dissenting.
[¶ 18] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 19] In paragraph 12, the majority has quoted the district court’s findings on remand. Those findings are inadequate and do not satisfy the statutory requirements for continued commitment, and I would reverse.
[¶ 20] The district court relies primarily on the assessment of Dr. Sullivan, but makes no attempt to show how the facts developed in Dr. Sullivan’s report support its decision for continued commitment.
[¶21] The following is the entirety of the factual content of Dr. Sullivan’s report of Midgett’s behavior during the last year of confinement:
The undersigned completed a comprehensive review of Mr. Midgett’s chart over the past year. Below are several examples of behaviors and attitudes that exemplify his functioning in sex offender treatment; this is not exhaustive as there are many progress notes in his chart.
Mr. Midgett started the year on the Pretreatment Stage (i.e., Stage 0) of the 6-stage sex offender treatment program at NDSH. His most recent treatment plan, dated 2/28/08, indicated that due to changes in the treatment program he will be going to a new group, Basic Skills II, which is still a pretreatment group.
He is noted to be quite disruptive in group treatment, interrupting others and engaging in side-talk. He also tends to lose focus of the topic at hand when he is speaking. He has been redirected on these issues many times. In his Core group therapy, he has expressed concerns on multiple occasions that he does not understand the assignments, despite that he has often completed such assignments adequately. He has required much reassurance that group work is not graded and there are no right or wrong answers. He has tended to focus overly on others’ issues, and failed to look at himself instead. Over the past year, Mr. Midgett has participated in Core group therapy, Cognitive Restructuring class, and Social Interaction class. However, toward the end of this review period, he started skipping Cognitive Restructuring with the excuse that he does not like it or understand it. He began refusing to sit with the Core treatment group during sessions. He has also come to treatment sessions on more than one occasion, stating that he will not talk during the session. He has stated in group that the reason he is here is because he violated probation, and his evaluations were based solely on his past. He completed a Financial Management class offered here at the hospital.
Mr. Midgett has had conflicts with several other residents during this year. Some of these appear to be related to his belief that he can do what he wants regardless of others’ wishes and requests. For example, on one occasion (7/15/07), Mr. Midgett was eating on one of the couches when another resident informed him that food was not allowed on the furniture. Mr. Midgett complied, but when the other resident walked away, he began eating again. The resident returned, and reminded him that food was not to be eaten on the couch. Mr. Midgett called the resident a bitch *34and threw a packet of crackers at the resident. Staff were able to redirect the residents. He has also had conflicts with residents about his tendency to monopolize the television and turning up the volume. When asked to address this in treatment, he was unable or unwilling to identify any thoughts or feelings that led to watching TV, stating he sometimes “just does”. This is the definition of impulsivity.
On 6/18/07, Mr. Midgett approached a female staff member, put his arm around her shoulder, and asked, “So are we going out tonight? How about you pick me up at 8 and we’ll go to Apple-bee’s.” Residents are not permitted to touch staff, particularly female staff. The staff member informed Mr. Midgett his behavior was inappropriate, and he quickly apologized and walked away. On 7/30/07, he addressed in group that he rubbed himself on the nurses’ desk when talking to a female staff member. He stated he would attend Sex Addicts Anonymous on the unit.
Mr. Midgett was given a behavioral write-up for going into another resident’s room during the past year. He also called a staff member a “fat bastard” on two occasions. He has been argumentative with ward staff when he wants things. He has acknowledged that he engages in staff shopping (i.e., going from staff member to staff member in hopes that one of them will give him his way). He also acknowledged that he engages in horseplay, which is against the rules. When informed by the pharmacy that he had taken his “as needed” migraine medication too frequently, and thus he would not be allowed to use it for a couple of weeks, Mr. Midgett responded, “If I want to take Imitrex for my headaches I take them and no one will stop me.”
[¶ 22] At a discharge hearing, the State has to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Midgett remains a sexually dangerous individual. In re A.M., 2009 ND 104, ¶ 8, 766 N.W.2d 437.
[¶ 23] To satisfy substantive due process requirements, the State must establish a “causal relationship or nexus between the individual’s disorder and dangerousness, which indicates the individual’s mental disorder is linked to an inability to control behavior.” In re Rush, 2009 ND 102, ¶ 9, 766 N.W.2d 720. “‘The importance of independent judicial decision-making means the judge, rather than the test scores or the psychologists who create them, is the ultimate decision-maker.’ ” In re Vantreece, 2009 ND 152, ¶ 12, 771 N.W.2d 585 (quoting In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 21, 745 N.W.2d 631). Based on that rationale, we have said “Crane and N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3 require proof of difficulty in controlling behavior by expert evidence in the record from which the district court, as the ultimate decision-maker, can conclude the individual has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior.” Vantreece, at ¶ 12. The court must state specific facts in its order to support its findings that the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior and remains a sexually dangerous individual. Rush, at ¶ 10. We cannot review a court’s decision if the court does not provide any indication of the evidentiary basis for its decision because we do not know what evidence the court considered. Id. “Detailed findings, including credibility determinations and references to evidence the court relied on in making its decision, inform both the committed individual and this Court of the evidentia-ry basis for the district court’s decision.” Id.
*35[¶ 24] Here, the district court’s findings about whether Midgett has serious difficulty controlling his behavior are sparse. Most of the court’s findings were about Dr. Sullivan’s testimony regarding Midgett’s diagnosis of pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder and that he has not received sex offender treatment. However, diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder alone is not sufficient to establish a connection between the disorder and future dangerousness. In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 518. There must also be evidence clearly showing the disorder is likely to manifest itself in a serious difficulty controlling sexually predatory behavior. Id. The court’s findings do not explain how Midgett’s diagnosis distinguishes him from the typical recidivist and results in a serious difficulty controlling his behavior.
[¶ 25] The court found Dr. Sullivan testified about Midgett’s continuing impulsivity while at the State Hospital, including sexual contact with another resident in a secure placement in the community and repeatedly going to places he was prohibited from going. Dr. Sullivan testified that these incidents occurred prior to Midgett’s commitment at the State Hospital. The court’s finding that this impulsive behavior occurred while Midgett has been at the State Hospital is not supported by the evidence.
[¶ 26] The court found the State established Midgett has serious difficulty controlling his behavior and has engaged in inappropriate and impulsive behavior at the State Hospital while awaiting entry into the sex offender treatment program. The court’s findings are conclusory statements without any findings about specific instances of inappropriate and impulsive behavior to support these findings and it is not clear from the record what behavior the court relied on.
[¶ 27] The court does not have to find there was new sexually predatory conduct. In re R.A.S., 2009 ND 101, ¶ 19, 766 N.W.2d 712. However, there must be some findings of instances of inappropriate or impulsive behavior or findings about expert testimony explicitly opining that the individual is unable to control his behavior to support the court’s finding that the committed individual has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. See Vantreece, 2009 ND 152, ¶¶ 9-12, 771 N.W.2d 585 (inability to control behavior may be established by expert testimony explicitly opining the individual is unable to control his behavior); Rush, 2009 ND 102, ¶ 10, 766 N.W.2d 720 (the court must specifically state the facts its decision is based upon and make detailed findings, including credibility determination and references to evidence the court relied on in making its decision).
[¶ 28] The court also found it is “unknown” whether Midgett will be able to control his sexual urges until he completes the sex offender treatment program. This is not the standard for continuing commitment; rather, the State must present clear and convincing evidence Midgett is likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. In re Midgett, 2009 ND 106, ¶ 6, 766 N.W.2d 717 (Midgett II).
[¶ 29] The district court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings about whether Midgett has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The district court has not explained how the evidence offered at hearing or the information contained in Dr. Sullivan’s report demonstrates this. Under an evidentiary standard that requires clear and convincing evidence, the record does not support the district court’s conclusory finding that Midgett has serious difficulty controlling his behavior. On the record before the district court, the court’s decision is not supported by clear *36and convincing evidence, and I would reverse the court’s order denying Midgett’s motion for discharge.
[¶ 30] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER