concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 23] I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority’s opinion regarding visitation, but concur with Parts I, III, and IV providing facts of the case, affirming division of marital property, and declining to clarify or remand the child support issue.
[¶ 24] The majority reverses the district court judgment and remands for preparation of findings supporting supervised rather than unsupervised visitation for Chad Marquette. I believe the majority’s approach needlessly prolongs this matter because Part I of the Court’s opinion contains more than sufficient facts to allow this Court to decide the supervised visitation issue. Also significant, but ignored by the majority, is that Chad does not want the case remanded for findings.
[¶ 25] During oral argument Chad’s counsel was asked whether he was requesting remand for additional findings. He unequivocally responded “no” because his position was based on the law rather than on the inadequacy of the district court’s findings. Chad’s position is evidenced by the following colloquy:
Justice Maring: So what are you asking us to do? Are you asking us to remand this to the district court for more specific findings, or are you asking, are you saying to us there, even if let’s say if the trial court said — Well I made my decision based on, you know, the episode of him shooting himself in the foot, the manic episodes that he has had, and you know and so on, his noncompliance with meds in the past and I don’t know if he is going to be compliant, you know, in the future. Would you be back up here again — I mean, if we sent it back and said make findings and the court made such findings to support its decision— Would you be back up here saying those are not sufficient?
Mr. Chapman: Your honor, my position is that there could be no findings under this record that would be sufficient to withstand prior case law by this Court and the statute that we are dealing with, 14-05-22(2). I am asking for a reversal and to institute the visitation suggestions as outlined in my brief and as testified to by—
Justice Sandstrom: It is your position— that it is not merely the court failed to make sufficient findings, but if it had made findings that on their face appeared to be sufficient they would be clearly erroneous, is that what your— because of—
Mr. Chapman: Absolutely, because there is no, there’s no evidence, there’s no finding that the court could possibly *328make creating any causal link whatsoever—
This exchange conclusively establishes the issue here is not whether the district court’s findings were adequate. Rather, the question is whether North Dakota law and this Court’s precedent allow Gretchen Marquette to supervise and wholly control Chad’s visitation.
[¶ 26] I would address the issue framed at oral argument. That is the real question now, and likely will be the question presented to us again after completion of the exercise in futility interposed by remand. I would also answer the real question in this case, and not remand for additional findings because, as explained below, facts supporting the district court’s order are evident from both the record and the majority’s own opinion.
[¶ 27] I agree with the majority that district courts generally need to provide adequate findings of fact to allow this Court to perform our appellate function. Majority opinion at ¶ 11; see In re Spicer, 2006 ND 79, ¶ 8, 712 N.W.2d 640. “However, we will not reverse a district court’s decision when ‘valid reasons are fairly dis-cernable, either by deduction or by inference.’ ” Id. In this case, like in Spicer, the district court made virtually no findings. See id. at ¶ 9. And here, like in Spicer, we have all the information necessary to understand the underlying decision. I also note that the same dearth of findings that led the majority to remand the visitation issue provided adequate findings for us to affirm the district court’s property distribution. Majority opinion at ¶¶ 12-17.
[¶ 28] Regarding visitation, the fact section of the majority opinion shows the parties were married from 1996 to 2005, during which time “Chad Marquette was not stable and was easily agitated.” Majority opinion at ¶ 2. Chad was diagnosed with mild depression in November of 2000 and was prescribed antidepressants. Id. Chad quit taking his medication in January of 2001, and his mental condition was so unstable that Gretchen left the marital home with the children. Id. This protective move from Minnesota to Williston was supported by a North Dakota district court’s emergency order allowing her to remain in Williston with the children. Id.
[¶ 29] Gretchen and the children returned to Minnesota in August 2001, but Chad’s condition declined less than a year later when he was spending more time alone, was unable to sleep, was crying often, and was delusional. Id. at ¶ 3. In August 2002, Chad went into their garage and shot himself in the foot. Id. At the time of Chad’s self-inflicted gunshot wound, Gretchen and the children were in their house which was attached to the garage. Id. Gretchen and the children again left for Williston, and Chad was hospitalized until November 2002.
[¶ 30] Gretchen and the children returned to Minnesota upon Chad’s discharge from the hospital but again had to return to Williston when Chad experienced violent mood swings. Id. at ¶ 4. Gretchen went back to Minnesota in January 2003, only to learn Chad left for Rome on “orders of the Pope.” Id. Chad was detained en route and hospitalized for three weeks. Id. Gretchen and the children returned to Williston. Id. Chad filed for divorce in December 2003. Id. During trial in February 2005, Chad’s mother testified that Chad had been stable for about five months, meaning Chad had not been stable much of 2004. Id. at ¶ 5.
[¶ 31] Additional facts not included in the majority’s statement of facts but cited in a brief filed with this Court show Chad has been consistently delusional during the marriage. He has told his children that they are decedents of European royalty *329and has expressed the view that he has billions of dollars waiting for him in a London bank. Chad has engaged in violence with Gretchen and with his brother and father, the latter of which led to criminal charges against Chad. Chad shot himself in the foot as part of a perceived deal with the devil, and he has called Gretchen derogatory and demeaning names in public. He has also lost control and caused a public scene while with Gretchen and the children.
[¶ 32] The record contains additional details but these facts more than adequately demonstrate remand is not necessary to adjudicate this case. The district court ordered supervised visitation because the unfortunate facts surrounding Chad’s mental illness establish unsupervised “visitation is likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.” N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2). The district court’s order is well supported by facts in the record, and remand will only delay— but not change — 'that conclusion. We should therefore proceed to answer the real question, namely whether the district court improperly gave Gretchen excessive authority to supervise Chad’s visitation. Because the majority declines to do so, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion.
[¶ 33] DANIEL J. CROTHERS