(dissenting on Issue I and concurring on Issue II).
ISSUE I
[¶ 53] I generally join in the dissent of Justice Sabers. However I do not think it necessary to revisit the propriety of the holding of Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80 (S.D.1995), as the facts therein are substantially different than the facts now before us. Whether the holding in Richards survives or is reversed should await a day when the issue is again whether marital counseling by a psychologist comes within the statutory definition of a “practitioner of the healing arts.” See SDCL 15-2-14.1 and SDCL 36-2-1(3).8
[¶ 54] The issue before us is whether the facts of this case are governed by SDCL 15-2-14.1. The trial court made this quite clear in its Memorandum Opinion:
[T]he gravamen of the complaint alleges that Defendant Lenz failed to properly discharge his professional duties which resulted in their damage. Thus, these claims essentially allege medical malpractice. The statute of limitations as set forth in SDCL 15-2-4.1 pertains to a “practitioner of the healing arts” and applies “whether based upon contract or tort.” “Healing art” includes mental condition. See SDCL 36-2-1(3)_ Accordingly, SDCL 15-2-14.1 applies and there is a two year statute of limitations in the action against Lenz. (Citations omitted.)
[¶ 55] Here, Linda Rehm was not treated with counseling for marital problems which can have as its source such non-medical origins as financial problems, religious differences, work habits, temperament and the like. Rather, she was treated for depression. Unfortunately she was not just having a bad day. She was hospitalized for depression so severe that it had in the past and would later manifest itself with suicidal threats.9 While in the hospital, Linda Rehm was being treat*572ed for her condition with prescription medication. She was subsequently referred to West River for further treatment upon her release from the hospital.10
[¶ 56] Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (25th Ed 1974) defines depression as “a psychiatric syndrome consisting of dejected mood, psychomotor retardation, insomnia, and weight loss, sometimes associated with guilt feelings and somatic preoccupations often of delusional proportions.”
[¶ 57] While we have not had previous occasion to directly address the nature of the condition, most recently we dealt with its effects on a person. In State v. Engelmann, 541 N.W.2d 96 (S.D.1995), Engelmann’s depression was described by a psychologist as “a serious mental illness; people suffering from it simply cannot make rational decisions.” Id. at 99. In allowing Engelmann to withdraw his guilty plea we concluded:
A diagnosis of ‘Severe Depressive Episode,’ a recognized mental disorder, reduced Engelmann’s decision-making ability. Even the State’s psychiatrist, though he disagreed with the depth of Engel-mann’s impairment, was unable to dispute this diagnosis, but confirmed Engelmann’s blunted thought processes and diminished mental clarity.
Id. at 103. To me this describes an “unhealthy ... mental condition” as set forth in SDCL 36-2-1(3) which defines “healing art.” Rehms sought treatment from Lenz as a practitioner of this healing art, who is subject to the two-year statute of limitations under SDCL 15-2-14.1.
[¶ 58] Like Justice Sabers, I conclude a fair reading of the complaint sounds in a cause of action for malpractice whether it uses that explicit word or not. Paragraph VII, of Count I of that pleading states:
By Defendant Lenz’s actions, he was negligent in failing to exercise a degree of reasonable skill and care with the degree of knowledge and expertise ordinarily exercised by other psychologists in this and other like localities. Defendant Lenz neglected to heed Plaintiffs’ mental and emotional conditions, departed from accepted practices and procedures in the services rendered, failed to follow good psychological practices, performed contraindicated procedures on the Plaintiffs, and failed to provide necessary indicated procedures.
The allegations of the Rehms involve treatment for depression with suicidal tendencies. This leads me to the conclusion that the nature of the complaint is an action for malpractice within SDCL 15-2-14.1.
[¶ 59] Thus I would affirm the trial court’s granting of summary judgment on issue one. Under the facts of this case a two-year statute of limitations may seem harsh. However the wisdom of such a statute is the domain of the Legislature and not this Court.
ISSUE II
[¶ 60] As to issue two, I join with the rationale of the majority. Lenz and West River did not file a notice of review concerning the applicability of the two-year malpractice statute of limitations to this action rather than the three-year statute of limitations adopted by the trial court.
. I respectfully disagree with the majority's argument that the distinction between this case and Richards is not properly before us. Lenz filed his Appellee's brief before Richards was released by this Court. Rehms, in their reply brief, had the advantage of reading Richards and argued that it was controlling rather than distinguishable. Lenz got no chance to argue to the contrary as the request for oral argument was turned down. Lenz made one last attempt to argue Richards was distinguishable when on January 26, 1996 he petitioned this Court for leave to file a supplemental brief addressing that very subject. His request to file such a brief was denied by this Court.
To now suggest that the issue of the application of SDCL 15-2-14.1 is not properly before us when applied to the facts of this case, is to ignore the direct holding of the trial court and slams the door in the face of Lenz who tried to raise the distinction issue as soon as he was aware of Richards. It certainly is a Catch-22 situation for Lenz to be told that he cannot now attempt to distinguish Richards because he never raised the issue (1) due to his inability to predict the future and, (2) when Richards was issued, he could not raise it because this Court would not let him. Reduced to its essence, the majority would have us hold that Lenz loses not on the merits of the legal argument applied to the facts of this case, but rather because Richards is controlling even if wrongly decided, as is forcefully argued by Justice Sabers, and even if factually distinguishable as is argued by this writer, simply because the distinction issue was never briefed by Lenz even though it could not be.
I believe the trial court correctly decided the issue. That aside, we have consistently affirmed a summary judgment even where the trial court reached the right result but for the wrong reason. See Kehn v. Hoeksema, 524 N.W.2d 879, 881 (S.D.1994) and cases cited therein. What should be directly on point here is that we have also consistently held a summary judgment will be affirmed if there exists ANY basis which would support the trial court’s ruling. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Schilling, 520 N.W.2d 884, 886 (S.D.1994).
. Linda Rehm's struggle with depression has been long and severe. She was hospitalized for it at Rapid City Regional Hospital for two weeks commencing January 5, 1987. She was hospitalized a second time at Sioux Valley Hospital in Sioux Falls for one month from May 23, 1988 to June 17, 1988. Her condition resulted in a third hospitalization at Rapid City Regional Hospital commencing July 19, 1988, just one month following her discharge from Sioux Valley Hospital. She described her need for this treatment as, "I usually went to the hospital when I felt suicidal.”
. Linda Rehm claims to have viewed Lenz’s file on her after Lenz left West River. Although it cannot be verified by the record, according to Linda, Lenz’s diagnosis of Linda was anorexia nervosa and obsessive.