(dissenting in part and concurring specially in part).
[¶ 23.] I dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds that City’s complaint conformed to the requirements of state law.5 SDCL 32-25-21 sets forth the special requirements for a speeding complaint:
*769In every prosecution for violation of any of §§ 32-25-1 to 32-25-17 [i.e., speeding], inclusive, the complaint, and also the summons or notice to appear, shall specify the speed at which the defendant is alleged to have driven, and also the speed which such section declares shall be lawful at the time and place of such alleged violation. (emphasis added).
City’s complaint failed to specify either the speed Ewoldt allegedly drove or the lawful speed at the time and place of the claimed violation. It merely charged that he drove at “a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent[.]” Therefore, the complaint was deficient and we should dismiss.
[¶ 24.] The majority opinion goes through an extensive statutory analysis to conclude the complaint’s allegation that Ewoldt drove at “a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent” was a sufficient allegation of “speed.” This ignores the “shall specify” language because the word “speed” is clear, certain and unambiguous.6 Speed is simply a rate of motion.7 “[G]reater than ... reasonable and prudent” is not a rate of motion, it is simply a descriptive or qualifying phrase. Since City’s complaint failed to specify the rate of motion Ewoldt drove or the lawful rate of motion at the time and place of his violation, its complaint was deficient.
[¶ 25.] The majority opinion uses a blizzard hypothetical to support its conclusion that it is not necessary to specify “speed” or existing conditions under SDCL 32-25-21. However, Tuscherer testified she was traveling at between ten' and fifteen miles per hour in a school zone with a signed speed limit of fifteen miles per hour when children are present and that Ewoldt passed her. Thus, the complaint could and should have alleged:
That on or about 7:55 a.m. on September 7, 1995, Brent William Ewoldt drove a vehicle at sixteen miles per hour in a school zone when children were present, a speed greater than fifteen miles per hour which was a reasonable and prudent speed under these conditions, in violation of Section 40-137 of the Revised Ordinances of Sioux Falls, South Dakota ...
Similarly, using the majority’s blizzard hypothetical, the complaint would have to allege:
That on or about 8:00 a.m. on January 1, 1997, John Doe drove a vehicle at seventy five miles per hour in a blizzard, a speed greater than forty miles per hour 'which was a reasonable and prudent speed under ■ these conditions, in violation of SDCL 32-25-3 ...
[¶ 26.] To comport with due process and provide the accused in a speeding case such *770as this with sufficient notice of the accusation and an adequate opportunity to defend himself (see City of Rapid City v. Albertus, 310 N.W.2d 167, 168 (S.D.1981)), the complaint must tell the accused exactly what he is charged with: the speed he is alleged to have driven, the lawful or reasonable and prudent speed at the time and place of his alleged violation, and, that his speed was greater than was reasonable and prudent under existing conditions. SDCL 32-25-21; Sioux Falls Municipal Ordinance 40-137. City’s complaint, which alleged in vague terms that Ewoldt’s speed was “greater than was reasonable and prudent” fails due process. What did this tell Ewoldt? It told him nothing about extraneous conditions that made his speed unreasonable at the time of his alleged violation. In fact, under City’s complaint, he could have been convicted for driving one mile per hour if that speed was claimed unreasonable for existing conditions.8
[¶ 27.] The majority claim that requiring complaints to contain allegations of speed in prosecutions for driving at unreasonable speeds will “cripple” prosecutions in eases where the offense is reported by a citizen who does not have a radar gun is meritless. When a citizen complains, law enforcement should investigate the road and weather conditions, the reasonable speed under those conditions and the defendant’s speed.9 Any investigation would necessarily address these basic questions.
[¶ 28.] Based upon this analysis, City’s complaint was deficient for its failure to specify the speed Ewoldt drove and the reasonable and prudent speed under the existing conditions. While a technical deficiency in a complaint does not always provide a basis for its dismissal, a complaint in a speeding case is distinguishable because no indictment or information needs to be filed. See State v. Hanson, 53 S.D. 205, 220 N.W. 518 (1928) (complaint need not charge an offense with the precision used in indictment or information), see also SDCL 23A-6-1 (class 2 misdemeanors, petty offenses and ordinance violations need not be prosecuted by indictment or information).
[¶ 29.] The complaint in a speeding case is normally the only charging document. Therefore, it is like an indictment or information and jurisdictional. See State v. Walker, 9 S.D. 438, 69 N.W. 586 (1896). In Honomichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D.1983), this court held that without a formal and sufficient indictment or information a court does not acquire jurisdiction and any judgment it enters is void. The same is true with regard to a complaint in a speeding case. To paraphrase Honomichl, in a speeding case, a complaint is a vital substantive document rather than a mere technicality. See Honomichl, 333 N.W.2d at 799.
[¶ 30.] In this instance, City’s failure to file a sufficient complaint against Ewoldt deprived the magistrate court of jurisdiction. Therefore, its judgment is void and should be reversed. This would eliminate the need to address Ewoldt’s sufficiency of the evidence argument. Even after a reversal, the City could recharge and retry Ewoldt upon filing a proper complaint.10
[¶ 31.] AMUNDSON, J., joins this special writing.. It is clear that City’s complaint must conform to the requirements of state law rather than City’s ordinances. I write specially to point out the involvement of the judicial branch concerning the supremacy of state law on court procedure. That City’s complaint must conform to *769state law is further supported by the rule-making power granted to this Court by Article V, Section 12 of the South Dakota Constitution:
The Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all courts and may make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing the administration of all courts. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern terms of courts, admission to the bar, and discipline of members of the bar. These rules may be changed by the Legislature.
S.D, Const, art. V, § 12 (emphasis added).
This Court has inherent power to regulate procedure in the courts of this state. See, e.g., Lemon v. Pasternak, 340 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Iowa 1983) (judges have inherent power to adopt rules of practice within their courts); Jones v. Eastern Michigan Motorbuses, 287 Mich. 619, 283 N.W. 710, 712 (1939) (power to regulate procedure is inherently vested in Supreme Court to be exercised under its rule making powers); State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 553 (Minn.1994) (Supreme Court's statutory authority to regulate criminal procedure in all state courts arises from court’s inherent judicial powers).
These authorities, in conjunction with Article IX, Section 1 of the South Dakota Constitution, unquestionably establish the supremacy of state law in defining court procedures. It is important to note, however, that state law in this area may be a product of the judicial branch or the legislative branch of state government. The majority opinion's isolated reference to Article IX, Section 1 of the South Dakota Constitution and its use of the language "plenary powers" tends to incorrectly suggest the Legislature’s authority in this area is exclusive.
. " 'When the language of a statute is clear, certain, and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute.' " B.W. v. Meade County, 534 N.W.2d 595, 597 (S.D. 1995) (quoting Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D.1984)).
. “Speed" is a, “rate of motion irrespective of direction: the magnitude of velocity expressed as a particular relationship <the car maintained a $ of 150 miles per hour$.” Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2189 (1976).
. The specificity of "speed” required by SDCL 32-25-21 focuses on the real issue in cases such as this, i.e., not how fast the defendant was going, but the conditions that made his speed "unreasonable.” In this case, the focus should be on the school zone and the presence of children. In the majority's hypothetical, it should be on the blinding blizzard.
. A citizen is competent to testify as to his estimate of the defendant's speed. See City of Vermillion v. Williams, 84 S.D. 589, 174 N.W.2d 331 (1970) (people with experience driving cars and observing speeds thereof are competent to testily in regard to speed of motor vehicles).
. See State v. Sadowski, 331 N.W.2d 274 (N.D.1983) (where a defendant's judgment of conviction is null and void because of trial court's lack of jurisdiction to adjudge the defendant guilty, double jeopardy does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense); see also Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S.Ct. 749, 751, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907) (before person can be said to have been put in jeopardy, the court in which he was convicted must have had jurisdiction to try him for the offense charged).