dissenting.
[¶ 20] I respectfully dissent. The district court’s finding that R.S. is a person requiring treatment is clearly erroneous because there is no clear and convincing evidence supporting the finding that R.S. *200poses a serious risk of harm to others if he is not treated.
[¶ 21] To establish that a mentally ill person requires treatment, convincing evidence must be presented to show that if left untreated, the person poses a serious risk of harm to himself, others, or property. Interest ofl.K, 2003 ND 101, ¶ 17, 663 N.W.2d 197. Section 25-03.1-02(12), N.D.C.C., provides a detailed definition of what constitutes “serious risk of harm,” including a substantial likelihood of “Hill-ing or inflicting serious bodily harm on another person or inflicting significant property damage, as manifested by acts or threats.” In this case, the district court found that a serious risk of harm exists because there is a substantial likelihood that R.S. will inflict serious bodily injury on others. However, the evidence presented at the commitment hearing does not provide clear and convincing support for this finding.
[¶ 22] R.S. has lived alone for many years and is self-sufficient. He has held a full-time position as a maintenance worker for about fifteen years. He does not have a history of violent or threatening behavior. At the commitment hearing, Dr. Pryatel testified that R.S. stays to himself at the State Hospital and has not had any confrontations or caused any problems there, even without medication. R.S.’s nephew testified that he does not think R.S. would harm himself or anyone else.
[¶ 23] In support of its finding that R.S. poses a serious risk of harm to others, the district court relied primarily on the incident where R.S. carried a gun into the police department. However, this incident, when viewed in light of all the circumstances, is not convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that R.S. will inflict serious bodily harm on another person if he is not treated. Officer Rainesalo had invited R.S. to return to the police station if he needed to talk just fifteen minutes before the incident. Although Officer Rainesalo testified that he felt threatened by the gun that R.S. carried into the station, R.S. did not exhibit any accompanying violent or threatening behavior. Indeed, Officer Rainesalo testified that R.S. walked slowly past the front desk, held the gun down along his side, and never made verbal threats or pointed the gun at anyone. After Officer Rainesalo seized the gun, he discovered that it was unloaded, which was consistent with R.S.’s claim that he brought the gun to the police station to check whether it was stolen.
[¶ 24] Furthermore, Dr. Pryatel’s expert testimony was not clear and convincing evidence that R.S. poses a serious risk of harm to others if not treated. His testimony did not establish a substantial likelihood that R.S. will inflict serious bodily harm on others, which was the district court’s finding. Dr. Pryatel testified only that without medication, psychotic disorder “tends to spiral and get worse and worse” which “could lead to an event.” Dr. Prya-tel gave a vague answer when he was asked whether the incident with the gun is a significant indicator of future dangerousness. The doctor responded, “Making statements that he feels a hit man is out after him and has a weapon here so.... ” In his testimony, Dr. Pryatel relied primarily on the general characteristics of psychotic disorder and not the particular facts of R.S.’s ease. “Clinical experience and psychiatry in general” may establish a profile of a person who might reasonably be expected to be a danger to others, but I am not persuaded that a profile, without more, constitutes the clear and convincing evidence which is statutorily necessary to conclude that R.S. is a person requiring treatment.
[¶ 25] In this case, it is clear that R.S. would benefit from mental health treat*201ment. He suffers from delusions and paranoia. However, this is not the standard. There must be clear and convincing evidence that R.S. is a “person requiring treatment” under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12). Although this Court has held that direct evidence of overt violence or an expressed intent to commit violence is not required to find that a person poses a “serious risk of harm,” the statute does require clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that R.S. will inflict serious bodily harm on another person “as manifested by acts or threats.” N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-02(12); Interest of D.Z., 2002 ND 132, ¶ 9, 649 N.W.2d 231. Based on the entire record, there is no clear and convincing evidence that R.S. poses a serious risk of harm to others if left untreated.
[¶ 26] I would reverse the district court’s Order for Hospitalization and Treatment.
[¶ 27] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, J. concurs.