(dissenting).
[¶22.] I dissent. We do not need to remand to conclude that the circuit court correctly reversed the Board. In fact, it would be error to do so. The Board failed to make a finding of fact that Brown did not comply with the conditions of the suspended sentence requiring sex offender participation. Therefore, Board’s revocation of his suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion and an error as a matter of law. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Department of Soc. Servs., 1996 SD 34, ¶ 12,545 N.W.2d 223,229:
Findings of fact must support conclusions of law. The Commission’s decision to reinstate Schroeder was not supported by its own factual findings, an error as a matter of law. We thus affirm the circuit court’s decision to reverse.
(citing Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 325 N.W.2d 292, 297 (S.D.1982) (“A well-established rule is that the findings of fact must support the conclusions of law.”) (agreeing with the circuit court’s reversal of Career Service Commission’s factually unsupported legal conclusion)); see also Baldwin v. National College, 537 N.W.2d 14, 19 (S.D.1995) (“This court has consistently held that the conclusions of law ... must find support in the findings.”); accord State v. New, 536 N.W.2d 714, 716 n. 1 (S.D.1995); First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. Maxon, 534 N.W.2d 37,40 (S.D.1995).
[If 23.] The conference opinion incorrectly attempts to fill in the blank for the Board regarding what its finding of fact must state in order for its decision to be upheld. It is too late. Allowing Board to rewrite its findings of fact to support its conclusion would render our well-established standard of review meaningless,
[¶ 24.] AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent.