Schmidt v. Gateway Community Fellowship

SANDSTROM, Justice,

dissenting in part.

[¶ 30] I respectfully dissent.

[¶ 31] I am not convinced that a church should be denied the protection otherwise provided by law because one of the reasons for, or consequences of, its generosity is that others may be inspired to join in its good work or in the beliefs that inspire it.

[¶ 32] Nor do I believe that persons who lead “a godly life” — perhaps feeding the poor, providing free medical care, or providing “Good Samaritan” relief at the scene of an accident, all without expectation of remuneration, thinking that is what they are called to do — should be denied the protections otherwise provided by law because they believe or hope that others may be inspired by their example to join with them in doing good works. See N.D.C.C. § 32-03.1.

[¶ 33] Nor should a philanthropist lose the protections of law because the philanthropist hopes that an example of generosity will inspire others to become philanthropists.

[¶ 34] Nor should a service club doing good works be denied the protections of law because its members or leaders hope the example of selfless service may inspire others to join them in their work.

I

[¶ 35] Although our statute is not as clear as we might like, the language focuses on the purpose of the person invited onto the property. See N.D.C.C. ch. 53-OS.

[¶ 36] Section 53-08-02 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:

Subject to the provisions of section 53-08-05, an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.

*211N.D.C.C. § 53-08-02 (emphasis added). Under the words of the statute, it is the “entry or use” of the premises “by others” that is “for recreational purposes.” The focus of this statute is on the users of the property. What was their purpose in entering and using the property? This focus is consistent with our holding in Leet v. City of Minot, 2006 ND 191, 721 N.W.2d 398, where we looked to the purpose for which the plaintiff was on the premises. In that case, even though others were on the premises for recreational purposes, the plaintiff was on the premises for business purposes. Id. at ¶ 21.

[¶ 37] The plaintiffs here came onto the property for recreational purposes.

II

[¶ 38] I have found no case in the country denying recreational use immunity that would otherwise be available to clubs or religious organizations on the basis that hosted events included an aim of recruiting new members.

[¶ 39] In Bronsen v. Dawes County, 272 Neb. 320, 722 N.W.2d 17 (2006), an attendee of a historical fur trade celebration stepped into a hole in a county courthouse lawn and fell down and broke her ankle and then brought a negligence action against the county and the nonprofit organization, Fur Trade Days, that hosted the event. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held the attendee was “picnicking,” which was a recreational purpose, and thus the nonprofit organization was immune from liability. While part of the purpose of the celebration was likely to bring awareness and recruitment to Fur Trade Days, the Nebraska court made no mention of that aspect and simply held it was not erroneous for the district court to find the attendee’s actions fell into the category of “picnicking,” which constituted a recreational purpose under the Recreation Liability Act.

[¶ 40] Similarly, in Maleare v. Peachtree City Church of Christ, 213 Ga.App. 593, 445 S.E.2d 321 (1994), a church left its grounds and fixtures, including a playground, open to the general public free of charge. After a church member was severely injured when the swing she was sitting on broke, she brought suit against the church. The district court granted summary judgment to the church, finding it was granted immunity under the Recreational Property Act. The church member argued she was a “paying member” of the church, but the Georgia Court of Appeals denied that argument, because the playground was frequently and regularly used by the public, including non-members of the church. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment and did not consider the possible argument that the church left its grounds open to raise awareness and increase recruitment to the church.

[¶ 41] In Thompson v. St. Mary’s Immaculate Conception Church, 1998 WL 13936 (Conn.Super.Ct.), the Superior Court of Connecticut denied a motion for summary judgment and found the defendant church would not be granted immunity from liability. In that case, the plaintiff attended a fund-raising fair hosted by the church, fell down, and was injured. The district court declined to grant the church recreational use immunity, because although the concerts were free, the fair also included games, rides, and amusements, which were not.

Ill

[¶ 42] I would not deny to the church the benefits of the recreational use immunity statute simply because a reason for or an effect of the church’s permitting members of the public to enter for recreational *212purposes may be that some participants might ultimately choose to join the church.- [¶ 43] DALE V. SANDSTROM