concurring specially.
[¶ 20] As I understand the majority opinion, it reverses solely because the district court did not make an explicit finding of bad faith on the part of Burleigh County State’s Attorney Richard Riha, his Assistant State’s Attorney Brandi Sasse Russell, or the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s secretarial staff (collectively, “the state’s attorney”).
[¶ 21] The majority opinion obscures the facts, making the state’s attorney’s misconduct appear less egregious than it appears on the face of the record.
[¶ 22] The record reflects this is not a case in which the state’s attorney could not secure the presence of the state’s witnesses. This is a case in which the state’s attorney chose not to secure the presence of the state’s witnesses. The witnesses were all under subpoena to appear at the Burleigh County Courthouse on the day of the original trial. — the day before the rescheduled trial. As the district court pointed out to the state’s attorney, any witnesses who were not served with a new subpoena “in the field” could have been served with a new subpoena when they appeared at the courthouse on the originally scheduled trial day. Instead, the state’s attorney contacted the witnesses and told them they did not have to appear. The state’s attorney has asserted that subpoenaing witnesses in this manner would be unethical, but has presented no authority either to the district court or to this Court to support the assertion.
[¶ 23] In addition, after the in-chambers hearing, the district court directed the attorneys to proceed directly to the courtroom. The state’s attorney failed to appear, and the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.
[¶ 24] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit appears to suggest that an explicit finding of bad faith may not be required. “The court did not, however, find that the government had acted in bad faith, nor does the record *293indicate a basis for such a finding. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in turning aside the government’s Rule 48(a) motion and inviting a motion to dismiss from the defendant....” United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 513 (4th Cir.2000) (emphasis added).
[¶ 25] Although I believe a strong case can be made that the record here reflects bad faith and willful misconduct by the state’s attorney, I believe the better practice is for the district court to make an explicit finding.
[¶ 26] The Court of Appeals noted in Goodson:
Under both Rule 48(b) and its supervisory power, a district court has broad discretion to manage its docket and to impose a wide range of sanctions against parties who violate the court’s scheduling orders. The sanction of dismissal with prejudice, however, is a harsh remedy for enforcement of those powers, and, indeed, its use becomes a significant event. For in dismissing ... with prejudice, the court allows its interest in the orderly administration of justice to override the interests of victims and the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law.
Id. at 514 (citations omitted).
[¶ 27] I concur in the result, somewhat reassured by the district court’s ability to make an explicit finding of bad faith where appropriate and to impose a “wide range of sanctions” if the problem recurs in the future.
[¶ 28] I understand the further proceedings on remand are that the district court is to enter an order dismissing without prejudice — the remedy requested by the state’s attorney. As provided in State ex rel. Koppy v. Graff, 484 N.W.2d 855, 859 (N.D.1992), reinstated criminal proceedings would be subject to an evidentia-ry hearing on the issues of bad faith or misconduct by the state’s attorney.
[1129] DALE V. SANDSTROM