concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 29] I agree with much the Majority says about judicial impartiality and the reasons for judicial disqualification. However, those legal concepts become both confusing and difficult to apply because of the inherent mismatch created when disciplinary rules are used to regulate adjudicative proceedings. See Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 877 (N.D.1993) (“The Rules of Judicial Conduct direct a judge’s decisions on disqualification.”). “A violation of the Rules of Judicial Conduct by the judge who presides over a case can result in the reversal of a judgment.” Id. at 879-80. The result is that across the nation, Canon 3E has become the most litigated section of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See Ronald D. Rotunda et al., Legal Ethics: The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional Responsibility 862 (2002). I write separately to minimize the inherent confusion and difficulty of using disciplinary rules in courtroom proceedings and to prevent that confusion from being compounded by a lack of clear demarcation between what I think are several distinct concepts under Canons 3E and 3F.
[¶ 30] One concept is that “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E. Our decisions interpret Canon 3 to require disqualification for both actual partiality and the appearance of partiality. This Court has explained:
“The Rules of Judicial Conduct direct a judge’s decisions on disqualification. Rule 2 demands that ‘[a] judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.’ Rule 2(A) thus directs that ‘[a] judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act in such a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.’ Rule 3(C)(1)(a) makes a judge’s disqualification ‘appropriate when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ ”
Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d at 877.1
[¶ 31] This Court has also stated, “The appearance of impropriety can be as im*492portant as the fact.” Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Brakke, 512 N.W.2d 718, 720 (N.D.1994). We explained in Wentworth:
“The disqualification directions in Rule 3(C) are not merely guidelines; they are mandatory. Our primary concern is the preservation of public respect and confidence in the integrity of the judicial system, which ‘can only be maintained if justice satisfies the appearance of justice.’ Even without intentional bias, disqualification can be essential to satisfy the appearance of justice.”
Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted). These general and difficult to administer concepts, along with some cases deciding particular fact patterns, are all we have offered judges to decide in a myriad of situations whether they can or should continue to preside over a case.
[¶ 32] A second concept is that the Code provides several “automatic” or “per se” circumstances when a judge is disqualified. Judges are disqualified from presiding over matters when they have an actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, when they have personal knowledge of evidentiary facts, or when they or a close family member were or are a lawyer, witness, or have an economic interest in the matter. See N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E(1). With few exceptions not relevant to this case, these circumstances automatically and immediately disqualify the judge from presiding over a case. Id.; see also James J. Alfini et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 4.04, at 4-10 (4th ed. 2007) (“The Codes provide a list of circumstances in which a judge’s disqualification is automatic.”).
[¶ 33] Concept three is that most disqualifications under Canon 3E can be waived by inaction or failure to object. Alfini, supra § 4.14, at 4-67. However, waiver of an objection available under Canon 3E is far different from the exacting remittal procedure prescribed in Canon 3F. Because strict adherence to the remittal procedures in Canon 3F is required, it would be antithetical to apply normal waiver analysis to that process. Although not an issue here, because remit-tal is not permitted for “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers,” a party likely cannot waive an objection to a judge’s failure to disqualify on any of the grounds for which remittal is prohibited. See N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3F; Matter of Estate of Risovi, 429 N.W.2d 404, 407 (N.D.1988) (where disqualification cannot be remitted, judge must immediately withdraw and any subsequent order is void).
[¶ 34] In this case, I agree with the Majority that the Judge was not automatically disqualified due to the presence of any per se circumstances. Majority Opinion at ¶ 16. Therefore, the issues on appeal are whether the Judge abused his discretion by not recusing, whether Jacobson waived his objection to the Judge’s failure to recuse himself, and whether the Judge did recuse himself and the parties remitted his disqualification under Canon 3F.
Recusal and Waiver
[¶ 35] North Dakota judges have a balancing act to perform when faced with a question of partiality. On the one hand, *493judges are instructed to “hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required.” N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3B(1). On the other hand, judges are disqualified from a case when, by use of an objective test, they determine their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E(1). When a judge believes he or she is not disqualified but circumstances exist material to that consideration, the judge is encouraged to disclose those circumstances to the parties. Commentary to the Code provides:
“A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.”
N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E(1) cmt. See Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 536 N.W.2d 666, 674 (N.D.1995) (Meschke, J., dissenting) (Judge’s “failure either to disclose or to disqualify compounds the problem of perceived partiality, even if he was not actually biased.”).
[¶ 36] Here, the Judge learned during trial that he had a social relationship with a witness. In response, the Judge did not deem himself disqualified from the case and he did not terminate his participation. Instead, he disclosed on the record the basis of the relationship with the witness, as contemplated in the commentary quoted above. The colloquy between the Judge and counsel was as follows:
“Mr. Elhard: State will call Dr. Charles Allen.”
“The Court: All right. Hang on a second. I don’t know if this is going to make a difference to either party but I hadn’t gotten a witness list or anything prior and Dr. Allen and I are acquaintances. Our sons played baseball together. If that makes a difference to either of you, you better let me know now and I’ll recuse myself. I hate to do that after coming down here and everything, but like I said, I didn’t have any witness list or any way to know [who] the witnesses were until I walked in this morning-so if that’s going to be a problem for you Mr. Grenz.”
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 37] The foregoing shows the Judge made an initial disclosure of a social relationship with the witness. I view his statement, “If that makes a difference to either of you, you better let me know now and I’ll recuse myself,” as one inviting a motion for the Judge to recuse, as intended by the Canon and commentary. N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3E and cmt. See also Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11 cmt. 5 at 28 (2007) (discussing the ABA’s new Rule 2.11 on disqualification and modified Commentary that “[a] judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.”). Notably, “Disclosure of information relevant to disqualification does not mandate a judge’s disqualification.” See Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1) annot. at 190 (2004).
[¶ 38] Neither counsel accepted the Judge’s invitation to request recusal, either at the outset or after further discussion. Normally, the failure to object is a waiver precluding subsequent challenge on appeal. See Delzer v. United Bank of Bismarck, 484 N.W.2d 502, 509 (N.D.1992). However, further consideration of the question is required because of the Judge’s subsequent statement he would generally find the witness credible.
*494[¶ 39] After inviting a recusal motion and receiving equivocation from defense counsel (“Your Honor, it’s almost impossible to make that determination. I don’t know what to say, Your Honor. Clearly you believe that it may have an impact because of your knowledge.”) the Judge said:
“The Court: Well let me put it this way. If Dr. Allen’s credibility is going to be an issue, which in most cases witnesses are, I would be inclined to believe what he had to say because I’ve known him for several years in a couple different contexts and I find him to be a credible, believable person. I mean if all he’s going to be testifying to is fact things where credibility isn’t much of an issue, then that may make a differen[ce]. I don’t know what else I can tell you. Obviously I would do the best I can not to let that unduly influence me, but as I say, I’ve known him for several years and I would find him believable in most circumstances.”
The majority concludes, and I agree, these statements by the Judge that he would find the witness credible “created a situation in which Judge Haskell’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Majority Opinion at ¶ 17. However, I cannot agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the Judge’s disclosure “indicates he decided he was disqualified from the proceeding.” Id.
[¶ 40] In my view, the Judge should have recused himself under Canon 3E on the basis of his view of Dr. Allen’s credibility. But he did not. Jacobson could have contemporaneously objected to the Judge presiding over the trial. But he did not. Instead, Jacobson waited until after trial and until after he received an unfavorable decision to move for a new trial based on judicial partiality. Jacobson waited too long and waived his objection to the Judge not recusing himself. The result is that Jacobson waived his objection under Canon 3E. I therefore concur with the Majority’s conclusion that the judgment should be affirmed.
[¶ 41] My analysis would end here, and I would not reach issues relating to Canon 3F and remittal of disqualification. I therefore cannot join the Majority because it concludes the Judge did recuse himself and because it proceeds to discuss and decide this case based on remittal under Canon 3F.
Remittal of Disqualification
[¶ 42] Canon 3F provides a procedure for remittal of a judge’s disqualification from a case under certain circumstances. We are cautioned that “Canon 3F permits the parties to waive disqualification if the proper steps are taken.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3F annot. at 249 (2004). “Any method for obtaining a waiver of disqualification that deviates from the requirements of Canon 3F is not valid.” Id. See Ariz. Jud. Eth. Adv. Comm. Op. 97-2, 1997 WL 599607, at * 1 (Feb. 13, 1997) (“The remittal procedure of Canon 3F must be strictly followed.”).
[¶ 43] The Code of Judicial Conduct provides for remittal and states:
“Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Section 3E may disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The *495agreement shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.”
N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3F. Broken down, effective remittal conducted in strict compliance with Canon 3F requires a showing that each of the following steps have been taken:
1. The judge determined he or she is disqualified under Canon 3E;
2. the judge determined disqualification under Canon 3E was for other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties or their lawyers;
3. the judge determined he or she is willing to offer remittal;
4. the judge disclosed to the parties and their lawyers the basis for the judge’s disqualification;
5. the parties and their lawyers determined they are interested in waiving disqualification;
6. the parties and their lawyers determined they all waive or remit the judge’s disqualification;
7. the parties’ and their lawyers’ determination to waive the judge’s disqualification was made “without participation by the judge”;
8. the judge agreed to participate in the proceeding after being notified that all parties and their lawyers have waived or remitted disqualification; and
9. the agreement of all parties and their lawyers to waive or remit disqualification, and the judge’s agreement to participate, has been incorporated into the record.
N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3F. These requirements are cumulative. The grammatical structure of Canon 3F indicates all of these criterion must be satisfied before remittal is permitted. In the case before the Court, any analysis of remittal is ultimately fruitless because the record does not support a conclusion that all of these requirements were addressed, much less satisfied.
[¶ 44] I will assume for purposes of analysis that the Judge’s statement, “I’ll recuse myself,” was in fact a statement of recusal. I will also presume for purposes of analysis that the Judge determined re-cusal was for reasons other than automatic disqualification, and that the Judge decided he was willing to accept remittal. These conclusions enjoy support, at least by implication, in the Judge’s statement, “If that makes a difference to either of you, you better let me know now and I’ll recuse myself.” Thus, the first three factors arguably have been satisfied. Similarly, the Judge’s disclosure of his reason for disqualification satisfies the fourth prong of Canon 3F requiring that the parties and their lawyers know why the Judge removed himself from the case and what they are agreeing to waive.
[¶ 45] But I cannot agree the remaining factors are supported in the record. Factors five and six require that the parties and their lawyers be given an opportunity to decide if they are interested in remitting, and that they have the chance to make that decision “without participation by the judge.” Commentary to Canon 3F explains that these requirements are “[t]o assure that consideration of the question of remittal is made independently of the judge.” N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3F cmt. The comments also state, “[A] judge must not solicit, seek or hear comment on possible remittal or waiver of the disqualification unless the lawyers jointly propose remittal after consultation as provided in the rule.” Id.
[¶ 46] Here, we have been offered nothing directly supporting an argument that the parties wanted to remit disqualification. We could only reach that conclu*496sion by inference based on the lack of an objection to the Judge’s continuation of the case, or upon counsel’s statement following the Judge’s disclosure on the record:
“Mr. Grenz: Well Your Honor, based upon the discovery that we made, I can’t find any statements or anything else that were given by the doctor. Again, if all he’s going to do is testify in regard to what the pictures show and confirm that that was her condition, that’s one thing, but if he’s going to testify to anything else, I’d ask that that be stricken.”
[[Image here]]
“Mr. Elhard: ... I have it in my discovery that he was a witness that we were going to call.”
“Mr. Grenz: He made that disclosure—
“The Court: Well let me stop you. I’ll allow Dr. Allen to testify as to his examination in the emergency room, however if there’s any records or documents that weren’t provided to the defense, he’s not going to be able to introduce those into evidence or testify from them.”
“Mr. Elhard: Okay.”
“Mr. Grenz: With that proviso, Your Honor. ”
“The Court: All right. Dr. Allen, if you want to come up here please and be sworn.”
(Emphasis added.)
[¶ 47] Given the need for strict compliance with remittal procedures, we should be unwilling to conclude Jacobson agreed to discuss remittal of the Judge’s disqualification based on his counsel’s concurrence in an in-limine motion concerning documents or records not produced in discovery and not admissible at trial. I also believe we neuter our Canon if we conclude — like the Majority appears to have concluded — that this requirement is satisfied by a party’s failure to affirmatively object to the judge continuing to preside over a matter. This is especially true since the question of remittal is not ripe for consideration until after the judge is disqualified. See N.D.Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3F (“A judge disqualified by the terms of Section 3E ... may ask the parties and their lawyers ... to waive disqualification.”).
[¶ 48] This record also contains nothing to support the conclusion Jacobson and his attorney had an opportunity to discuss re-mittal out of the Judge’s presence. Nor do we have any support in the record that the parties and their attorneys had an opportunity to discuss remittal without the Judge being present. Instead, the trial transcript contains the colloquy between the Court and counsel, followed by the testimony of Dr. Allen. Nothing indicates a time-line break or a private conversation between any of the parties and their counsel. On these facts, factors five and six have not been satisfied.
[¶ 49] The seventh requirement is that all parties and their counsel agree to waive or remit disqualification. Commentary to Canon 3F states, “A party may act through counsel if counsel represents on the record that the party has been consulted and consents.” Like consideration of factor five, silent acquiescence in the Judge’s continuation of trial should be insufficient as a matter of law to conclude Jacobson waived or remitted disqualification. I also have difficulty contemplating how all of the parties and their lawyers could have agreed to remit disqualification without first having had an opportunity to communicate with each other out of the Judge’s presence. However, due to availability of electronic communications and ever-resourceful counsel, I am willing to leave that question for another day.
*497[¶ 50] The eighth requirement is that the judge agrees to proceed after being notified that all parties and their lawyers consent to remittal. Here, we have no remittal agreement by the parties, so nothing could have been communicated to the Judge. We also have no express acknowledgment that, after deeming himself disqualified, the Judge accepted remittal and rejoined the case. Rather, we have a record showing disclosure by the Judge, followed by a colloquy between the Judge and counsel, followed by a limitation of documentary evidence, followed by Dr. Allen’s testimony, and ultimately followed by completion of trial. These facts are consistent with a judge making a disclosure under Canon 3E, as discussed above. These facts are inconsistent with the mandatory — and cumulative — remittal procedures required under Canon 3F.
[¶ 51] The ninth and final requirement is that the remittal agreement be “incorporated in the record.” Commentary to Canon 3F states, “As a practical matter, a judge may wish to have all parties and their lawyers sign the remittal agreement.” The reason for requiring a clear record should be self-evident; we do not want ambiguity in situations involving judicial ethics or courtroom proceedings. The impact of the lack of a clear record is demonstrated here, where uncertainty exits whether the Judge disqualified himself and, if so, whether he intended to offer remittal of that disqualification. The lack of an agreement incorporated into the record means that any arrangement between the court, the counsel and the parties was ineffective.
[¶ 52] In summary, I cannot agree the district court conducted a remittal proceeding under Canon 3F. If this really was a remittal proceeding, I would conclude the district court abused its discretion by remitting disqualification based on the record before us. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the Majority Opinion discussing and deciding that this case is based on Canon 3F.
[¶ 53] DANIEL J. CROTHERS, J.. The “Rules of Judicial Conduct” referred to in Wentworth were North Dakota’s adoption of the American Bar Association's 1970 version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Those Rules were replaced by our adaptation of the American Bar Association's 1990 Code *492of Judicial Conduct, which became effective in North Dakota on January 1, 1994. See North Dakota Court Rules, State, 2008, 466 (Thomson/West 2008). Canon 3C of the 1970 Code was strengthened in the 1990 Code to include mandatory language and became what we now know as Canon 3E. However, this Court in Wentworth construed the provisions of 3C "as mandatory and not merely guidelines.” Reems v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 536 N.W.2d 666, 671 n. 3 (N.D.1995). Therefore, this Court’s application of Canon 3C in Wentworth has equal application to current Canon 3E. Reems, at 671 n. 3.