dissenting.
[¶ 41] The trial court concluded this case is analogous to State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D.1991), and that under Everson the officer “was not required to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of any further wrongdoing by Defendant in order to ask for her consent to search the vehicle.” But in Everson the defendant *138was held due to the delay in obtaining a license check on the trailer because of the mutilated condition of the license plate. It was during that delay the officer requested permission to search the automobile to which the trailer was attached.
[¶ 42] In this case, I agree with the dissent that the officer’s extended detention after completing the traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The authority to stop a vehicle for a traffic violation is not authority or justification to interrogate the driver on unrelated matters. I also agree with the dissent to the extent that if the detention is illegal, we need look closely at the circumstances to determine if there was a clear interval between the illegal detention and the request to search before we conclude the permission to search was indeed voluntary notwithstanding the illegal detention. Under the totality of the circumstances in this instance, the clear interval and the volun-tariness of the consent to search are not readily apparent. I join the dissent in concluding we should remand the matter to the trial court for that determination.
[¶ 43] GERALD W. VANDEWALLE, C.J.