(dissenting).
[¶ 62] I agree with the majority opinion that failure to demand a retraction under SDCL 20-11-7 precludes a claim for punitive damages.1 But this was not a proper de*137mand for retraction because the aggrieved party must “[specify] particularly the statement or statements claimed to be false and defamatory.” Here, Dr. Sparagon, the aggrieved party, did not specify particularly the false statement. The false statement was that Dr. Sparagon was Lee’s physician, and he was not. Therefore, Dr. Sparagon merely needed to inform defendant that he was not Lee’s treating physician but he did not. Dr. Sparagon’s technical and coy responses were evasive and more camouflage than compliance with SDCL 20-11-7. Therefore, his failure to comply in good faith with SDCL 20-11-7 upon defendant’s offer to correct false statements should preclude his claim for punitive damages.
[¶ 63] I also dissent because defendant was clearly entitled to the qualified privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(3). This was “a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, [its readers] by one who is also interested,” in diabetes on an Indian reservation. SDCL 20-11-5(3). Even the majority opinion says, “[u]ndoubtedly, diabetes on Pine Ridge is of great public interest.”
[¶ 64] This court stated a test for qualified privilege in Peterson v. City of Mitchell, 499 N.W.2d 911 (S.D.1993):
An infallible test in determining whether a communication published under the particular circumstances is or is not privileged is to ask whether, if true, it is a matter of proper public interest in relation to that with which it is sought to associate it.
Peterson, 499 N.W.2d at 915 (quoting McLean v. Merriman, 42 S.D. 394, 399, 175 N.W. 878, 880 (1920) (emphasis added in Peterson)). The Peterson court then concluded that the citizens of Mitchell had a common, public interest in apprehending criminals which led to application of a qualified privilege. Id. at 916.
[¶ 65] Dr. Sparagon stated, in a national Veterans Administration publication, that thirty percent of the Indian people on the reservation have diabetes and that foot problems accompany diabetes. Clearly, then, the residents of the Pine Ridge reservation had a “common, public interest” in the issue of diabetes and podiatrie care which entitled defendant to a qualified privilege in printing the story. See Peterson, 499 N.W.2d at 916.2
[¶ 66] These facts entitle defendant to a qualified privilege under SDCL 20-11-5(3). Therefore, this matter should be tried to the jury, on proper instructions, based on qualified privilege as there is a genuine issue of material fact as to malice, i.e., whether the false statement was made “with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth.” Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415, 419 (S.D.1990) (citing Harte-Hanks, Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989)).
. An improper demand for retraction under SDCL 20-11-7 precludes punitive damages only *137and does not affect general or special damages. The language of Clementson as quoted in the majority opinion refers to "general” damages but our statute does not.
. This situation differs from Rood v. Dutcher, 23 S.D. 70, 120 N.W. 772 (1909), relied upon by the majority opinion.
In Rood, this court stated:
Whether or not a newspaper article falsely reflecting on the professional skill or conduct of a person engaged in the practice of medicine is privileged depends on the relation of the physician, as such, to the public, not on his peculiar methods of soliciting business.
Rood, 23 S.D. at 75, 120 N.W. at 773. The Rood court distinguished a physician from a public official and held that the definition of "privileged communication” did not include newspaper articles relating to the professional conduct of physicians, because "only such persons as desire to employ [the doctor] are interested in communications relating to his professional conduct.” Id., 120 N.W. at 774.
However, the trial court found the subject of podiatrie care on the reservation “of sufficient public importance” to extend a qualified privilege to defendant. I agree. The trial court correctly distinguished Rood because diabetics on the reservation rely on public health medicine and, "recipients of public health services would have no choice on who would provide their po-diatric care." The common, public interest in the high rate of diabetes and its accompanying foot problems among residents of the Reservation indicates that many persons would be "interested in communications relating to” the disease and its effects.