(dissenting).
[¶ 20] I dissent for the same reasons set forth in my special writing in State v. Sieler, 1996 SD 114, ¶¶ 25-33, 554 N.W.2d 477, 483-85 (Sabers, J., dissenting), reproduced in part as follows:
The addition of the words “separate transactions” to the written judgment after defendant began serving his sentence constitutes an illegal enhancement of sentence.
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South Dakota case law is clear that a sentence cannot be enhanced once it has been imposed and once the defendant has begun serving it — even if the enhanced sentence would have been a legal sentence had the court imposed it in the first place. “Once an offender is within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, the judicial branch — the circuit court — loses *444jurisdiction and control.” State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125, 129 (S.D.1985) (citation omitted). We have stated, on numerous occasions, that “as against an unwilling defendant, a valid sentence cannot be increased in severity after he has commenced the serving thereof[.]” State v. Ford, 328 N.W.2d 263, 267 (S.D.1982) (citing State v. Hughes, 62 S.D. 579, 584, 255 N.W. 800, 802 (1934); State v. Jackson, 272 N.W.2d 102 (S.D.1978); Ex parte Watt, 73 S.D. 436, 44 N.W.2d 119 (1950)). “A sentence commences as soon as the prisoner suffers some confinement in the custody of a sheriff.” Id.
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... After examining federal courts’ disposition of the issue, this court held “that the oral sentence is the only sentence, and that the written judgment must conform to iV’ [Ford, 328 N.W.2d at 267] (relying upon United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.1974); Chunn v. United States, 462 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir.1970); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S.Ct. 1765, 23 L.Ed.2d 230 (1969); Rakes v. United States, 309 F.2d 686 (4th Cir.1962)); see also State v. Cady, 422 N.W.2d 828, 830 (S.D.1988) (collecting additional federal cases to support the proposition that it is settled law “that the oral sentence is the only sentence and the written sentence must conform to it”). On that basis, the [Ford] court invalidated the second sentence and reinstated the first. We should do the same.
Id. at ¶¶ 25-29, 554 N.W.2d at 483-84 (emphasis in original).
[¶ 21] In Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 21, 11 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963), the United States Supreme Court dealt with a written judgment and sentence which levied a sentence of one year and one day, exceeding the orally pronounced sentence by one day. The Court framed the issue as follows:
May a United States District Judge orally revoke the probation of a Defendant in open court and in the presence of the Defendant and his counsel and impose a sentence of confinement for a specific period of time and thereafter enter a formal written judgment and commitment in which a larger and longer sentence of confinement is imposed and set forth?
The Court answered in the negative stating, “This error, in enlarging the sentence in the absence of petitioner, was so plain in light of the requirements of Rule 43 4 that it should have been dealt with by the Court of Appeals, even though it had not been alleged as error.” Accord United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2nd Cir.1974) (reversing and remanding for written judgment to be corrected in accordance with the oral pronouncement of sentence). Similarly, in this case, Puthoff s oral sentence was pronounced on March 18, 1996; however, the written Judgment and Sentence was signed and filed by the circuit court judge on March 19, 1996.
If, as the Government would have it, appellant was sentenced not when he appeared before [the sentencing judge] but at some later time when the commitment was signed, the sentence would be invalid since appellant was not present.
Id. (quoting Sobell v. United States, 407 F.2d 180, 184 (2nd Cir.1969)). Clearly, the enhancement was illegal under our statutes, as well as United States Supreme Court and South Dakota Supreme Court precedent. See also United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir.1992) (reversing and remanding for resentencing; defendant clearly had right to be present in open court when judge made original sentence harsher by adding special parole term not mentioned at oral sentencing); accord Rust v. United States, 725 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir.1984) (defendant must be present when sentence is made more onerous); United States v. McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 450-51 (10th Cir.1972) *445(noting that the written judgment was invalid both because it augmented the sentence and because it was entered without the presence of either defendant or his counsel).
[¶ 22] The defendant’s right to be present and to speak when his sentence is imposed is constitutionally based. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356, reh’g denied, 398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.”); United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1496 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66, 71 (5th Cir.1975) (“The sentencing is, of course, a critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, at which he is constitutionally entitled to be present and represented by counsel.”) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967)); cf. United States v. Turner, 532 F.Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D.Cal.1982) (not even defendant can waive requirement of presence at sentencing).
[¶ 23] Absent the addition of the words “separate transactions,” which appeared in the written Judgment and Sentence but do not appear in the transcript of the oral sentence, Puthoff would have become eligible for parole almost two years earlier than he will under the illegally enhanced sentence. The addition of those critical two words, after a valid oral sentence was pronounced and outside the presence of the defendant, imper-missibly augmented his sentence.
[¶ 24] The majority is wrong when it states that the change in Puthoffs parole eligibility date “did not violate the prohibition against the written sentence increasing the severity of the oral sentence.” Supra ¶ 7. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 35-36, 101 S.Ct. 960, 968, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 27 (1981) (unanimously concluding that a law which postponed the date when an inmate would become eligible for early release by curtailing the availability of future gain-time credits made the punishment more onerous); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 891, 896, 137 L.Ed.2d 63, 73 (1997) (noting that the essential inquiry is whether the period of incarceration is lengthened). While both Weaver and Lynce involved the ex post facto clause, it is clear that pushing the date upon which an inmate becomes eligible for parole into the future constitutes enhanced punishment. “[T]he removal of [good time] provisions can constitute an increase in punishment, because a ‘prisoner’s eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant’s decision to plea bargain and the judge’s calculation of the sentence to be imposed.’ ” Lynce, 519 U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 898, 137 L.Ed.2d at 75 (quoting Weaver, supra); cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974):
Nebraska may have the authority to create, or not, a right to a shortened prison sentence through the accumulation of credits for good behavior ... [b]ut the State having created the right ..., the prisoner’s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.
See also In re Grosh, 415 N.W.2d 824 (S.D.1987). In that ease, the trial court’s modification of its initial oral sentence did not, on its face, increase the length of the sentence; however, this court held that the elimination of a work release provision over five months after sentencing was an “impermissible augmentation of sentence.” Id. at 828. Moreover, whether a sentence has been increased is not a matter of degree- — even “technical” increases warrant the vacating of written judgments which do not comply with the oral sentence. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 171 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir.1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 926, 69 S.Ct. 647, 93 L.Ed. 1088 (1949) (holding that district court was not empowered to increase sentence by amending judgment to include a fine of $1.00; not even the suspension of payment of the fine changed the fact that the sentence was illegally increased); Bartone, supra (enhancement of sentence by only one day constituted error).
*446[¶25] Accordingly, the words separate transactions” should be stricken from the written Judgment and Sentence so that the original sentence may be reinstated “as it existed on [the date of original sentencing], in all respects.” Grosh, 415 N.W.2d at 828. While the majority may have thought Sieler was an anomaly, it is clear the mistake was repeated in this case. The majority should admit the error and reinstate the oral sentence, not compound the error by affirming Puthoffs illegal sentence.
. Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is codified at SDCL 23A-39-1, and provides:
A defendant shall be present at his arraignment, at the time of his plea, at every stage of his trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as provided by §§ 23A-39-2 and 23A-39-3.
(Emphasis added). The exceptions provided in 23A-39-2 & -3 do not apply in this case.