(dissenting).
[¶ 34.] The dispositive principle of law in this case is the majority rule that an action for trespass to real property must be brought where the real property is situated. Because a claim for punitive damages is not a separate or independent cause of action, the dependent, ancillary punitive damage claim must also be tried where the real property is situated. Therefore, the trial court erred and we should reverse and remand.
[1135.] “Trespass to realty, being a local action must be brought in the county where the land lies[.]” 87 CJS Trespass § 64, at 1012 (1954); see also 75 AmJur2d Trespass § 204, at 156 (1991):
Actions to recover damages for trespasses to the person or to personal property are transitory in character and may be brought against the offender wherever he may be found. However, actions to recover damages for injuries to real property are local, and not transitory, and therefore they must be brought in the forum where the land is situated.
(Emphasis added). A “local action” is
[o]ne wherein all principal facts on which it is founded are of a local nature; as where possession of land is to be recovered, or damages for an actual trespass, or for waste affecting land, because in such case the cause of action relates to some particular locality, which usually also constitutes the venue of the action.
Black’s Law Dictionary 938 (6th ed.1990).
[¶ 36.] In French v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 407 F.Supp. 13, 15-16 (D. Del.1976), the court discussed the difference between local and transitory actions and explained the rationale for requiring local actions to be brought where the real property is situated:
The rule exists for salutory reasons. It prevents courts unfamiliar with local property rights and laws from interfering with the title to real property. Moreover, since such actions often involve the testimony of local witnesses concerning the cause of action and the historical usages of the property, the restricted venue makes it more likely that the action will be tried in a convenient forum with full disclosure of all relevant facts, and notice to all interested parties.
This Court will not engage in an exhaustive survey of all the cases dealing with the “local” “transitory” problem. It is sufficient to point out that generally those cases which have been found to be local involved either title to property; injunctive relief to stop the injury to property; or an action for trespass ... or waste.
(Collecting cases at nn. 6-8); see also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669, 13 S.Ct. 224, 228, 36 L.Ed. 1123, 1128 (1892) (“Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local. And so as to the rights of real property, the subject being fixed and immovable.”).
[¶ 37.] Perhaps this is such a basic principle of the common law of trespass that this court has never before felt compelled to state it. However, in cases where we analyzed whether we had jurisdiction in actions for trespass to real property in Indian country, we based our decision on where the land was situated, giving no regard for where the defendant resided. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Diamond A Cattle Co., 63 S.D. 481, 484, 260 N.W. 836, 838 (1935) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction in action for trespass to Indian country and stating, “Certainly the case presents a controversy with reference to the right of possession of Indian lands in the Indian country.”); Peano v. Brennan, 20 S.D. 342, 349, 106 N.W. 409, 412 (1906) (declining to assume subject matter jurisdiction over reservation land and noting that trespass to land outside the reservation would be under state court jurisdiction).
[¶38.] It makes no sense whatsoever for the majority opinion to require the punitive damage claim to be tried in tribal court when the trespass claim must be tried where the trespass occurred. Obviously, the tribal *882court has no jurisdiction over the trespass claim. The majority opinion cites no authority for the creation of such a multiplicity of suits. Therefore, I would hold that the punitive damage claim must be tried in the same court in the same county where the land is situated because it is not a “cause of action” — it is merely a dependent, ancillary claim to the trespass cause of action.
[¶ 39.] The majority opinion violates three principles of law: First, the principle of the “majority rule,” as stated above; second, the principle of law against multiplicity of actions; and, third, the spirit of the principle of law against splitting causes of action because here they are mandating a split, not of causes of action, but of one cause of action and one dependent, ancillary claim, which does not even qualify as a cause of action. See Sodak Distributing Company v. Wayne, 77 S.D. 496, 499, 93 N.W.2d 791, 793 (1958) (stating that “[i]t is likewise conceded that the rule in this state does not permit a single cause of action to be split or divided among several suits.”) (citations omitted). See generally Wintersteen v. Benning, 513 N.W.2d 920, 922 (S.D.1994) (Sabers, J., dissenting) (stating “[i]t is generally recognized that the rule against splitting a cause of action is primarily for the benefit of the defendant....”); Bowen v. American Family Ins. Group, 504 N.W.2d 604, 605 (S.D.1993) (stating “we have long recognized that a subrogated interest may not be split from an insured’s cause of action against a tortfea-sor.”); Joseph E. Edwards, Annotation, Waiver of, by Failing to Promptly Raise, Objection to Splitting Cause of Action, 40 A.L.R.3d 108, 111 (1971) (stating that “[t]he rule precluding splitting of a cause of action is founded upon the principle that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits.”).
[¶ 40.] Notwithstanding the above, if the claimant here is successful on his trespass and punitive damage claims, he may have to go to tribal court to levy and execute on any judgment in excess of the bond.
[¶ 41.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in rejecting jurisdiction on the punitive damage claim and we should reverse and remand.