(dissenting).
[¶ 47.] I respectfully dissent. To me this appeal presents three issues: (1) whether the doctrines of laches and estoppel are legally applicable in a case such as this and, if so (2) should they be applied to the facts of this case and, if not (3) did the trial court abuse its discretion in setting the arrearages at $14,000? As issues (1) and (2) have been extensively set forth by the majority and the dissent of Justice Konenkamp, my major concern is with issue (3).
[¶ 48.] SDCL 25-8-5 is the statute which authorizes a mother of a child born out of wedlock to recover “a reasonable share of the necessary support of a child....” While this is limited to six years, the statute is silent as to any other conditions. At common law this jurisdiction has long recognized the doctrines of laches and estoppel. Under SDCL 1-1-24, these doctrines remain in force unless “they conflict with the will of the sovereign power” as expressed in our statutes. Nowhere in the statute is there any definitive language that the six-year limitation is exclusive of all other defenses. In Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484 (S.D.1991), we recognized the doctrine of waiver is applicable to this type of case. The fact in Hershey the child was already 18 goes to the doctrine’s factual applicability only and not to whether it could be statutorily applied in the first place, for if statutorily forbidden the age of the child would be irrelevant. As such, together with the authority cited by the majority, I conclude the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches are applicable to SDCL 25-8-5.
[¶ 49.] The second question is whether this case factually supports the application of laches and estoppel. These doctrines are affirmative defenses per SDCL 15-6~8(c). As such, Loomis has the burden of proof to support their applicability to this case. Flynn v. Lockhart, 526 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 1995). The transcript of the hearing is a scant eleven pages. Both Teller and Loomis testified giving Loomis the opportunity to develop these claims. The sum total of Teller’s testimony is one page:
REFEREE: Okay, Ms. Watson, questions for Ms. Teller?
MS. WATSON: Sure. I’d like to tell her, did you ever notify Mr. Loomis that he had a daughter?
MS. TELLER: No I didn’t because I didn’t [sic] where he was at this time when I was pregnant.
*438MS. WATSON: Well, you were able to find him for this child support proceeding, correct?
MS. TELLER: No.
MS. WATSON: Did you ever try to find him at all?
MS. TELLER: Yes I did.
MS. WATSON: What did you do to try to find him?
MS. TELLER: I tried to find him on my own and I couldn’t, so I just left it. MS. WATSON: So, has he had any relationship at all with your daughter for the last 14 years?
MS. TELLER: No.
MS. WATSON: And your first notice to him would have been in December of last year?
MS. TELLER: In December? Right.
MS. WATSON: So did you ever contact child support enforcement or any law enforcement agency or anybody to try and contact Mr. Loomis?
MS. TELLER: No, I did not.
MS. WATSON: Why did you wait 14 years • to bring a paternity action?
MS. TELLER: I guess uh, Kristie wanted to know where her dad was at now and it [sic] about time, I guess, that they met.
MS. WATSON: Don’t you think it would have been time when she was young so maybe he could have had a relationship with her and she could have had a relationship with him?
MS. TELLER: Yes, I did. I do make mistakes, I guess.
MS. WATSON: And you intentionally prevented contact between father and daughter for 14 years?
MS. TELLER: Right.
Loomis testified as to his finances but is totally silent as to any claim that the acts of Teller interfered with his right to establish a father-daughter relationship with Kristie. While the subject does come up, it does so only from Loomis’ attorney as a “little history” and this clearly is not competent evidence. Attorneys cannot testify on behalf of them clients. Rumpza v. Donalar Enterprises, 1998 SD 79 ¶ 29-34, 581 N.W.2d 517, 524-25; Ward v. Lange, 1996 SD 113, ¶ 27, 553 N.W.2d 246, 253; Estes v. Millea, 464 N.W.2d 616, 619 n.4 (S.D. 1990). To me the evidence falls short of invoking laches or estoppel precluding any support going to the child by way of her mother. Instead, the hearing examiner and subsequently the circuit court took this evidence into consideration in making a partial reduction in the form of a deviation from the child support guidelines.
[¶ 50.] The final and perhaps the most difficult issue is to determine the appropriate amount of the back support. The hearing examiner and circuit court allowed a deviation in the form of a reduction from $21,-343.52 to $14,000. The hearing examiner noted that Teller could have easily notified Loomis during the first three years when they were both living in Gillette, Wyoming. Further, Loomis “in the interim established a family with two children, ages seven and twelve, and his financial circumstances and associated factors demonstrate to the referee that a substantial deviation from the strict support schedule is warranted under the circumstances.” Unfortunately, there is no rationale as how the $14,000 is determined. I agree with Justice Konenkamp that under SDCL 25-8-5, the child support guidelines are not mandatory as with current and future support. See SDCL 25-7-6.2. However, they are a helpful starting point.13
*439[¶ 51.] We have repeatedly held that a parent’s duty to support his or her children is paramount and all other financial obligations are secondary. Vcmder Woude v. Vander Woude, 501 N.W.2d 361, 863 (S.D. 1993) (citations omitted). Ordinarily, the child support obligation to the oldest daughter would take precedence over obligations resulting from remarriage. Kost v. Kost, 515 N.W.2d 209, 214 (S.D.1994). However, here it is conceded that Loomis married, fathered two children and supported his spouse and children totally unaware of the third child conceived with Teller. Loomis is fully agreeable to pay current and future child support for Kristie.
[¶ 52.] Loomis’ modest income is a net of $1,438.74 per month. Mother’s income is imputed minimum wage of $668.31 net per month. It would be in Kristie’s best interests to be awarded the full $14,000. Better yet for Kristie would be to award her mother the full $21,343.52. However, Kristie should not be enriched by taking bread out of the mouths of the other two children.
The ultimate conclusions of the majority and dissent concerning this issue strikingly illustrate the problem faced by the trial court in this case and routinely faced by the circuit courts of this state in matters of domestic relations and child support. There are simply too few dollars to meet even the most modest standard of living. Judges are not dispensers of manna from heaven. Far too often they are called upon to apportion poverty and its accompanying misery by degree based on the type of determinations that are required in support cases such as this.
State ex rel VKH v. SW, 442 N.W.2d 920, 925 (S.D.1989) (Gilbertson, Circuit Judge, concurring). See also Ochs v. Nelson, 538 N.W.2d 527, 531 (S.D.1995). The facts of this case are a far cry from the very substantial financial resources in Evans v. Evans, 1997 SD 16, 559 N.W.2d 240; Billion v. Billion, 1996 SD 101, 553 N.W.2d 226, and Ochs, 538 N.W.2d 527, which focused the issue of the entitlement to child support and did not require a corresponding question of how much hardship or financial damage such contributions would inflict on the other members of the family involved.
[¶ 53.] Based on the unique circumstances of this case, I would treat the three children equally as all were alive during the appropriate six-year period. As such Í would award Kristie one-third of the original arrearages of $21,343.52, that being $7,114.50. If we are to be required to apportion poverty and its accompanying misery, then at least it should be apportioned evenly. I would also allow Loomis to make reasonable installments on this obligation and if he remains current, then no levy, garnishment or other collection procedure should be authorized that might work an undue hardship on his current family.
[¶ 54.] For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. Loomis argues that a referee is limited in its authority to a deviation under the child support guidelines (SDCL 25-7-6.10) and has no equitable powers. Under SDCL 25-7A-6, ”[t]he referee shall make a report to the court, recommending the amount of the debt due to the state, if any, and the monthly support obligation of the parent and the arrearage debt due to the obli-gee. ...” Under SDCL 25-7-6.10(2), a deviation from the guidelines is allowed for ”[a]ny financial condition of either parent which would make application of the schedule inequitable.” As such, the emotional trauma caused by the inability to establish a relationship with a previously unknown 14-year-old daughter is not a basis for a deviation. Further, SDCL 25-7-6.2 limits the guidelines, and thus any deviations therefrom, to present and future support obligations. Thus, it would appear to fall upon the circuit court, rather than the hearing examiner, to determine whether the invocation of equitable defenses such as laches and estoppel are appropriate in a given case.