concurring in the result.
[¶ 21] I concur in the result denying the injunctive relief requested. I believe it is improper, under the circumstances, to take this matter from the voters of North Dakota. Nowhere in the submissions to this Court has any party suggested the Secretary of State has failed to properly perform his constitutional duties to refer a legislative measure to the voters of North Dakota. There is no basis asserted by any party to invoke the mandatory original jurisdiction of this Court.
[¶ 22] The State Board of Higher Education asks us to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction because by referring legisla*222tion to the voters which repeals a statute, the repealed statute becomes effective by operation of N.D. Const, art. Ill, § 5, until the matter is decided by the voters. The Board asserts that the underlying statute is unconstitutional and assumes the outcome of the vote on the referendum. Under the circumstances, addressing the merits of the Board’s contentions would constitute an advisory opinion in contravention of the reserved powers of the people.
[¶ 23] The Legislative Assembly of North Dakota enacted House Bill 1263, which provided:
The intercollegiate athletic teams sponsored by the university of North Dakota shall be known as the university of North Dakota fighting Sioux. Neither the university of North Dakota nor the state board of higher education may take any action to discontinue the use of the fighting Sioux nickname or the fighting Sioux logo in use on January 1, 2011. Any actions taken by the state board of higher education and the university of North Dakota before the effective date of this Act to discontinue the use of the fighting Sioux nickname and logo are preempted by this Act. If the national collegiate athletic association takes any action to penalize the university of North Dakota for using the fighting Sioux nickname or logo, the attorney general shall consider filing a federal antitrust claim against that association.
The bill was signed by the Governor on March 15, 2011, and filed with the Secretary of State on March 15, 2011. This bill was codified as N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46. It became effective August 1, 2011. It is the underlying statute and is not the subject of the referendum.
[¶ 24] Rather, in special session the Legislative Assembly enacted Senate Bill 2370, which provides:
SECTION 1. UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA ATHLETIC NICKNAME AND LOGO. Neither the state board of higher education nor the university of North Dakota may adopt or implement an athletic nickname or corresponding logo before January 1, 2015.
SECTION 2. REPEAL. Section 15-10-46 of the North Dakota Century Code is repealed.
SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Act becomes effective on December 1, 2011.
The Governor signed the bill on November 9, 2011. Senate Bill 2370 is the legislation that is referred to the voters.
[¶ 25] The chief concern for the exercise of our original jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. Ill, §§ 6, 7, is that the Secretary of State properly perform the function of certifying petitions to refer legislation to the voters of North Dakota. RECALLND v. Jaeger, 2010 ND 250, ¶¶ 24-26, 792 N.W.2d 511; Husebye v. Jaeger, 534 N.W.2d 811, 813 (N.D.1995); Mun. Servs. Corp. v. Kusler, 490 N.W.2d 700, 701-02 (N.D.1992); Lips v. Meier, 336 N.W.2d 346, 348 (N.D.1983); Haugland v. Meier, 335 N.W.2d 809, 811 (N.D.1983). The Board has not asserted the Secretary of State has improperly performed this function. The Board does not assert the referral petition itself is unconstitutional under our state constitution, State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.W.2d 823, 824 (N.D.1975); State ex rel. Gam-mons v. Shafer, 63 N.D. 128, 132, 246 N.W. 874, 875 (1933), or under the federal Constitution, State ex rel. Askew v. Meier, 231 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D.1975), except by reference to N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46. The Board only alleges: “Because N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46 is unconstitutional, the Referendum Measure, which temporarily revives N.D.C.C. § 15-10^46 and, if *223passed, will result in the repeal of SB 2370, is likewise unconstitutional.”
[¶26] The Board asks us to take the matter from the voters on its assertion that a statute enacted by the Legislative Assembly, and subsequently repealed, is unconstitutional. Article III of the North Dakota Constitution articulates the powers reserved to the people. Section 1 of Article III provides: “the people reserve the power ... to approve or reject legislative Acts, or parts thereof, by the referendum .... This article is self-executing and all of its provisions are mandatory. Laws may be enacted to facilitate and safeguard, but not to hamper, restrict, or impair these powers.” The decisions of this Court have acknowledged the importance of these reserved constitutional powers. “[W]e are guided by the principle that referendum provisions in the constitution must be liberally construed, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the exercise of this right by the people.” Husebye, 534 N.W.2d at 814 (citing McCamey v. Meier, 286 N.W.2d 780, 787 (N.D.1979)).
[¶ 27] When the voters exercise their vote, they too will be acting in a legislative capacity. Hernett v. Meier, 173 N.W.2d 907, 915 (N.D.1970).
Under this constitutional provision [initiative and referendum provision of previous constitution], the Legislative Assembly and the people are in effect coordinate legislative bodies with coextensive legislative power; a law enacted by one has no superior position as a rule of conduct over one enacted by the other; a law enacted by one is subject to the same rules of construction and the same tests of constitutionality as one enacted by the other.
State ex rel. Eckroth v. Barge, 69 N.D. 1, 10, 283 N.W. 521, 525 (1939) (quoting State v. Houge, 67 N.D. 251, 258, 271 N.W. 677, 680 (1937)).
[¶ 28] If the voters would exercise their vote in the manner the Board appears to fear, then the issue of whether N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46 is unconstitutional can be adjudicated. However, this Court has indicated that asserting a statute is unconstitutional is not alone sufficient for this Court to take original discretionary jurisdiction. Mun. Servs. Carp., 490 N.W.2d at 706; State ex rel. DeKrey v. Peterson, 174 N.W.2d 95, 100 (N.D.1970).
[¶ 29] In Municipal Services Corp., this Court was similarly asked to exercise original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute, but declined on the basis the matter was not ripe for review because the voters had not acted. 490 N.W.2d at 706. See also Anderson v. Byrne, 62 N.D. 218, 229, 242 N.W. 687, 691-92 (1932). In this case, the statute referred to the voters repeals N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46. If the voters were to approve the repealer action, the statute attacked by the Board would no longer exist. When one possible outcome of a vote is to eliminate the very statute under attack, there is no reason for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under the high bar that has been set for such intervention, as discussed in the separate concurring opinion of Justice Crothers. See Kelsh v. Jaeger, 2002 ND 53, ¶ 2, 641 N.W.2d 100.
[¶ 30] In Anderson, 62 N.D. at 221, 242 N.W. at 688, petitioners asked this Court to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing an initiated measure on the ballot on the grounds that the measure was unconstitutional. This Court declined to interfere with the initiative process, citing with approval the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer: “The courts, therefore, can no more prevent, when all statutory requirements have been complied with, the people from voting upon a proposed initiative measure, than it could prevent the Legisla*224tive Assembly, when convened, from voting upon the same measure.” Anderson, 62 N.D. at 282, 242 N.W. at 693 (quoting State ex rel. Carson v. Kozer, 126 Or. 641, 270 P. 513, 515 (1928)).
[¶ 31] Construing the referendum powers under the similar provisions of the prior North Dakota Constitution, as it applied to a repealer statute, this Court noted that our state constitution does not restrict the power of the people when dealing with a repealer statute, because to do so would hamper, restrict, or impair those powers:
This language is clear and specific. The scope of the power of the referendum as here stated is as broad as the power of the legislature to enact laws. It is stated specifically and emphatically that the people “reserve the power ... to approve or reject at the polls any measure or any item, section, part or parts of any measure enacted by the legislature.” The language used clearly evidences an intention and purpose that no enactment by the legislature and no part of any enactment by the legislature is excepted or withdrawn from the operation of the power of the referendum. Nothing is said in the constitutional amendment which in any manner limits the purpose and scope of the power of the referendum as thus first clearly and specifically declared. Indeed, there is no contention that anything said in the constitution limits the power of the referendum or prevents it from being invoked against any measure enacted by the legislature and against any and every part of any measure enacted by the legislature.
Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 731, 24 N.W.2d 737, 745 (1946) (emphasis in original).
[¶ 32] This matter is distinctly unlike State ex rel. Wefald v. Meier, where recognizing the high importance of the people’s referendum power, this Court acted to facilitate the exercise of that power by settling a dispute as to the form of the ballot. 347 N.W.2d 562, 566 (N.D.1984). This Court did not, however, act in an advisory capacity to opine about the outcome of the people’s vote. In Wefald, this Court addressed process; here the Board asks this Court to address outcome. The distinction is critical as to why it is inappropriate to address the merits of the constitutional argument at this time. In Wefald, this Court noted:
It is clear from our review of the constitutional provisions and our prior cases that the referendum is the means by which the legislative power is reserved by the people. It is a part of the legislative process which is not complete until the time for filing referral petitions has passed, or the measure has been either rejected or approved by the voters at an election having the referred measure on the ballot.
Id.
[¶ 33] It is not insignificant that the Attorney General, on behalf of the Board, seeks a declaration that N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46 is unconstitutional, but neither is it determinative. In Langer v. State, 69 N.D. 129,154-55, 284 N.W. 238, 252 (1939), this Court declined to issue a declaratory judgment at the request of the Governor and several other state officials because to do so would be to issue an impermissible advisory opinion:
The debates of the Constitutional Convention leave no doubt that it was the deliberate judgment of the framers of the State Constitution that Judges of the Supreme Court, as part of their official duties, should not be required, or authorized, to give advisory opinions. So, in this State, it is not a matter of choice whether the Judges of the Su*225preme Court shall, or shall not, give advisory opinions.
[¶ 34] Similarly, in State ex rel. Aamoth v. Sathre, 110 N.W.2d 228 (N.D.1961), this Court was asked to declare unconstitutional the unfinished work of an apportionment group under allegations its proposal would apportion the state House of Representatives in an unconstitutional manner. The apportionment group was:
a constitutionally created legislative body that acts under powers conferred upon it by Section 35 of the North Dakota Constitution as a part of the independent, coordinate legislative branch of the State government, and that it has not yet completed its work but still is acting in the process of discharging the legislative duties imposed on it by such constitutional provision.
Aamoth, 110 N.W.2d at 231. This Court firmly rejected a constitutional challenge to an incomplete legislative process, reiterating the holding from Anderson:
This court has heretofore held that it is no part of the judicial function to interfere with the constitutional processes of legislation, and that it will not entertain a suit to test the constitutionality of a proposed act of the Legislature on the ground that, if such act is enacted, it will interfere with the constitutional rights of the litigant.
Id. at 230. See also Wefald, 347 N.W.2d at 566.
[¶ 35] The Board argues the issue of the statute’s constitutionality is not advisory because even though N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46 was repealed by the Legislative Assembly, it was revived by operation of N.D. Const, art. Ill, § 5, when the referendum petition was submitted. That is true, but only with certainty until the vote on the referred measure. “An initiated or referred measure which is approved shall become law thirty days after the election, and a referred measure which is rejected shall be void immediately.” N.D. Const, art. Ill, § 8. Therefore, any determination this Court makes on the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46, will be an advisory opinion on the people’s vote.
[¶ 36] This Court has exercised its jurisdiction where the constitutional authority of the people to act did not exist. RECALLND, 2010 ND 250, ¶¶ 6-7, 792 N.W.2d 511; Walker, 232 N.W.2d at 826-27; Askew, 231 N.W.2d at 825. It has also acted in situations of urgency. Wefald, 347 N.W.2d at 564.
[¶ 37] It is clear that the constitutionality of N.D.C.C. § 15-10-46, the statute asserted to be a problem, is not a matter of urgency. If it were so, the Board would have challenged its constitutionality, as it could have done, immediately upon its signature by the Governor on March 15, 2011, one year ago, or any time thereafter. The fact that it did not do so until now indicates this is not a matter of urgency.
[¶ 38] I concur in denying the injunc-tive relief requested.
[¶ 39] Carol Ronning Kapsner