.” (Emphasis added.)
[¶ 39] This is not the standard. The noncustodial parent’s inability to maintain the same frequent contact and degree of closeness with the child is not a sufficient basis to deny a relocation when the “move is sought in good faith and to gain legitimate advantages for the custodial parent and the child.” Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 37, 560 N.W.2d 903; Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶ 7, 624 N.W.2d 694 (quoting Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 37, 560 N.W.2d 903). Naturally, Stephanie’s relocation to California will result in a visitation schedule that is less convenient and less frequent for Thomas. This is true, however, for any proposed relocation, and the trial court cannot consider convenience, frequency of visitation or closeness in a manner that circumvents the proper interpretation and application of factor four.
[¶ 40] In Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶¶ 8-9, 624 N.W.2d 694, we noted our concern about a sentence in the trial court’s decision that states: “If the move were allowed, there would be no regular contact between father and son.” We emphasized “the fact a noncustodial parent will not be able maintain the same visitation schedule is not, alone, a basis for denying permission to the custodial parent to leave the state with the child.” Id. at ¶ 9. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of the move because we concluded the trial court’s decision was not based on frequency of visitation but rather the conclusion the custodial parent would not comply with the visitation order thus preventing “regular contact.”
[¶ 41] Here, however, the trial court concludes a “close relationship” cannot be maintained and preserved by restructured visitation. There is a big difference between maintaining a “close relationship,” which connotes frequency and convenience, and maintaining “regular contact,” which connotes compliance with a restructured visitation schedule. I recognize the trial court concluded “in all likelihood” the noncustodial parent would have more difficulty in arranging visitations because of past visitation difficulties with the custodial parent. Frustration of visitation is an appropriate consideration in determining whether each parent will comply with restructured visitation under factor four. See Tishmack v. Tishmack, 2000 ND 103, ¶ 19, 611 N.W.2d 204; Hentz, 2001 ND 69, ¶ 9, 624 N.W.2d 694. I am not convinced, however, the trial court considered the facts of closeness, frequency of visitation, and convenience of contact in the proper context.
[¶ 42] In this case, if the trial court had properly applied factor four to the evidence, I do not know whether it would have found factor four in favor of Thomas based solely on the two incidents of frustration of visitation. The parties have been divorced for seven years, and the trial court found only two incidents of frustration of visitation. During the first incident, Thomas was scheduled to have visitation with the child on her birthday, but since he did not plan a birthday party for the child, Stephanie planned one for her at a local motel. After Thomas became aware of the party, he consented to it and was able to exercise visitation that evening. The second incident involved a scheduled telephone contact. While Stephanie and the child were in California over Father’s Day, the child did not call Thomas. Stephanie, however, testified she asked the child to call Thomas on two occasions, and the child declined to do so both times. Also, Stephanie testified *87Thomas knew the number where she and the child could be reached in California, and he, too, failed to call.
[¶ 43] Furthermore, the trial court’s findings under factor four are at odds with its findings under factor two. Under factor two, the trial court must determine whether a motion to relocate is motivated by a desire to interfere with visitation. Stout, 1997 ND 61, ¶ 35, 560 N.W.2d 903. In doing so, the court must determine the degree to which the custodial parent will comply with visitation arrangements after the move. Id. The trial court considering the same evidence it did under factor four concluded under factor two that Stephanie’s desire to move was not to defeat or deter Thomas’s visitation with the child. Under factor four, however, the trial court concluded Stephanie was not likely to comply with a restructured visitation order. These findings are inconsistent, and if the court, with regard to factor two, was of the opinion that the two incidents of interference with visitation did not indicate that Stephanie would not comply with visitation after the move, then it should have found she would comply with a restructured visitation under factor four. It did not, however, and I believe the trial court must reconsider its findings under factor four.
[¶ 44] Because I believe the trial court misapplied factor four, I would remand for the trial court to determine whether a restructured visitation is possible and, if so, whether the two incidents regarding Stephanie’s interference with visitation over a seven-year period are sufficient grounds to find this factor in Thomas’ favor.
[¶ 45] Mary Muehlen Maring