dissenting.
[¶ 23] There is no statutory definition of “misconduct” as used in N.D.C.C. § 52-06-02(2). Perske v. Job Service, 336 N.W.2d 146 (N.D.1983). Rather, as the majority notes, that definition has evolved through our case law. Id. I agree with the majority opinion there is evidence that LM Glasfiber had an unwritten policy and that Schweitzer was aware of the policy. An employer may have a number of written or unwritten policies covering a range of matters from trivial to highly sensitive. Without more consideration of how one violation of that policy affects the employer’s interest, I am concerned we have established automatic disqualification for unemployment benefits whenever a policy, trivial or highly sensitive, is violated. But automatic disqualification is clearly not what this Court intended when we said in Perske: “In an appeal such as this, the issue is not whether or not the employer had the right to discharge the employee, but rather the issue is whether or not Job Service is justified in denying benefits for the conduct in question.” Id. at 148.
[¶ 24] In Perske, we adopted the definition of misconduct cited by the majority from Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941). Significantly, we noted:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court noted the public policy of cushioning the effect of unemployment by a series of benefit *245payments and determined that this policy would be defeated if mere mistakes, errors in judgment, and unintentional carelessness were considered to be within the definition of “misconduct”. The Wisconsin court construed the unemployment statute in a manner least favorable to working a forfeiture to the unemployed individual ....
Id. at 148, 296 N.W. 636 (emphasis supplied).
[¶ 25] Considering only whether or not a policy of the employer has been violated without weighing that policy against the employer’s interests does not fulfill the purpose for which the Wisconsin court and, subsequently, this Court, adopted the definition of “misconduct” which we all agree controls this proceeding. In Hins v. Lucas Western, 484 N.W.2d 491, 496 (N.D.1992), we concluded that: “Where the conduct in question is an isolated incident, the connection between the conduct and the impact or potential impact on the employer’s interest must be especially close.”
[¶ 26] Here, there is no evidence this was more than an “isolated instance” of an unsophisticated person seizing on an increase in her responsibilities to exaggerate her status in an attempt to secure employment for her brother. I agree she had no authority to do so and there is evidence to indicate she knew she had no authority to do so. It was an ignorant attempt that was quickly uncovered. Nevertheless, there is little or no discussion of the impact on the employer’s interest in the Job Service decision. Rather, the emphasis is on whether or not the isolated incident was intentional. Most of the Job Service decision is concerned with the factual issues of whether or not Schweitzer knew she did not have the authority to do what she did. If it was intentional, it appears Job Service presumes the impact against the employer’s interest. I have found no cases in which we have held that an intentional incident presumptively has a close impact on the employer’s interest. While I agree the incident was intentional and against the employer’s interest, there is no discussion of the impact on the employer’s interest. Without that discussion and finding in the Job Service decision, I am not convinced that this isolated incident comes within the definition of misconduct which this Court, not Job Service or the Legislature, has adopted.
[¶ 27] If we do not require some weighing of the employer’s policies against an important interest of the employer, I believe we allow employers to seize on a violation of any policy when unemployment rates are high, workers are readily available, jobs are scarce and unemployment compensation is most needed, to discharge an employee without concern about the employer’s rate of contribution. See N.D.C.C. § 52-04-06. Although the employer may discharge an employee without cause in the absence of a contrary contractual obligation, the employee should not be deprived of unemployment compensation unless there has been a substantial, as well as an intentional, disregard of the employer’s interests. Unfortunately, the trend in the past decisions of Job Service as well as the opinions of this Court appear to allow compensation where the employee’s actions were unintentional or the employer’s policy was not clear, and to deny compensation where the policy was clear and the employee’s actions were intentional, without further discussion of how the intentional disregard of the policy significantly impacted the employer’s interests.
[¶ 28] Deciding whether a person’s actions constitute misconduct for purposes of determining eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Marion v. Job Service North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 609, 611-12 *246(N.D.1991). The agency’s findings of fact must be supported by the evidence which in turn must sustain its conclusion regarding misconduct. Id. Where the agency’s conclusions are based upon undisputed facts we review those legal conclusions anew. Id. (citing Newland v. Job Service North Dakota, 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1990)).
[¶ 29] Although there was some dispute as to the facts in this matter, for purposes of my position I would consider the facts as found by Job Service to be undisputed. But, without discussion of how those specific facts involved a substantial disregard of the employer’s interests, we should not affirm the decision.
[¶ 30] Because I do not believe the findings and, perhaps, the record reflect Schweitzer’s actions rose to that level in this instance, I would reverse the decision of Job Service North Dakota denying her claim for unemployment benefits and remand for further findings on how the isolated instance at issue here involved a substantial disregard of the employer’s interests.
[¶ 31] MARY MUEHLEN MARING, J., concurs.